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THE

# CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

## No. CCXLVI.

## NOVEMBER, 1864.

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## VOLUME LXXVII.

## FIFTH SERIES, VOLUME XV.

JULY, SEPTEMBER, NOVEMBER, 1864.

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# CONTENTS.

## No. CCXLIV.


| Art. | | Page |
|---|---|---|
| I. | Character and Historical Position of Theodore Parker | 1 |
| II. | The New King of Greece | 41 |
| III. | Robert Browning | 51 |
| IV. | Marsh's "Man and Nature" | 65 |
| V. | Robert Lowell | 73 |
| VI. | Renan's Critical Essays | 83 |
| VII. | Edward Livingston | 98 |
| VIII. | A Word on the War | 109 |
| IX. | Review of Current Literature | 116 |

*Theology.* Dewey's Lowell Lectures, 116. — *History.* Rawlinson's Five Monarchies, 119. Merivale's Romans, Vols. III., IV., 120. Kingsley's Roman and Teuton, 121. Riehl's Culturstudien, 122. — *Political Economy.* Moran on Money, 125. — *Geography and Travels.* Tuckerman's America and her Commentators, 127. Count Marcellus's Ancient and Modern Greeks, 130. Kirwan's Modern France, 132. European Mosaic, 134. Burton's Abeokuta, 134. Eastwick's Persia, 135. Savage Africa, by Winwood Reade, 135. — *Miscellaneous.* Immen-See, 136. Trollope's Small House at Allington, 138. Jarves's Art Idea, 139. Gervinus's Shakespeare Commentaries, 140. Jane Cameron, 141. Stumbling-Blocks, 141. Thoreau's Maine Woods, 142.

New Publications Received . . . . . 143


## No. CCXLV.


| Art. | | Page |
|---|---|---|
| I. | Antisupernaturalism in the Pulpit | 145 |
| II. | Carolina Coronado | 160 |
| III. | American Art and Artists | 175 |
| IV. | The Bible and Slavery | 191 |
| V. | The Religious Lesson of Religious Controversy | 201 |
| VI. | The Two Carlyles, or Carlyle Past and Present | 206 |
| VII. | The Brothers Grimm | 232 |

VIII. American Expositions of Neutrality . . . . . 239

IX. Review of Current Literature . . . . . 251

*Theology.* Hopkins's Spots on the Sun, 251. Sawyer's Gospel according to Mark, 252. Clarke's Sermons, 254. — *Essays, &c.* Victor Hugo on Shakespeare, 256. — *History and Geography.* Sabine's American Loyalists, 259. Eastern Shores of the Adriatic, 260. Fortescue's Russian Poland, 261. Hopkins's Hawaii, 262.

New Publications Received . . . . . 263

---

## No. CCXLVI.

Art. Page

I. Doctrine and Theory of Inspiration . . . . . 265

II. Notes on Hospitals . . . . . 286

III. Praed's Poems . . . . . 292

IV. Miss Beecher's Pelagianism . . . . . 301

V. Frothingham's Key to the Philosophies . . . . . 314

VI. The Antiquity of Man . . . . . 339

VII. The Presidential Election . . . . . 351

VIII. Review of Current Literature . . . . . 366

*Theology.* Hibbard's Religion of Childhood, 366. Lutteroth on Matthew, 368. — *Philosophy and Science.* Brittan's Man and his Relations, 369. Mill's Dissertations and Discussions, 370. Dwight's Modern Philology, 372. — *Geography and Travels.* Mouhot's Asiatic Travels, 373. Exodus of the Circassians, 374. Lowell's Fireside Travels, 376. — *Poetry and Fiction.* Tennyson's Enoch Arden, &c., and Browning's Dramatis Personæ, 377. Miss Prescott's Azarian, 379. Emily Chester, 379. — *Miscellaneous.* Essays on Social Subjects, 381. Thackeray, the Humourist, 381. Disraeli's Amenities of Literature, 381. Children of Lutetia, 382. Maori King, 384. London to John O'Groat's, 385. Eugénie de Guérin, 386. Wilson's Antislavery Measures in Congress, 386. Spencer's Classification of the Sciences, 388. Webster's Dictionary, 388.

New Publications Received . . . . . 389

---

INDEX . . . . . 391

THE

# CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

NOVEMBER, 1864.

## Art. I. — DOCTRINE AND THEORY OF INSPIRATION.

The course of criticism in the last fifty years has done the signal service to theology of removing the question of Inspiration from the field of dogmatics to that of literature and science. In undertaking a fresh discussion of it at the present time, we may hold ourselves excused from regarding it as a doctrine to be either defended or attacked. We are justified in regarding it only as an opinion held under certain historical conditions which are now passed away, — an opinion to be illustrated, accounted for, judged, among the creeds and traditions of the past, but having little other interest or value now to thinking men.

I. We will take for our point of departure the rigid and strict doctrine on the subject familiar to our elder students of theology, — that which we occasionally hear urged among the unlettered, as an antidote to a prevailing scepticism, — that which is sometimes patronized by literary journalists, as a respectable opinion, not to be molested by neutrals in the theological debate, — that which declares (in the language of a recent advocate) that "every verse of the Bible, every word of it, every syllable of it, every letter of it, is the direct utterance of the Most High." If we were arguing seriously against the opinion, as actually held and cherished by Christian believers, it would be right to give it the benefit of some of those numerous modifications, or compromises, by which it gradually dwindles to a vague suggestion that the "spiritual" portions of the Bible have, as such, a character and authority of their own, inde-

pendent of their subject-matter, and differing in kind from that belonging to any other writing. But these are, evidently, mere modifications and compromises. They point plainly to a doctrine too far outgrown by the world's common-sense to be any longer tenable in its literal import. They are the *débris* of a previously existing creed, not an original formation. And it is necessary, for purposes of criticism, to take for our starting-place the positive, explicit, uncompromising statement of the doctrine already quoted.

In examining now into the conditions under which an opinion so strange to all modern habits of thought could have arisen, it is necessary, next, to look from our modern point of view at the material offered us under the above-named category of "plenary inspiration," — namely, the writings of the Old and New Testaments. And since unquestionably the Christian belief in that doctrine is derived directly from the Jewish, let us consider first the Old Testament by itself.

Now if there is anything which may be asserted with absolute confidence under the light of modern knowledge, it surely is, that the writings of the Old Testament are the relics which have escaped the wrecks of time of *the entire literature of a people during its existence as a nation.* Not only the general aspect of the writings suggests this view, but it is borne out in every detail by a more careful examination of them. While criticism is at fault to assign to many of them a precise date and authorship, and while the old positive assertion on the subject stands in rather advantageous contrast to the present looseness and uncertainty of opinion, the *circumstances* of their composition and their literary character have been brought into very clear light. No competent critic, for example, would argue from Ewald's rather arbitrary assignment of the Pentateuch to six or seven precisely defined sources, either in favor of the old opinion, or against his general conception. To the critical reader it is perfectly clear that there is a great diversity of sources and a wide difference in age in the different parts of what appear on the surface to be single compositions. Here a family register or tradition, there a scrap of old annals or legal code, again a song, a ballad, a patriotic ode, — and these again no way distinguished in the form of composition, ar-

ranged with nothing of what we should call literary skill, but patched together miscellaneously, vivid but inartistic, a precious and genuine memorial in substance, but in form answering to none of what we are wont to consider the tests of unity, integrity, or skill in literary handiwork.

I speak, of course, especially of the historical books; but what has been said will apply literally to much of the prophetic writings, while the same inartificial and rude style of composition is outgrown in only a very few books, such as Job and Ecclesiastes, which we are justified in bringing down to a comparatively late period. The fact which stands before us, and which I wish to make clear at starting, is, that *during the creative period of the Hebrew literature* there are no symptoms whatever of that set, artificial, and "sacred" character which later periods ascribed to the same writings. On the contrary, besides the qualities already spoken of, there is evidently a very free handling of the material. We find no apparent system of selection, very little of strict and careful form. Looked at as literature, we have, instead of a set and orderly composition, a loose conglomerate of writings, infinitely curious and valuable as specimens of those early formations of life and thought, — far more precious to us, no doubt, than a more systematic structure would have been, — but with no one quality that could possibly suggest a common origin, much less a celestial source.

Such, in brief, are the characteristics of the *creative* period of the Hebrew canonical writings, so far as they bear on our present argument. It seems very evident that the supernatural character ascribed to these writings is a thing of quite other circumstances, and of far later date. We need not enter here into the discussion of those questions of the character of the Israelitish worship, and the date of the Levitical code, which are perhaps the most important in a purely historical view. The period we have to deal with is when all the differences, so obvious now to a critical eye, were merged in a fond, uncritical reverence, a sacred and grateful memory, that knew no more of the controversy of prophet and priest, of Jehovah and Elohim, that saw the life of Israel single and unique, relieved on the dim background of the past. There is a Jewish

tradition which, in a very characteristic way, introduces us to this later phase of the Hebrew mind. It tells that, in the conquest by Nebuchadnezzar and in the captivity of Babylon, all the sacred things were destroyed, and every record burnt, — the sacred history, song, prophecy, all that inspired canon of venerable writings, had perished utterly ; but Ezra the scribe, in the return to Palestine, was specially *inspired to remember* every word as formerly written in the sacred books, so that he dictated a copy in all points identical with that which had been destroyed. Translated into modern phraseology, the task of Ezra was unquestionably the task of editorship. He was the compiler, arranger, *rédacteur*, of the relics which had floated safe from the general wreck. Fragments they were, no doubt, from a vastly greater bulk, — fragments which no skill of editing could piece together so that the loose joints and the diversity of material should be disguised. Neither does any token appear that this was even attempted. It is rather as if, with a pious and reverent care, everything had been pieced together that could be gathered up ; each portion keeps the mark, color, flavor, that belonged to it in its original form ; and often, as in despair of any harmonious adjustment, the fragments are simply cast in, side by side, without pretence of date or sequence, to make the editor's task complete.*

The characteristic thing about the collection of Hebrew writings at this stage is, that, as a collection of fragments, it is final and complete. The very language in which they are written has ceased, as a living tongue, to be spoken among men. *Nothing can be hereafter added, nothing must be taken away.* In this phrase we have already the formal definition of a canon. A collection thus made, never to be altered or diminished, at once, by a law of human thought, begins to be invested with an imaginary symmetry and an ideal perfection. Consider how it is in other examples still more familiar, — the Homeric poems, the cycle of Greek tragedy, the body of classical literature as a whole, — and the sentiment not only of the ancient Greeks, but of modern scholars, that has gathered about these secular canons of antiquity. Or, for a

* As, for example, in the tragic episodes which close the Book of Judges, and in the duplicate character of the narrative in the First Book of Samuel.

singular and very modern instance, consider the phase of constitution-worship prevalent among our own people, — that blind reverence to a document of very recent origin, — not merely the good sense that accepts it as a working polity, but the habit of idealizing it as self-evident perfection, purely, it would seem, from the difficulty of mending it, so that, practically, it can neither be altered nor diminished. Now, among the Jewish colonists after the captivity, this idealizing sentiment had full sway, and spent all its force upon a single object, namely, the closed canon of the Hebrew writings. These writings contained the only record of that national life which those poor pilgrims looked back upon with a fond, an intense, a despairing pride. Here were the sacred odes their fathers had sung. Here were the tales of the camp-fire and the traditions of the hearth. Here were the deeds of famous kings and the words of glorious prophets. Here were the family registers that linked the miseries of the present with the grandeur and mystery of the past. Here, above all, was the Law, the venerable code which made at once the central bond and the glorified ideal of the Hebrew state. Every sentiment — of religion, of veneration for the past, of patriotic pride — combined to stamp that sacred and awful character upon the record which was the one treasure rescued from the perished nation. Intense to a degree which we can feebly conceive, that sentiment must have been: so intense that it found no difficulty in accepting the most extravagant theories as to the origin and perfection of that record; no difficulty in its contradictions, obscurities, and frequent inhumanities; no difficulty in ascribing to it such sanctity, that its very accidents of penmanship became typical of religious mysteries, and till heaven and earth should pass, not one jot or tittle, not a blunder in the text, or misspelt word, or misshapen letter,* should pass from the sacred scroll.

It is, perhaps, one symptom of the intellectual lassitude and

* The standard editions of the Hebrew Bible, it is well known, preserve many of those curious accidents of penmanship. Thus, "the letter *Nun* is twice reversed, signifying once the turning of Jehovah to his people and once their turning back from him"; and "it is an argument for the stability of Scripture that a diminished *Heth* has not vanished entirely."

despair that come upon a people in its decline, that sacred writings, thus fondly idealized and made the type of all perfection, come inevitably to be ascribed to a superhuman source. The national genius, in its decrepitude, cannot even conceive the imagination of a mind to create or a voice to give utterance to them, — sees in itself no likeness or suggestion of such a power; as the dwellers near Baalbec gaze with fear and amazement at the mighty ruin, and think that those vast stones were placed there by genii and not by men. It is characteristic of a people in that condition, that the achievement of the past, the work of its own ancestors, serves no longer to stimulate and instruct, but to oppress and overawe. We have seen, and still see, enough of this mental timidity, even in a population so bold, adventurous, and irreverent as our own, not to be surprised at the shapes it takes in the more slavish and imaginative East, and among a people whose only monument of the past is the group of sacred writings gathered about the shrine of their ancestral faith. And we are well justified in ascribing to that sentiment no small share in forming those previous conditions, under which the doctrine we have before stated became not only possible, but inevitable. In other words, the tendency to canon-worship marks the fact of transition from the creative period of the national genius to degeneracy, poverty, and decline.

In addition to this is a circumstance to which I have just alluded; namely, that the birthplace and peculiar home of this superstition is in the slavish and imaginative East. The canon-worship of the Jews is only one instance of a fact which we find wherever, east of the Mediterranean, sacred writings have been preserved and cherished (as they seem always to have been) in an obsolete and forgotten tongue. "The orthodox Hindoo regards the Vedas with the most intense reverence, as the inspired word of God, as existing from eternity, and as the foundation of everything in religion, philosophy, art, science, and literature." The Vêndidad "is cast chiefly in the form of colloquies between the supreme divinity and his servant or prophet Zarathustra (Zoroaster), in which the former makes known to the latter his will respecting his creation." "The Koran is, according to the Moslem creed,

coeval with God, uncreated, eternal. Its first transcript was written from the beginning in rays of light upon a gigantic tablet resting by the throne of the Almighty; and upon this tablet are also found the divine decrees relating to things past and future." In the Jewish Sanhedrim "it was a question whether the Law itself or the tradition were the holier; 'The words of the Law are weighty and light, but the words of the Scribes are all weighty,' was a saying among the Jews, — one which must have been vehemently contested until the dispute was compromised by affirming that both, if not absolutely eternal, at least existed in Paradise before the world was." * I do not hold myself bound to trace the subtile association of ideas, or the mental habits of the race, or all the steps of development that led to such a belief. It is enough for my purpose to show, that in dealing with it we are dealing with a fact not particular and exceptional, but wide-spread and general. We are met, if not by a law of the human mind universally, at least by a characteristic which prevails in all the Oriental races whose religious writings we know. Whether superstition, imagination, dogma, or tradition, the fact of such an opinion is a general fact of their religious condition; while the writings to which the opinion clings are, in each instance, writings whose contents, character, and date are ascertained, as nearly as may be, by the ordinary critical and historical proofs.

The evidence already quoted respecting the Hebrew Scriptures brings us down to the time of the Gospel, the forming period of the Christian canonical writings. At the boundary which separates the Jewish from the Christian sacred books, we find an opinion fully developed, and doubtless shared in by the earliest disciples, which ascribed the former in the strictest sense to direct inspiration from celestial sources. The traces of this belief in the New Testament are not very numerous or important; perhaps the most curious illustrations of it are the attempts at allegorizing, — that last effort of an ancient reverence that clings to the letter which a new spirit has outgrown, and substitutes a "spiritual sense" for the native

* These citations are taken from the most familiar and accessible authorities. The general fact is, of course, well known to students of these matters.

meaning, — such as we find, for example, in Galatians and Hebrews. In general, there is but little in the New Testament writings to illustrate, directly, either the Jewish belief of the day, or the transition to the doctrine which afterwards became so prominent in almost all schemes of Christian theology.

Traces we do find, however, of the early stages of that process. It must be borne in mind, that, in treating of the New Testament writings, we are dealing with the creative period of Christian thought, not the period of crystallization and technicality. There is no consciousness in any of those writings that they belong to a peculiar, a "sacred" category. Waiving for the present the polemic sense which modern critics have discovered in them, we seem to find them dealing very directly and simply with the actual condition of things in the early Church. Here is the primitive tradition, or narrative, as gathered from the lips of eyewitnesses and by-standers, of the ministry which was the fountain-head of the faith. Here are the few and fragmentary hints of the missionary career of its first converts and messengers. Here, above all, as illustrations of the feeling and thought of the time, are the letters of counsel, comfort, controversy, exposition, appeal, spreading over the critical space of a dozen or twenty years, during which the faith was getting knit, cleared, and fixed.

If we look to these for hints of that remarkable transition of opinion towards a stage of belief which saw in these very writings a new canon of celestial origin, and of sanctity like that attributed to the old, we shall find them, first, in the assertion of a certain authority, official and apostolic, which entitles the writer to rebuke, exhort, argue, — by no means in a way to overrule the freedom of private thought, indeed, but so as to impress his own mind with great vigor and firmness on the common conscience and belief.

We shall find them, secondly, in the recognition of a Divine Spirit actually present, living and working in the soul of the believer, and to be known by certain indubitable signs. The noble assertion of this doctrine — perhaps more characteristic than any other of the early faith — in the eighth chapter of Romans, the evidences and tests of it set forth in detail in

First Corinthians, the personal and moral characteristics of it as enforced to the Galatians, make perhaps the most important testimony we have as to the very highest order of spiritual sentiments and ideas prevailing in the early Church. And we cannot doubt that writings such as these were speedily received, cherished, held in reverence, as only second in dignity to the canon of the earlier faith.

Far more near, indeed, to the conscience and heart of the believer they must have been than the ancient record, which gradually lapsed into comparative indifference and neglect.* The effort at allegorizing itself seems to show an uneasy consciousness of the distance already forming and widening between the old dispensation and the new. If the old was to be received at all, it had to be in a sense utterly foreign from that it naturally bore; and the Old Testament must be restamped in "types" taken from the modern font. The instinct, the half-unconscious drift of the Christian community, brought it into a position towards the ancient writings not quite in harmony with the creed which was still implicitly retained. The *real* "sacred writings" of the Christians — those which inspired their faith, directed their conscience, and comforted their souls — were getting to be writings that lay outside the canon they had been taught to hold in exclusive reverence. Here was a definite scruple to be met and overcome. It is met, as I understand the matter, in the argument of the famous passage (2 Timothy iii. 16), that "all Scripture divinely inspired," — that is, answering to the tests of true spiritual quality, — though not contained in the limits of any canon, or vouched by any particular creed, is yet "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." And these words, so far from being the assertion of a formal dogma, seem to be rather in the nature of a permission or vindication of the new order of *uncanonical* religious writing, which by necessity of the case was coming so fast to take the first place to the conscience and devout feeling of the Church.

* The arguments of Origen and others against the Gnostic hostility to the Old Testament were undoubtedly a protest against a very wide-spread tendency in the early Church.

Again a season of change and revolution, which annihilates for us almost all records of the primitive Christian tradition. Again an interval, almost void and without monument, separating the first generation of believers from the third. And now we are at a time when life is getting fast crystallized into formula, and thought into creed. The first Christian writings, Gospel or Epistle, hold now their place of unchallenged reverence in the heart of the Christian community. The relics which remain of that first age, of miracle, of fervor, of first-hand testimony, of reverent personal memory of the risen Christ, form a group of sacred writings by itself, and unique. From that group nothing may be diminished, to it nothing can be added. Some wavering of boundaries there may have been, some portions of more or less doubtful genuineness; but such questions as these get settled practically, as such questions will; and again we have the phenomenon of a group of writings with the formal characteristics of a canon, — unique, single, and complete.

And it is not long before we find the old instinct of idealizing busy about this comparatively recent record. The Gospels, the pillars of the faith, must be neither more nor less than four, because there are four elements, four winds, four corners of the earth; the type of them is discerned in the four faces of the cherubic vision; the mysteries of the new belief are discovered to have a thousand parallels and symbols in the records of the old. It is not long before we find the Alexandrian spiritualists busy in commenting on the phrases of this new Scripture, assuming sanctities and mysteries in the words themselves; and the old canonical formula of "the Law and the Prophets" is altered in the Christian formula to include "the Gospels and Apostolic writings." So that, apparently without forethought, without concert, without any positive edict of authority, the Church found itself in possession of its sacred writings, to which the form, the sentiment, and the idea of canonicity had already become attached. That the form, so idealized, was projected on an infinite background, and referred to a transcendental and superhuman source, seems to have been due in part to old traditions and habits of belief, confirmed by the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, and, later, by the

Realistic philosophy of the Catholic Church. And the transition from sentiment to creed was short and simple.

It is no part of my present purpose to trace the forms and phases in which the theory of inspiration has been held at different periods, or to meet the arguments by which it has been maintained. I start with the assumption that it represents an opinion which the progress of human thought has effectively outgrown, and which modern criticism has put quite beyond the pale of rational belief. Whatever benefit may have resulted from it once has long since ceased to exist; whatever mischief has resulted from continuing to profess it is fast diminishing. And we are well entitled to deal with it as has now been done, — that is, to look on it dispassionately as one fact in the history of human opinion, and to trace, as far as we may, the sentiments which gave birth to it, and the circumstances which rendered it a credible, a possible, a dear and helpful belief, in the period of its origin. It is but a sketch and a hint that has now been given; yet we are confident that the fullest exposition would but fix and confirm the outline above traced.

II. But our task in dealing with an opinion so marked, so wide-spread, so sacredly cherished, so profoundly influential in the history of human thought, is only half done when we have considered, critically, the circumstances of its origin. It is a warped and shallow judgment which sees in it only one of a thousand shapes of aimless and baseless error; which refuses to see that it answers not only to something constant in the structure of the human mind, but to something real in the universe of things. Without attempting in detail an exposition of the positive truth contained in the theory of Inspiration, I will simply indicate one or two points in the direction which such an exposition should follow.

In the first place, the general *fact* of Inspiration should be clearly seen and firmly grasped as a truth of intellectual science. And, to be unembarrassed by theological creeds or prejudices, the general fact should be stated in the broadest and simplest way. A phrase as unexceptionable as any appears to me to be, that *Truth is communicated to the mind from sources beyond the conscious, active intelligence.* In

other words, man not only works up to truth, but in some cases — and those perhaps the most essential and fundamental of all — truth comes down to him. Of the fact itself we have no question. The only difficulty is, to state it in such a way that it shall be seen and recognized as a genuine fact in experience. It may help us in our realizing of it, if we remember how the universe is made up of facts which show present, active, and (as it were) conscious thought controlling the phenomena. According to the fine formula of Dr. Hedge's Dudleian Lecture, these facts are best stated in the phrase, INTELLIGENCE CO-ORDINATE WITH EXISTENCE. Mind and matter are the warp and woof of things. The mathematical accuracy in selection and the mechanical nicety in adjustment which make what we call the "law" of crystalline structure, are simply a series of facts prearranged and controlled by the forming Mind. Where are the invisible fingers feeling in the darkness? where is the groping instinct among the "atoms," that will not be content with anything else than absolute obedience to that law? Where the method and intent of the process are still clearer, as in the growth, the symmetrical flowering, the nicely-timed fructification of a plant, it is the same thing on another plane. No one will affect to say either that there is no controlling, and (as it were) consciously contrived and intended plan, or that that plan resides in the symbolic C, H, N, O, with whatever affinities those symbols or elements are supposed to be endowed. Nor will any atheistic fatuity or "positivist" reticence deny the simple fact, that the instincts of animals, to say nothing of the adaptations of their structure, do show a mind, a directing intelligence, a conscious direction and forethought existing somewhere, which it would be wildly and ludicrously absurd to ascribe to anything in the rudimentary mental structure of the animal tribes themselves, or to the laws of their organization as such. I say nothing here of the attributes of the Deity as shown in the works of creation. I would even keep clear from all the tangle of prejudice and misunderstanding that has gathered about the "argument from design." What I wish to show and all I wish to show is, that, in speaking of a superior, a directing, an informing Intelligence, we are committing ourselves to no

doubtful theory whatever, but are using the simplest and plainest language we can find to tell the most familiar fact.

The second step in the direction of a true theory of Inspiration appears to be this: the fact that *all these leadings of a higher Intelligence are seen to be in harmony with the truth of things;* nay, that they constantly involve harmonies remote, occult, unsuspected, which are soon to be made more and more clear with the advance of scientific discovery. The operations of the controlling Mind have never in a single instance been shown to be mistaken or deceptive. The adaptation is just as perfect where it involves spheres of being apparently quite distinct, — as the animal instincts in migration, or in the choice of food, — as in the simpler cases of vegetable growth corresponding to soil and climate, and the narrow play of affinities in the structure of a gem. In other words, the Intelligence which forms, guides, and controls — whatever else we may think of the nature of it — does, in fact, compel each grade of being to conform itself, as if by clear intelligence, to conditions wholly outside its own range; while in every instance the course of action so compelled upon it is found to correspond, in entire harmony, with laws and facts only made known by patient search in other quarters. This second step, or what we may call *veracity of nature*, answers to the practical value of any theory of Inspiration, namely, our reliance on it for the knowledge of objective truth. And, as we have seen, it has nothing to do with any doubtful theory to account for the fact, but is simply our plainest statement of the fact itself.

When we come to apply these principles to the case of human knowledge and thought, we find ourselves embarrassed by the fact, that in man the conscious intellect has so wide a range that it is apt to seem commensurate with the whole field of our knowledge, belief, and mental power; so that the current philosophy draws a sharp distinction in kind between the human and brute intelligence, and holds that the one is as utterly devoid of instinct (or unconscious reason) as the other is of reason or developed consciousness. Without troubling ourselves to enter into that discussion now, it is enough to say that the agency of the universal Mind, the con-

trolling Intelligence, the "Over-soul," the Logos, or Divine Reason, whose conscious sphere is outside the limits of human thought, is quite as plainly to be seen in man as in inferior creatures. As soon as we turn from the limited field of psychology to what we may call the natural history of the human mind, that is, to the facts on a scale broad enough to see their mutual relations and controlling laws, we recognize as clearly the dominion of a higher Intelligence, as in the instincts of animals. Perhaps the most striking evidence of it, to an ordinary mind, is in those laws of history which are beginning to be acknowledged by all classes of thinkers: the life of nations, and the genesis of historical periods following some law or plan, which can be stated in intelligible terms, which must have existed ideally somewhere before the beginnings of human history, and which is so far beyond the scope or fathom of man's thought or will that we cannot even conceive of it as a possible attribute of the human mind, any more than the laws of planetary motion.

But an illustration that comes still nearer to our present topic is found in the laws and faculty of human speech. Nothing at first glance might seem more arbitrary, more strictly within the boundaries of conscious thought. Nothing, on deeper study, is seen to be more strictly ordered by conditions utterly beyond the scope of reason or will, — conditions which intelligently and purposely and essentially fit language for its uses as a vehicle of intercourse among intelligent creatures. Renan,* in maintaining the "spontaneous" origin of human speech, in all its curious complexity, reminds us that, in what comes under the category of spontaneous, there is no such thing as hard or easy; in other words, language in its ultimate laws is the expression of (to us) infinite intelligence, just as much as life is the expression of infinite power. Indeed, no intelligible account can be given of any one of the laws of human thought which does not imply a larger sphere of conscious Intelligence quite outside the range of our consciousness, — a controlling Mind, co-working in all the phenomena of our thought.

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* *De l'Origine du Langage.*

Possibly the same thing is shown even more clearly in the case of exceptional minds, — what we call genius in any of its modes. The most striking to the imagination are, perhaps, the instances of mathematical genius, — that clear intuition of an order of facts and relations so remote and complex, that often they cannot be intelligibly stated to persons not gifted with some corresponding faculty, while they can be shown to be the regulating facts and relations which control various orders of visible and palpable phenomena. Whence comes that power of intuition? The mind conscious of it is apt to speak of it reverently as a "gift." What is the Mind that gives it? Or shall we take the materialist assumption, and say that it is simply the result of an organization very fine and perfect in this particular way? And what does this assertion mean, once challenged and analyzed, but that the universe is full of Absolute Intelligence, which manifests itself wherever there is a way for it, — which can be *turned on*, as it were, like gas or water, by any channel fitted to conduct it, — an Intelligence of which instinct, reason, genius, are but the spontaneous or accidental exhibitions?

It will be borne in mind that I am not here attempting to demonstrate any theory, but simply to state, in the plainest way, a class of facts which, once seen, no one will fail to recognize, but which it has been the tendency of recent speculation to overlook, at least in the relation I have now sought to trace in them. These facts justify us in taking for granted the reality of Inspiration — that is, the communication of truth to the human mind from sources beyond the range of consciousness — as one of the fundamental laws of human thought. And the proper business of theology or philosophy appears to be, not to prove the reality of the fact, but to trace the conditions which define its operation and determine its value.

The first obvious condition or limitation is that which is found in the bodily or mental organization of the individual. The capacity of the human mind, as to particular orders of truth, seems to be as strictly limited as the capacity of a hollow vessel for its contents, or of a musical instrument for harmony. The limit of capacity may be harder to find, but it

seems to be as definitely fixed. The experience of most students in mathematics teaches them that there is a barrier which they may indefinitely approach, but which they will probably never be able to reach or pass, by any amount of faithful labor. In poetic or artistic power the line of excellence is, if possible, still more sharply drawn, which condemns minds of a certain quality, no matter what their devoted toil, to remain forever in a subordinate rank. And no reason exists for doubting that the same limitation exists as to men's capacity for spiritual truth; or that this limitation, whether residing in brain or nerve, or in some still more occult and delicate part of our structure, makes one of the conditions of what is properly called inspiration. I do not deny — nay, would rather insist upon — the absolute freedom of the Divine Intelligence, in selecting the receivers and agents of his truth. Yet it appears to be like the freedom of the artificer who selects the tool because of its fitness, or of the commander who knows already which officer or man should be assigned to the special service. That the inspiration of Isaiah took the color and shape of his stern, obstinate, and somewhat sombre patriotism, — that the revelation of the Gospel itself accords as precisely with the spiritual conditions of its epoch as the ripe fruit to the season, growth, and nature of the tree, — tells neither for nor against the supernatural source of the celestial light. It merely shows that, whatever the method of Divine operation, it observes those conditions, without which, indeed, we have no reason to think of it as even possible. At least, there is no example of a disregard of them in any other sphere of the Divine power known to us.

Now we find that, by virtue of something in their bodily or mental structure, some men are in relations with nature, putting them within reach of ranges of positive and objective truth, to which the ordinary mind has no access whatever. We have already considered the gift, perhaps wonderful as any, of mathematical intuition. Of a different sort, less purely intellectual, are those structural conditions which we conveniently term "nervous," which give to persons of a certain temperament a sympathetic apprehension of weather-changes, of hidden water-springs or metallic veins, of bodily maladies, — conditions

proved, as it would seem, by abundant testimony, — such that, in those particular ways, these persons are an authority to others for the existence of facts which there is no other present way of knowing. Their case is simply another instance of the veracity of nature, as much as the instinct of an insect in the choice of its food and the shelter of its young. And we have all, no doubt, observed of persons gifted with any singular genius or personal power, that the exercise of that gift has the same unconscious ease and certainty that we remark in the movements of a wild animal, — an ease and certainty that can be had by no invitation, and are the result of no conscious endeavor. The most striking examples of this power are seen in the control which some persons exert over the nervously excited or the furiously insane; while obscurer instances are seen in innumerable forms of personal influence, and what we call "magnetic" power. These spheres of Intellect and Will are the natural analogues of Inspiration and Miracle; and, while they prove nothing either way as to the reality of a superhuman origin in any given instance, at least they suggest how certainly, perhaps inevitably, the Divine force will adapt itself to conditions already existing in the sphere of its manifestation.

To follow the argument one step further. There are minds of a certain order which appear to be as plainly organized for religious as others are for mathematical intuition. This, be it observed, is quite distinct from the power of clear ratiocination or accurate definition, — which make the particular merit of a religious philosophy, as such. It is the power of simple vision, the *perception* (to the perceiver's consciousness) of spiritual fact. The statements of religious doctrine are the assertion of certain facts, of which one characteristic is, that they can be verified by no process of direct observation or known method of proof. They must be accepted outright as facts, or not at all. And they must be accepted either from direct intuition of them, or else on the authority of persons held to be competent witnesses of them. Such facts are the being and providence of a living God; the supremacy of good over evil in the ultimate laws of being; the Eternal Life, in which is

found the completion of the destiny of every creature;* the certainty of a just retribution of right and wrong. Now as to these we know that many persons — perhaps the great majority — have no intuition whatever, or first-hand knowledge of their own; while there are many others to whom they are clear and evident facts, such that it is a light and easy thing, in the assurance of them, to undertake any task, however hard, to bear any burden, however grievous. Such is our common and familiar experience of these matters. And are we not following strictly the analogy of nature and the conditions of certitude in other things, when we accept this insight of theirs (duly verified and checked) as a veritable "inspiration," and acknowledge in them a genuine "authority," within their own sphere of observation? The point is, that facts of that order must be known as facts, or otherwise not at all. And may they not be perceived as such, by minds of a certain cast, as really and as truly as other minds perceive mathematical relations, or are cognizant of influences which we vaguely class as magnetic, electrical, or vital?

We have only one step more to take in this inquiry. If certain minds are so constituted, in virtue of their physical or spiritual organization, as to have direct vision of things which others must accept on authority or by hearsay only, since organization has its own laws of genesis and growth, it will probably be found connected in some way with the characteristics of race. The distinction is clearly recognized by all students of history, which ascribes fancy and religious fervor or intuition to Eastern races, reason and shaping imagination to the Western. The distinction is again familiar which ascribes religious insight especially to the Hebrew, and scientific intelligence to the Greek. The consciousness of the Orientals themselves has expressed the same thing, by saying that "from Shem are descended all the holy men and seers," while none among the sons of Japhet has risen to the dignity of prophet.

* This phrase is chosen rather than "the Immortality of the Soul," first, because it is doubtful whether the belief in personal immortality is recognized in those Hebrew writings afterwards adduced in illustration; and secondly, to make the statement sufficiently general without inviting the question as to the future life of brutes, which needlessly complicates the argument of Bishop Butler and of Theodore Parker.

It is recognized again by Renan, in the statement that "monotheism" is the great characteristic of the Semitic family, as distinguished from the intellectual tendencies of the Indo-European races, — though apparently without ascribing to it any authority or scientific value. And yet, would there be anything contrary to a true scientific method, if we assume that this as well as other orders of intuition answers to its own sphere of fact, and may be accepted as a genuine testimony of that fact? Especially when we take the singularly constant testimony of the highest, the truly representative minds of that race, may we not fairly suppose that this very marked endowment of theirs corresponds to something in the world of fact, which it is, as it were, their special commission thus to reveal to other minds of different endowment?

Now in the case of those Hebrew Scriptures before referred to, we find a phenomenon quite unique, I believe, in all the original and spontaneous expressions of human thought. We find — along with much that is false, rude, gross, in the particular conception — a singular consent of harmony as to the one central and main assertion. We find a constant, steady, and very noble testimony as to precisely those facts and laws of the "spiritual" order, which other races, more finely endowed in many ways, have found it hardest to apprehend, and which have always remained the vexed questions of our philosophy. This testimony is borne to them not as matters of opinion, but as facts of direct intuition and personal knowledge. The religiously gifted man is called a SEER. The characteristic of a sceptic and materialist period is, that there is "no open vision." And, like all the language of original sight and personal experience, the words in which it is told are never outgrown. We are still obliged to borrow from those writings the utterance of our best religious thought, our profoundest feeling, our clearest faith. The best religious life of humanity has grouped itself about the points that shine so radiantly in the Hebrew Psalms, — such, for instance, as the nineteenth, the thirty-fourth, the hundred and third, and the hundred and thirty-ninth. The phrases which contain them are precisely the phrases inseparable from all our best and most comforting thoughts on religious things.

In saying this I am not attempting to make out a case for the Hebrew Scriptures, — still less to defend them, as a whole, from any of the charges of modern criticism; but simply to state a characteristic which has always been recognized in them, and which is the foundation of the authority so many generations have ascribed to them. Where men stumble because they know that they are walking in the dark, they thankfully take guidance from those who walk firmly in difficult places because they know the ground. And this seems to be the case with the world's acceptance of these writings. There is a moral order, a divine order, in human things, very dimly seen, very often obscured to the vision of most men, which seems to have been clear as day to the eye of those Hebrew seers. Now what does the acceptance of their testimony imply? It implies, first, recognition of the fact itself, perhaps the most significant of all in human experience, that man can place absolute reliance on that unseen Order, — a reliance so complete as to prove a practical solution, we may even say the *only* practical solution, of the perplexities of human life. It implies, secondly, recognition of the thing testified, the subject-matter of that faith, — so far, at least, as to see in it a fact vouched by authentic witnesses. This fact, from the nature of the case, admits no direct demonstration or ocular proof, but is verified in the only way we have a right to look for, in the experience of many generations, coinciding point for point with that of the original witnesses. This practical verification, this consent of ages, this constancy of faith abiding every conceivable test as to its sufficiency and value, appears to be precisely that which spiritual truth, as such, might fairly claim. It is, perhaps, the only demonstration which it properly admits.

In following this course of argument I am far from thinking that the question as to the special inspiration of particular men is sufficiently met. Still less does it adequately cover the ground included in what we know as the Christian revelation. My only aim has been to suggest the general course of thought which it seems to me must be taken in order to get a legitimate base for indicating the just authority of Scripture, and for reconciling its claims with a scientific habit of mind in the

search for truth. That authority does not reside in the words, but in the thing testified, and in the law of mind which apprehends it. Intellectually, it will be of great value if we can separate form from substance, so as to be wholly free to criticise the one, while reverent and constant in our acceptance of the other. And religiously it cannot be overlooked, that the human mind has always craved for its highest convictions some authority beyond that of the individual reason. What most men want, what they will always want, is, not a philosophy, but a faith. What an intelligent believer wants is a philosophy which, so far as it goes, will help legitimate his faith. This double want appears to be met only when we have stated the claim of "inspired" men as to their testimony in such a way as not to violate our canons of belief in matters which can be verified to the senses and the understanding. And this seems best done when we consider the laws of testimony and the true nature of authority recognized in every department of science.

It would weaken the force of the present argument, and greatly impair the authority which we have ascribed to the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, if we were to restrict it to those writings alone, out of the great multitude of noble and pious words which have told and fortified the faith of humanity. But no one, not even the most unfriendly critic, will fail to see that those are *typical* writings in that class. They are the world's great and conspicuous testimony to truth of the spiritual order. Any argument which vindicates the reality and authority of that order of truth must find its clearest illustration there. And such an argument, fairly followed out, will confirm the reverence so many generations have felt for that volume, — as if it were unique and solitary in the line of God's communication with the mind of man, — while leaving the critic perfectly free to deal with the style, the expression, the mode of composition, and the particular conceptions, of those writings in which the spiritual truth is contained.

## Art. II. — NOTES ON HOSPITALS.

*Notes on Hospitals.* By Florence Nightingale. Third Edition. London. 1863.

Miss Nightingale's work on Hospitals passed to a third edition nearly a year ago. We are somewhat late in noticing this modestly named book, which is, however, remarkable in many ways. It is probably the first work on practical architecture written by a woman, and in this important department of book-making few men have written more to the purpose. The earlier portion of Miss Nightingale's career, though appealing more strongly to the admiration of all sorts of people, was really less noticeable than its more prosaic continuation. Many women in both hemispheres have followed her example, and gone out as hospital nurses, with more or less success; but few of those who return are, we imagine, competent to embody the results of their experience and observation in so valuable a form as Miss Nightingale has done in this extremely interesting book. Its basis was a paper read some years since before the Social Science Association, and which contained so much matter for study that its writer was desired to print it for general circulation. The paper was therefore revised for publication, and in the process of revision much was added, until in its present form it appears as a quarto volume of two hundred pages, filled with thoughtful and wise consideration of the thousand topics, great and small, which connect themselves with the building and management of hospitals, and illustrated with architectural plans and elevations of a dozen of the great hospitals of Europe, — the Lariboisière at Paris, the Vincennes Military, the Victoria, the Netley, the Children's, the Lisbon, the two new hospitals at Malta, and the Herbert hospital at Woolwich, lately finished, which the author considers as on the whole the most perfect in existence.

Miss Nightingale makes a careful examination of the defects of construction in existing hospitals, considering especially badly selected sites, imperfect circulation of air outside, badly arranged wards, — low, wide, with windows on one side only, and half the beds against a dead wall, — bad systems of venti-

lation and warming, imperfect drainage, a neglect of proper attention to sinks, water-closets, laundries, etc., the use of absorbent materials for floors, walls, and ceilings, and many others of less importance. This enumeration suggests the course of the next division of the book, which treats of the correct principles of hospital construction.

There is a chapter on Convalescent Hospitals, another on the Military Hospitals of India, a third on Children's Hospitals, all full of the most uncommon common-sense, refined by the clear mind which uses it, and applied with the directness which comes of practical knowledge. Miss Nightingale is perfectly familiar with her subject, and considers it as a man might do, that is, without the least sentiment, not after the manner of a philanthropist, but rather of an economist, — an economist of human life. Nothing can be finer than the confidence and boldness with which she exposes abuses and exhibits their results. In speaking, for instance, of the influence of site on the health of a hospital, she gives a table of the mortality *per centum* in one hundred and six hospitals of England, grouping them according to location. From this table we learn that in twenty-four London hospitals which had, on the 8th of April, 1861, 4,214 inmates, the number of deaths registered in that year was 3,828, or nearly 91 per cent. In twelve hospitals in large towns, which contained on the same day 1,870 patients, the number of deaths in the year was 1,555, or about 83 per cent; — while in thirteen naval and military hospitals situated on open sites in the country, generally by the seaside, the mortality was only 15 per cent on the number of inmates on the 8th of April, and in two infirmaries at Margate, not quite 13 per cent. Miss Nightingale says, with reason, that, making every allowance for the untrustworthy character of statistics, whose result may be produced by an infinite variety of causes, the great fact that in the two seaside hospitals last mentioned the number of deaths in a year was only one eighth of the number of inmates which the hospitals were treating at a given time, while the great institutions of the crowded city had a death to nearly every bed in the course of the year, is sufficiently startling to make it worth while to look pretty closely at the reasons for it.

Another illustration, perhaps even more striking, of the difference in the healthiness of hospitals under different conditions of location and management, is given in a comparison of the various military hospitals of the British army before Sebastopol during the siege of 1855. The hospitals at Scutari "contained perhaps the largest number of sick ever at one time under the same roof. The largest of these two famous hospitals had at one time 2,500 sick and wounded under one roof; and it has happened that of Scutari patients two out of every five have died. In the hospital tents of the Crimea, although the sick were almost without shelter, without blankets, without proper food or medicines, the mortality was not one half what it was at Scutari, but the tents had only a few beds in each. While in the well-ventilated, detached huts of the Castle Hospital, on the heights above Balaclava, exposed to the sea breeze, at a subsequent period, the mortality among the wounded did not reach 3 per cent." (pp. 11, 12.)

The frequency with which Miss Nightingale refers to her experience in the hospitals at Scutari for examples of all kinds of mistakes and ill-management, is noticeable as another evidence, if more were needed, of the fatal dulness and stupidity (to use no harsher names) which characterized the operations of the medical department of the British army during the memorable campaign against Sebastopol. We may, without vainglory, express our gratitude that our own noble armies, in the midst of their dreadful but glorious campaigns, after the calamitous failures of incompetent leaders, and the wretched knavery of swindling contractors and commissaries, have been spared the additional misery which follows when titled ignorance and pompous inefficiency get charge of a system of military hospitals.

Miss Nightingale's remarks in relation to the importance of a healthy site remind us painfully of the exploits of the Boston city government in the erection of the new Free Hospital. Yielding to that passion for vulgar display which, in the minds of the class of men who commonly control the affairs of our large cities, takes the place of architectural taste, the officials devoted all their energy and persistency to the point of erecting a building which should be at once magnificent and cheap.

And this object at least they accomplished. A towering dome of cast-iron, a massive colonnade of soft pine, attest the ambition of architect and committee. Nay, more, the plan of the establishment is excellent, and might have been matured after careful study of this very book of Miss Nightingale. But whose was the wisdom which, after all was done that could be done to produce a building which should be admirable within and admired without, planted it at last upon a site probably the worst that could be found within the city limits, — a site but yesterday reclaimed from the unwholesome waters of an estuary, exposed during a considerable portion of every day to the exhalations of dock mud and open sewer mouths, and which, by the admission of the building committee that selected it, depends for its salubrity on the remote contingency of the excavation at some future day of the whole water area of which it recently formed a part?

"Indeed," — we quote from the report of the Building Committee, dated in June, 1861, — "were we not convinced that the South Bay will in time be excavated, we should hesitate to recommend the erection of the hospital on the proposed location. The accumulation of sewerage would soon make the Bay an intolerable cesspool, pregnant with disease," etc.

This is not the place, perhaps, for the criticism of local follies; but in this, as in other matters, the public interest would gain if the public, or such portion of it as is qualified, should follow with a closer eye the doings of the officers to whom, with lazy and criminal good-nature, it leaves all the greater and smaller enterprises of the community, — that the stupidity or corruption of a score of ignorant placemen may not bear its annual fruit of disease and death, without the possibility of their being called to account for their misdeeds. The following remarks of Miss Nightingale apply to our case as closely as to any that she may have had in her mind while writing them.

"As the object to be attained in hospital construction is to have pure, dry air for the sick, it is evident that this condition cannot be fulfilled if a damp climate be selected. Retentive clay subsoils keep the air over certain districts of the country damp always, more or less, and soils of this character should not be selected as sites for hospitals. Self-

draining, gravelly or sandy subsoils are best. River banks, estuary shores, valleys, marshy or muddy ground, ought to be avoided. It may seem superfluous to state that a hospital should not be built over an old graveyard, or on other ground charged with organic matter; yet this has recently been done. Although hospitals are intended for the recovery of health, people are apt to forget this, and be guided in the selection of sites by other considerations, such as cheapness, convenience, and the like; whereas, the professed object in view being to secure the recovery of the sick in the shortest time, and to obtain the smallest mortality, that object should be distinctly kept in view, as the one which must take precedence of all others."

The topic of all topics upon which Miss Nightingale dwells longest, and with greatest emphasis, is that of Ventilation; a science dependent on the simplest and fewest principles of physics, yet in regard to which it is surprising how little is actually known. In what other department of practical science, for instance, was such a prodigious blunder ever made as that of Mr. Reid, — for many years the chief expounder of the principles of scientific ventilation, — who, by dint of reputation and influence, was allowed to introduce his "system" into the New Palace at Westminster, when, after months of engineering and an outlay of twenty thousand pounds, the whole system was discovered to be a stupendous failure, and nothing remained but to remove the costly works and advertise for a new plan. Miss Nightingale is far from relying upon systems, and speaks of them with hearty contempt.

"Open your windows!" she exclaims. "What is all this luxury of magnificent windows for, but to admit fresh air? To shut up your patients tight in artificially warmed air, is to bake them in a slow oven. Open the Lariboisière windows, warm it with open fires, drain it properly, and it will be one of the finest hospitals in the world."

And again: —

"If our object be to obtain a wholesome state of the air around the sick, we must have no air except what comes direct by windows or ventilating openings from the outer atmosphere, and we must have no other warming apparatus than the open fireplace. It is the safest warmer and ventilator."

Still again, farther on: —

"If a hospital must be ventilated artificially, it betrays a defect of

original construction which no artificial ventilation can compensate; it is an expensive and inefficient means of doing that which can be done cheaply and efficiently by constructing your building so as to admit the open air around. . . . . The chimney is indispensable as a ventilating shaft; the fire sets it acting; it takes the air from the ward so successfully, that, as has been proved by direct experiment, a single chimney will, in certain states of the wind, remove sixty thousand cubic feet of air in an hour, or as much as the French contract system allows for twenty-four patients."

Miss Nightingale's book treats not only of the construction, but of the management of hospitals. And in this department of her subject she speaks with an authority which no one will question. What she says makes it quite clear that the thousand points of detail, so easily overlooked or disregarded, yet so vital in their bearings on the health and comfort of the enfeebled inmates, — points which involve the most punctual, diligent, conscientious discharge of monotonous and disagreeable duties by every officer from the superintendent to the scullion, — make the perfect regulation of a great hospital one of the most difficult of all administrative achievements, and one of the rarest. We have, to be sure, made some progress since the days when the galleries of the Hôtel Dieu were filled with "multiple beds," shelf over shelf, holding from eight to twelve patients each, or since a more recent period, when, even as late as 1788, it was a common practice to assign two or four convalescent patients to one bed, half the number occupying the bed, while the other half sat up or walked in the court.

But there is no doubt that much more remains to be done, and it will be a long step towards perfection in this important matter, if the advisory boards shall have the good sense to allow themselves to be instructed by so competent a teacher as Florence Nightingale.

## Art. III. — PRAED'S POEMS.

*The Poems of* Winthrop Mackworth Praed. *With a Memoir by the* Rev. Derwent Coleridge. In Two Volumes. London: Edward Moxon & Co. 1864. Republished by W. J. Widdleton, New York.

The majority of our readers will require no introduction to the writer whose poems have now first received an authorized collection. During the quarter of a century which has elapsed since Praed's death, four successive editions of his poetry have appeared in this country, and his position as chief of the minor poets of the present century has been well established. The first three editions contained the collections made by the late Dr. Griswold from the various periodicals in which these fugitive pieces were scattered; the last contained quite a number of additional poems collected in the same way by Mr. Whitmore, but, we regret to add, it also contained several poems not written by Praed. All doubts and speculations may be considered as settled by this collection, made by his old friend, and enriched by the contributions of the poet's nearest relatives. However we may regret to find that some few favorites are now proved foundlings, we are glad to welcome so many new claimants for our favor.

The biography of the poet presents few striking events, excepting those of a literary nature. He was born on the 26th of July, 1802, at Teignmouth in Devon, and was the third and youngest son of William Mackworth Praed, sergeant-at-law. His maternal descent was from that Winthrop family of which one branch has been so honorably conspicuous in New England. His family was wealthy, and his father, a man of highly cultivated mind, carefully directed and fostered his poetic powers at an early age. In this edition will be found a few poems dating back to his fourteenth year, and one written in 1817 may well bear quotation: —

"When thy sad master 's far away,
Go, happier far than he, —
Go, little flower, with her to stay
With whom he may not be;

There bid her mourn his wayward lot,
And whisper still ' Forget-me-not ! ' "

In 1814 he entered Eton, and in 1820 the first number of a college magazine, " The Etonian," appeared. From this time Praed fairly entered upon public life. We can hardly appreciate here the difference between the qualifications of an English public man and of our own leaders. With us, literature leads to no advancement in any other pursuit; the suspicion of trifling with the Muses would be wellnigh fatal to any rising lawyer, merchant, or statesman. Scholarship is valued only in so far as it tends to practical results, and the prizes extended to it are few and unimportant. In England the case is entirely different. If we may judge at a distance, we should say that success in college gives a man a most desirable start in his later career. The constitution of the English Church is such that solid and permanent rewards await those who attain a high position at Oxford or Cambridge. The numerous sinecures create a large and influential body of men, who continue to devote themselves to study after their collegiate course is finished, and who are the dispensers of immense patronage. The prizemen of each year are marked and remembered, and they are regarded as the proper persons for every position, clerical or lay, which is within the gift of the educated classes.

To such an audience the " Etonian " made a brilliant appeal. It was indeed a marvellous production, and the greatest amount of its success was due to the writings of Praed. His poems were not only remarkable as the production of a schoolboy, but they were unrivalled by those of any contemporary. Full of life, point, and a charming ease of expression, they were calculated to attract immediate praise. The longest poems were " Gog," " Surly Hall," and " The County Ball "; the most distinctive ones were " Lines to Julia," and " The Bachelor." These were not only written in a most deliciously fluent and easy metre, but wit and insight into character were displayed in a degree which none have since surpassed. Take, for example, — though such extracts do no justice to the whole, — the following touch from " Gog," where the heroine is set adrift in a boat without provisions : —

" She pulled her lover's letter out
And turned its vellum leaves about;
It was a billet-doux of fire,
Scarce thicker than a modern quire;
And thus it ran: 'I never suppe,
Because mine heatte dothe eatte me uppe;
And eke, dear Loue, I never dine
Nor drink atte Courte a cuppe of wine;
For daye and nighte — I tell you true —
I feede upon my Loue for you.'
Alas! that Lady fair, who long
Had felt her hunger rather strong,
Said (and her eye with tears was dim),
'I 've no such solid love for him!'
And so she thought it might be better
To sup upon her lover's letter."

In 1821, Praed quitted Eton for Trinity College, Cambridge, and as Mr. Coleridge writes, " Since the days of Canning, no Etonian had brought with him so high a reputation, and large expectations were formed with regard to his academical career." His course was indeed brilliant, as he gained the medals for the Greek Ode and Epigrams, for English verse, and for English and Latin declamation.

" In the classical tripos his name appeared third in the list, a high position, yet scarcely adding to the reputation which he already enjoyed. In 1827 he was successful in the examination for a Trinity Fellowship, and in 1830 he completed his University triumphs by gaining the Seatonian prizes."

Of his other literary triumphs we shall speak soon, but we will first trace out his public life. In 1825, he was established at Eton as private tutor to Lord Ernest Bruce, keeping terms at Lincoln's Inn, and preparing for the bar. In May, 1829, he was called to the bar, and in 1830 and 1831 he was returned to Parliament for St. Germains. His borough being disfranchised he tried St. Ives in vain, but in 1834 he was returned with Mr. T. Baring from Yarmouth. Under the ministry of Sir Robert Peel, Praed held the office of Secretary of the Board of Control, and in 1837 he was elected by the voters of Aylesbury. During the latter years of his life he held the office of Deputy High Steward of the University of Cambridge. In the winter of 1838 – 9, symptoms of consumption appeared,

and on the 15th of July, 1839, he died. His remains were interred at Kensal Green.

It is not easy to form a just estimate of Praed's position as a statesman. When at Cambridge he was considered as the worthy rival of Macaulay; but the years he spent in Parliament were too few to enable him to take any leading rank. Bulwer in his poem of "St. Stephen's" states the case perhaps most fairly: —

> "More richly gifted, though to him denied
> E'en thine* imperfect honors, Winthrop died;
> Died, — scarce a promise of his youth redeemed,
> And never youth more bright in promise seemed.
> Granta beheld him with such loving eyes
> Lift the light lance which struck at every prize;
> What 's the last news? the medal Praed has won;
> What the last joke? Praed's epigram or pun;
> And every week that club-room, famous then,
> Where striplings settled questions spoiled by men,
> When grand Macaulay sat triumphant down,
> Heard Praed's reply, and longed to halve the crown.
>
> "Yet in Saint Stephen's this bright creature failed;
> Yes, but o'er failure had he not prevailed
> If his that scope in time which victory needs?
> Fame is a race, — he who runs on succeeds; —
> True in all contests, in the Senate's most;
> There but small way till half a life be lost;
> Long years a name the public hardly knows,
> From roots occult, unnoticed, grows and grows,
> Till inch by inch it widens into space,
> Towers o'er the grove and suns itself in Place."

It may perhaps be claimed for him that his talents would have earned for him a high rank, but that his life was cut short before he won public confidence and attention. However dearly his friends may cling to their opinions of his fitness for political honors, such transitory successes cannot compare with the permanent glory with which his poetical powers have surrounded his name. We gladly turn to the history of his successive literary triumphs.

Whilst at Cambridge, Mr. Charles Knight, since so distinguished as a writer and publisher, projected a Quarterly

* Buller.

Magazine, and Praed became the animating spirit of the enterprise. His associates were Macaulay, Moultrie, William Sidney Walker, Henry Malden, Derwent Coleridge, and Henry Nelson Coleridge. Though only six numbers appeared, for reasons fully explained in Knight's autobiography, Praed contributed several fine poems, two cantos of "The Troubadour," and some "Enigmas." Macaulay contributed, amongst other things, that article on slavery which grew into an article in the Quarterly, and was in both forms vigorously suppressed by his literary executors.

In 1826, whilst Praed was living at Eton, Knight undertook a weekly sheet, "The Brazen Head," which died in a month. Still Praed herein published "Lidian's Love," and some shorter pieces. About this time, also, the fashion of Annuals was in full vigor, and Praed wrote much for some of them. "The Gem," "The Literary Souvenir," "Friendship's Offering," "The Casket," — all of these contained examples of his most finished works of imagination. We may cite "The Bridal of Belmont," "The Legend of the Haunted Tree," "The Legend of the Teufel-Haus," "The Covenanter's Lament," "The Legend of the Drachenfels," and his masterpiece, "The Red Fisherman," as examples of the poetry which was issued through so ephemeral channels. The New Monthly Magazine was also a favorite with him, and therein appeared several of his "Every-day Characters," — quiet sketches of life touched with inimitable grace and pathos.

We learn from Mr. Coleridge's Preface, that Praed was a consummate master of political writing, and that hereafter we may have a reprint of a collection of those squibs which the author printed for private circulation. These and "Lillian," we presume, were the only distinct publications made in his life-time.

The longer poems have nearly all been published so often that quotations would be almost impertinent; still we will give from "The Bridal of Belmont" Lurley's song, as it was not in former editions: —

> "A voice ye hear not, in mine ear is crying; —
> What does the sad voice say?
> 'Dost thou not heed thy weary father's sighing,
> Return, return to-day!

Twelve moons have faded now:
My daughter where art thou?'

"Peace! in the silent evening we will meet thee,
Gray ruler of the tide!
Must not the lover with the loved one greet thee?
The bridegroom with his bride?
Deck the dim couch aright
The bridal couch to-night."

One example from "Lidian's Love" will show his proficiency in a metre which he rarely attempted. Sir Lidian, yet free from love, found a home for his fancy in

"A Paradise of Fancy's fabrication
Peopled by Houris of the heart's creation;
Who never thrummed upon the virginals,
Nor tripped by rule, nor fortunately fainted,
Nor practised paying compliments and calls,
Looking satirical or looking sainted,
Nor shrieked at tournaments, nor blushed at balls,
Nor lisped, nor sighed, nor drooped, nor punned, nor painted;
Nor wrote a book, nor traded in caresses,
Nor made remarks on other people's dresses."

Of the new poems we take one song: —

"THE CONFESSION.

"Father, Father, I confess —
Here he kneeled and sighed,
When the moon's soft loveliness
Slept on turf and tide.
In my ear the prayer he prayed
Seems to echo yet;
But the answer that I made, —
Father — I forget!
Ora pro me!

"Father, Father, I confess —
Precious gifts he brought;
Satin sandal, silken dress;
Richer ne'er were wrought;
Gems that make the daylight dim,
Plumes in gay gold set; —
But the gaud I gave to him, —
Father — I forget!
Ora pro me!

"Father, Father, I confess —
He 's my beauty's thrall,

In the lonely wilderness,
In the festive hall;
All his dreams are aye of me,
Since our young hearts met;
What my own may sometimes be, —
Father — I forget!
Ora pro me!"

Of the other additions some are prize poems and translations, some few are gleanings from the portfolios of his intimate friends. These have all a claim to our notice, but they do not add to our estimate of his ability. The Charades, now first collected, are, however, among the best he ever wrote. Quite a number of them were written, or at least published, in 1839, in aid of an Annual edited by T. K. Hervey. We believe that this volume was issued to assist the editor in some emergency; at all events the poems are interesting as being almost the last of the author's publications.

"XXXIII.

"The palmer comes from the Holy Land;
Scarce on my First can the palmer stand;
The prior will take the air to-day;
On my Second the prior trots away; —
'T is pleasanter, under a summer sun,
With robes to ride, than with rags to run!

"My whole leaps out of the way-side ditch,
With 'Stand!' to the poor man, and 'Stand!' to the rich:
From the prior he strips his mantle fair;
From the palmer he wins but pity and prayer: —
'T is safer, when crime is prowling wide,
With rags to run, than with robes to ride!"

"XXXV.

"The night was dark, the night was damp;
St. Bruno read by his lonely lamp.
The fiend dropped in to make a call,
As he posted away to a fancy ball:
And 'Can't I find,' said the father of lies,
'Some present a saint may not despise.'

"Wine he brought him, such as yet
Was ne'er on pontiff's table set.
Weary and faint was the holy man;
But he crossed with a cross the tempter's can;
And saw — ere my First to his parched lip came —
That it blushed and burned with liquid flame.

"Jewels he showed him, — many a gem
Fit for a sultan's diadem.
Dazzled, I trow, was the anchorite;
But he told his beads with all his might, —
And instead of my Second, so rich and rare,
A pinch of worthless dust lay there.

"A lady at last he handed in,
With a bright black eye, and a fair white skin.
The stern ascetic flung, 't is said,
A ponderous missal at her head.
She vanished away; and what a smell
Of my Whole she left in the hermit's cell!"

One portion of these poems presents the author in a new light, — those which are addressed to his wife and child. We will quote one dated in the House of Commons.

"When some grim sorceress, whose skill
Had bound a sprite to work her will,
In mirth or malice chose to ask
Of the faint slave the hardest task,

"She sent him forth to gather up
Great Ganges in an acorn-cup,
Or heaven's unnumbered stars to bring
In compass of a signet-ring.

"Thus Helen bids her poet write
The thanks he owes this morning's light;
And 'Give me,' so he hears her say,
'Four verses, only four, to-day.'

"Dearest and best! she knows, if wit
Could ever half love's debt acquit,
Each of her tones and of her looks
Would have its four, not lines, but books."

A melancholy interest attaches to the following poem to his wife, dated July 7, 1839, one week only before his death.

"TO HELEN.

"Dearest, I did not dream, four years ago,
When through your veil I saw your bright tears shine,
Caught your clear whisper, exquisitely low,
And felt your soft hand tremble into mine,
That in so brief, so very brief a space,
He who in love both clouds and cheers our life

Would lay on you, so full of light, joy, grace,
The darker, sadder duties of the wife, —
Doubts, fears, and frequent toil, and constant care
For this poor frame, by sickness sore bested;
The daily tendance on the fractious chair,
The nightly vigil by the feverish bed.

"Yet not unwelcomed doth this morn arise,
Though with more gladsome beams it might have shone.
Strength of these weak hands, light of these dim eyes,
In sickness . . . ."

His wife, Helen, daughter of George Bogle, Esq., died within the past year, leaving two daughters, — Helen Adelini and Elizabeth Lillian.

We have claimed for Praed the highest rank among the minor poets of the present century; this we do conceding to Tennyson a place among the great poets. Those who remember the earlier poems of Tennyson, however, will feel that, had he been taken away as early, his reputation would have been vastly inferior to Praed's. One of the few English critics of these poems has strongly expressed his sense of the great loss which English literature sustained in being deprived of such a leader. Tennyson's last book contains a half-petulant assertion of the influence he has exerted on the poets of the past twenty years. Had Praed survived, not only would he have probably given us more thoughtful and earnest poems, but the influence of his style would have been felt throughout the literature of the day. He would have taught pre-eminently that clearness of expression is as possible in poetry as in prose; that redundancies and inversions are necessities to poor workmen only; and the simplicity of the style is the best test of the strength of the thought.

We welcome the appearance of these volumes, in the full belief that they will exert a wholesome influence still. The days of the "spasmodic school" are numbered; but, since we must have our annual crop of poets, let us try to hold them to some good code. Let us beg them to avoid compound adjectives, newly coined words, harsh involutions, and unmeaning epithets; and, if they cannot imitate the point of Praed's writings, let them at least try to equal his melody.

## Art. IV. — MISS BEECHER'S PELAGIANISM.

1. *Common Sense applied to Religion, or the Bible and the People.* By Catherine E. Beecher. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1857.
2. *Appeal to the People as the Authorized Interpreters of the Bible.* By Catherine E. Beecher. New York: Harper and Brothers.
3. *Religious Training of Children, in the School, the Family, and the Church.* By Catherine E. Beecher. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1864.

We are glad to find a writer who is not an ecclesiastic discussing theological questions with earnestness and vigor. We are glad all the more that the writer is a woman. It is some guaranty that the discussion will not proceed in the ruts of tradition, and that the theology of the pulpit, the divinity schools and ministerial conventions, is to be ventilated and humanized. Miss Beecher comes to her subject with rare qualifications at least for negative criticism. With a nature of ardent aspirations and clear intellectual activity, she endured for years the perplexities and agonies which are inflicted upon keenly susceptible minds under Calvinistic theories of conversion and regeneration. As an educator of the young, and especially of young women, she has watched the effect of these doctrines upon them, causing the same perplexing dread, and stifling the most generous uprisings of the spiritual nature. She lived under the influence of this theology during years of sorrow and trial, joined a Calvinistic Church under mental protest that "there was a dreadful mistake somewhere," and after long struggle and difficulty rejected the Calvinistic system as false and baneful, and now finds shelter in the broader toleration and hospitality of the Episcopal Church. In her "Common Sense applied to Religion," "Appeal to the People," and the work now published on the "Religious Training of Children," she develops very fully her views of theology. With great moral earnestness, in a style perfectly free from all scholasticism, appealing with boldness and vigor to the plain sense and understanding of common minds, she deals a most destructive criticism against the theories that had troubled her

so long, and presents ideas of Christianity which she deems accordant with the character of God, with the plain meaning of the New Testament, with the wants of the soul and the common sense of mankind.

The negative, or more properly the destructive portion of her work, is admirably done. Sometimes by invincible logic, sometimes by apt illustration more telling than argument, sometimes by personal narrative calculated to touch the pity and indignation even of theologians who have any dregs of manhood left in them, she succeeds in making Calvinism not only absurd, but utterly hateful. The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth chapters, entitled "Puritan Church Training," in her last work, are made up mainly of extracts from the personal experience of a daughter of the late Dr. Payson, written, we suppose, by the daughter herself, and not designed, of course, to blacken the memory of that good man. It is only paralleled by the cross-examinations of the "Holy Office" in the exquisite refinements of cruelty. A little girl, of quick perceptions, acute conscientiousness, and tender feelings, is taken when three years of age, and in the ten long years that followed put through the tortures of a Calvinistic conversion. She is made to believe that her whole nature is depraved, and that she can do nothing to change it; that even her prayers are hateful to God; that she cannot love him without a change of heart, which he only can bestow; and that for not loving him she is exposed to eternal fire. One would suppose that a parent who believed in such a theory of conversion would at least leave his children alone till God chose to take them in hand. But no: this good man thought it his duty to ply his child constantly with the theological pincers and thumbscrews, and her innocent girlhood, which should have been bright and joyous, is a continuous night of terror and anguish under the brooding wrath of God.

In the constructive portion of her work, Miss Beecher is less successful, because this work is vastly more difficult. She reproduces in its main features the theology of Pelagius. She denies with emphasis, not merely the "total depravity" of human nature, but any depravity of nature whatsoever. The infant mind is the creation of God, and we impeach his wis-

dom or goodness when we deny that it is rightly constructed. To suppose that new-created minds are brought into being corrupt and sinful and incapable of obedience, and yet responsible and guilty for disobedience, is to represent the Divine character in such light that no child can love him, nor is even bound to love him. Sin arises not from depraved nature, but from depraved action, and there is no sin previous to voluntary transgression. Vindicating the native ability and free-agency of man, she makes "a controlling purpose of obedience," manifested in good works and an unselfish life, the condition of salvation. She believes fully in the Deity of Christ, in his atoning sacrifice as a means of saving the sinner, in the influence of the Holy Spirit in human culture and regeneration, and the endless misery after death of those who have had their probation here, and become confirmed in their wickedness. She does not accept, however, the Puritan doctrine of immediate salvation or damnation at death of all mankind, but brings out very distinctly the belief of the primitive Church, still retained in a modified form by the Episcopal, of a threefold state after death, — Heaven and Hell and *Hades;* which last is not the final abode, but the passage-way thereto. The notion of imputed righteousness is rejected as absurd, and the atonement of Christ evidently is not conceived as penal and vicarious.

We select the following illustration from many others designed to uncover the hideous absurdity of the received orthodox doctrine of depravity.

"Suppose a colony by some mischance settles on an [isolated] island which is found covered with the tobacco-plant. They clear their plantations, but find, by a remarkable and unintelligible arrangement, after every shower there is a fall of tobacco-seeds, disseminated from an inaccessible height by a machine erected for the purpose and constantly supplied. After some years they receive a missive from the king to whom the island belongs, in which he informs them that tobacco is the chief object of his detestation; that it is doing incalculable mischief to his subjects; that it is the chief end of his life, and he wishes it to be of theirs, to exterminate the plant and thus its use.

"He at the same time states that he is the author of the contrivance for scattering the seed, and that he keeps it constantly supplied, and

claims that he has a right 'to do what he will with his own' without being questioned by his subjects.

"He then enacts that any person who is found to use tobacco, or even to have a single seed or plant on his premises, shall be burned alive in a caldron of fire and brimstone.

"If, in addition to this, that king were to command supreme love to him and perfect confidence in his wisdom, justice, and goodness, all this would but faintly illustrate that awful system under consideration whose penalties are *eternal*." — *Common Sense applied to Religion*, p. 287.

The articles of faith, as Miss Beecher holds them, are thus summed up by herself: —

"That at the *first birth* of a child it is 'impossible in the nature of things' for it to feel and act for the happiness of others, till it has learned to know what gives pleasure and pain to *self*, and that there are other beings who can enjoy and suffer; so that a child by its very nature is at first obliged to be *selfish* in the *exercise* of faculties which *in reference to the great whole* are perfect.

"That the 'second birth' is the sudden or gradual entrance into a life in which the will of the Creator is to control the self-will of the creature; while under the influence of love and gratitude to him and guided by faith in his teachings, *living chiefly for the great commandment* takes the place of *living chiefly for self*. For this the supernatural aid of the Holy Spirit is promised to all who seek it; and without this aid success is hopeless. But the grand instrumentality is the *right training* of parents and teachers.

"Then in reference to that great change of character which wrongly educated minds must pass, in order to gain eternal life, there are three modes of expression in the Bible in regard to that, viz. 'love to God,' 'faith in Jesus Christ,' and 'repentance.'

"According to all uses of these terms in *practical* matters, *love* is nothing which does not include obedience or conformity of will and action to the being loved. Faith or belief is nothing unless it includes its fruits of obedience. *Repentance* is nothing unless it includes ceasing to do evil. *Obedience* to the laws of God, physical, social, moral, and religious, is the grand indispensable requisite. Now when any person is so engaged in striving to obey all these laws that it is the *first interest* of the mind, then there is a 'new heart'; and so great is the change from one of self-indulgence and disobedience to one of such earnest desire and efforts to obey God, that it is properly expressed by the terms 'born again' and 'created anew.'" — *Ibid.*, pp. 333, 334.

That the grand decisive change in becoming a Christian is

stated here very inadequately, resolving itself, as it must in Miss Beecher's system, into a change of external conduct and relations, and not change of nature, we think it would be very easy to show. Indeed, we do not see that, with Pelagian theories, "being born again" or "created anew" has any vital significance. Those words imply changes deeper and more radical than changes of the external man; and as to the internal man, that needs no changing, if Miss Beecher is right, except by way of development, since it was perfect at the first creation. Ceasing to *do* evil, not ceasing to *be* evil, is the whole work of repentance; and education, not regeneration, is the whole work of Christian nurture.

As opposed to Calvinism, Miss Beecher's system is vastly to be preferred, for any one might rejoice to escape from the gloom of a dungeon, though he emerged into the cold air beneath a wintry sky. Most heartily, then, do we sympathize with her in the good work she is doing, and the vigorous strokes which break open the prison-doors. But how she can rest in her present belief, we do not see. Pelagianism may be a good resting-place, even as many Unitarians have found it, where we may stop and take breath after struggling out of the darkness and the galling chains of spiritual bondage. But as a system adequate to solve the hard problems of existence, to satisfy either the heart or the intellect, and bring man into God's profound and sufficing peace, as it has always been found wanting, so it will always continue to be.

First of all, we say it discharges the fundamental facts of the Gospel of their vital import. If man needed only development, and not radical change, — if sin comes only from diseased action, and not from diseased constitution, — what need was there of anything more than educators and prophets to show us the way? Why the Divine Incarnation to redeem the race, when they only needed teachers to enlighten and guide them? All but a small fraction of Christendom, who rest in the sheerest Ebionism, have been profoundly convinced that Christ was more than a teacher, — even a Redeemer and Saviour; and that his incarnation, sufferings, death, resurrection, ascension, and second coming in the Paraclete, were not merely to move on the surface of human nature, and lead

to right action, but down among its native springs and elements, there to heal and cleanse, to readjust, inspire, and energize, and evolve a new creation out of chaos. Surely, this uniform testimony points to something in the nature itself of the religious life. True enough, Miss Beecher holds fast to the Orthodox Trinity, and, in her way, believes in the Deity of Christ. But these doctrines hang loose in her system, without use and without coherence; for as human nature in every new-born child from the days of Adam downward has been whole and perfect, and its native motions heavenward, why could not prophets and angels have guided it? and what mean the wonderful events which took place in Palestine eighteen hundred years ago, and around which the whole history of the race, before and after, becomes organized?

Moreover, Pelagianism, though less revolting to our moral sentiments than Calvinism, succeeds no better in clearing the Divine justice. A part of the race are to be saved through education and persuasion. So far the Divine plan is successful. But how is it with that vast portion who are lost forever in consequence of wrong training and unpropitious circumstance? Starting with natures perfectly pure and well directed, how easily, by a wise adjustment of circumstance, might all this native goodness have been wooed forth and set free! And yet, brought here by no act of their own, they are plunged into such external evil and corruption, that their goodness is repressed and deflected to everlasting ruin. It helps the matter very little to say that the sinner chooses evil rather than good. If he chooses it to his eternal destruction, why was he put in the way of it? or why was he created at all, when the Creator foresaw that existence was to turn out a failure and a curse for ever and ever? If the grand system of Providence is one of education only, and this is the dismal result of it, then we say, too, "There is a dreadful mistake somewhere," and the mistake lies plainly in the Divine arrangements. Suppose fifty young women have been committed to Miss Beecher to educate. They are given to her care in their unspotted innocence, their faculties all perfect, their affections and aspirations all pure. She has the entire control of place and circumstance in locating her seminary.

She can place it amid the sweetest charms of art and nature, and amid society of the selectest and holiest influence. And yet, with all these appliances at her command, she gives them bad books to read, and admits evil tempters among them, and returns twenty-five of these once innocent girls to their parents corrupted and ruined, and fit only for dens of infamy. And suppose the teacher should put forward the plea that the young women were free agents, and chose the ruin themselves, would the parents think the plea a valid one, and not rather a cruel and insulting aggravation of the wrong? And yet what else does Pelagianism make of the whole scheme of creation and providence, plunging pure and new-created souls, generation after generation, amid seductions and temptations which the Creator foreknows will turn them downward among the fiends, and not amid persuasions that will win them upward among his angels? You gain nothing by removing evil from the nature *in* man to the nature *about* him, which dominates and schools him through the most tender and susceptible period of his endless existence, — you gain nothing, that is to say, for the Divine character and justice, — unless you can show that evil has some better use and economy than this in the universe of God.

But we quarrel with Pelagianism for other than merely ethical reasons. It has no basis in *the facts of life*. It is woven from the speculations of a few minds here and there, and now and then. An amiable monk may produce it from his cell, or the successful teacher of young ladies may produce it again; but its inductions are too narrow and too superficial to account for the state of a world that lieth in wickedness. The facts of consciousness, the facts of history, and the facts both of physiological and psychological science are all against it.

It is not true, as Miss Beecher seems to suppose, that Augustine invented the doctrine of hereditary depravity. He gave it a lurid and baleful tinge, but already it was, not only in the Church, but in the common faith of the religious world. It was an essential element of Brahminism, but the Brahmins could make no ethical use of it, and resolved it into the essential evil of matter, which cleaves to the soul as its poisonous

coat, necessitating the maceration of the body, and making its appetites essentially sinful. It constituted the dualism of the Parsee religion, with its eternal antagonism of spirit and matter. Gnosticism, which came into the Church on the Oriental side, was a new modification of this philosophy; and, though the Gnostics were insignificant as a Christian sect, they exerted a very marked influence upon the early development of Christian doctrine. Docetism, Manicheism, and Monasticism all start from one postulate, — the essential evil of matter as the "hylic" covering of the spirit, — and hence the depraved natural appetites which men are born with, and which are fit only to be starved and mortified.*

In the Church, both Jewish and Christian, the doctrine of native depravity took a different form and coloring, and less materialistic. It was that of a depraved nature derived from Adam as the baneful fruit of the fall. No person well versed in the rabbinical literature before the time of Christ, or the patristic literature that followed, ever denied that this idea entered into every form of the prevailing anthropology. Very true, it had not been elaborated into distinct dogmas before the time of Augustine, except in Paul's Epistles; but the loss of Eden by the sin of the first parents, and the entail of a curse upon the entire species, was a belief as universal then as it is now.† It is perfectly plain, we think, that Paul was full of this faith. He takes it for granted, as something not to be brought into debate, and makes it the postulate of his whole doctrine of redemption in Christ. The entire race die in Adam, and go into Hades, and there all the generations have been gathered and are waiting. Christ not only became incarnate upon the earth, but descended into Hades also, to raise his people out of it, and make a clear pathway to the skies. He rolls off the hereditary curse, not by a make-believe or imputed righteousness, but by imparting inward health and power to believers, so that in him they shall all "BE MADE ALIVE," and the curse which the law, a mere outward rule, could not clear away, can be broken by the might of faith, which transforms the man from within, and removes the entail

* Consult Baur's *Christliche Gnosis*, especially the first four sections.

† See Neander's "Church Dogmas," under *Anthropology*.

of hereditary corruption. Hence his exultant strain as he closes his annunciation of the resurrection from the underworld, or the mediate state, — "O HADES, where is thy victory?" * No textual criticisms upon St. Paul can eliminate the doctrine of inherited spiritual death in Adam, with Hades for its consequence, and redemption in Christ as its remedy; and the *descensus Inferno*, found distinctly in the New Testament, and universally believed in the primitive Church, is postulated upon this doctrine alone.

It might be argued, as it has been, that the Jews borrowed the notion of native depravity from the Magians, and brought it with them from the captivity; that the primitive Christians borrowed it in turn from the Jews, and that the Gnostics inoculated the Church still further with the same virus which has descended and is spread over the Christendom of to-day. We hold all this sort of philosophizing to be utterly shallow and absurd. Men never "borrow" their neighbor's heresies till they have first lived them. Forms of doctrine which spread over whole provinces and down the ages are always forms of life cropping out from the profoundest consciousness of the race. The consciousness of evil lying at the core of being, antedating all voluntary action, staining the soul's divine chastity, clouding its celestial vision, whelming it under dark waves breaking upon waves, and tormenting it with eternal unrest, underlies all the religions East and West which have worked profoundly, and from this consciousness goes forth the cry for some light that will explain man to himself and guide him to the summits of peace. The fact that doctrines remotely affiliated are found alike in the heathen and Christian religions, has been complacently urged as evidence that these doctrines were interpolated from one into the other, or that the Church "borrowed" them from Pagan superstitions. It only proves that the mind of the race was groping after them, and that the Gospel came as the desire of the nations yearning towards the light. The conviction of innate depravity lying at the heart of the race found no better analysis of man in the Indian philosophy than into spirit and matter, and it met

* 1 Cor. xv. Our translators blur the whole course of the argument, by rendering *grave*.

with no other solution than that which drops the one and reabsorbs the other into the bosom of Deity. Gnosticism was plagued by this same problem of evil, and tried to solve it in a system which was an amalgamation of Magian, Grecian, and Christian ideas. Christianity, unlike these, finds evil, not in man's material nature, but in his spiritual; finds the seat of it by a more searching and profound analysis, and knows how and where to apply the remedy. Augustine believed in innate depravity before he was a Manichean; was tortured and distracted by it, and sought in Manicheism for an explanation of the stormy tumult within him. He renounced it as a shallow philosophy which did not go to the depths of his trouble, and in the system which he subsequently elaborated he reproduced the Church doctrine, though penetrated with the passions that surged within him. But the point of the argument is, that a conviction so ineradicable and general must have a fact to rest upon; that, if every new generation and every new-born child begins existence *de novo* like Adam, perfectly pure and whole, — if sin is only a marring of the surface and not a derangement of the inner structure, — it were utterly impossible that this consciousness of inborn and inherited evil should thus cleave to the heart of the race, and crop out in all its principal religions, and be borne ever onward as "the still, sad music of humanity."

No physiologist of the present day will deny that the condition of the parents affects both the physical and moral constitution of their offspring. Morbid tastes and appetites, tendencies to insanity, passions which cloud the reason or disturb its equipoise, lusts that infest the soul and lay it open to infernal sorceries, diseases of the body whose seeds the child brings with him into the world, affecting his nervous and thence his whole moral organism, — to deny that these evils are inherited from a vitiated ancestry is to deny facts which have long since been established and admitted as the verities of science. Miss Beecher is perfectly right in saying that no man becomes sinful except by voluntary action, using the word "sin" in its popular sense of personal guiltiness; but used in the Pauline sense as that "body of death" which lies back of voluntary action, and terribly sways it, and forces out the excla-

mation, "O wretched man that I am!" it means the morbid state that precedes all personal guiltiness and determines it. You may argue till doomsday against native depravity from "the goodness of God," or "the principles of honor and right" that are supposed to govern him. We are not dealing here with a metaphysical hypothesis, but with the sober, stern facts of existence; and vain is the ostrich-philosophy, which, instead of meeting them, only hides its head in the thicket and ignores them.

But we come upon more positive ground. We not only accept these facts of existence, but believe they have a necessary place in God's most beneficent plan for the salvation of the race. Total depravity and moral inability are dogmas which we reject as vehemently as Miss Beecher can possibly do; but good and evil commingled in the *nature* of man, as in all nature, that environs and educates him, not superficial and induced from without, but inborn and radical and insurgent from the spiritual deep within, is the only conceivable ground for God's highest achievement in humanity.

Our imaginations very easily picture to themselves a state of things in which there is nothing but peace and harmony, where all that is required of us is to be *developed* from lower to higher, and where some paradise on earth might prepare us for a paradise above. But it is very plain that this culture could produce only good natural men, and that a naturalized heaven would be their highest reward.

Three kinds of goodness are conceivable. There is instinctive goodness, which is wholly involuntary and which has no moral quality whatsoever. It is such as all good animals have which are dominated by their own natures. The lambs and the kine in the pastures, the birds of the air, the fishes in the pool, are in bondage to their natures, and therefore the good which they minister flows passively through them. It is not *their* goodness, and we do not credit it to them, and its highest enjoyment is sensuous pleasure.

There is natural human goodness, which is only a grade higher because endowed with intelligence. This, too, is instinctive, and therefore involuntary and without moral quality. It is the passive exhibition of the good propensities that men

are born with. It is the goodness of babes. It is the sweetness of infancy. It is the amiability of persons who act only from instinctive kindness. Parental love, family affections, the goodly fellowship of friendship, natural benevolence, may be fervent, and even prodigal, when wholly without moral quality. It was this goodness which the first man had in paradise, and, if the Divine plan had involved nothing else, he doubtless might have been retained in it, and so the race would have been a race of grown-up children, kept in terrestrial peace, regaled with sensuous, or at most instinctive pleasures. Man, with nothing but good in his nature to inundate his consciousness and brim over in his actions, would have been dominated by his nature, and never risen to the sublime prerogatives of a moral being.

But there is a still higher kind of goodness, and a higher heaven that rewards it. It comes from choice between the contrasts of good and evil. And that this choice may be made in all its energy and grandeur, these contrasts must present the opposites of the whitest light and the blackest shade. They must not run into each other, so that no one can tell where one begins and the other ends. They must stand front to front, in bold relief, and in a fully developed experience of good and evil. Hence this probation which the Infinite Providence provides. In the nature of man there is the lamb and the tiger, the dove and the vulture, serpents and birds of paradise, that which is clean and that which is unclean; but he is dominated neither by the one nor the other. He is poised between them, with the awful attribute of moral choosing. Always with him and immanent in his being, though not a constituent part of it, is the Divine Spirit itself, his eternal Helper. He need not succumb like the animal to his own nature, good or bad, and be swamped under it: he can tread the evil under foot and bruise the serpent's head; while the good he can control and mould anew into forms of celestial beauty. Man, instead of keeping in Paradise, like an improved human animal of amiable instincts, and rising thence to a Pelagian heaven, has been permitted to have a history wherein all the wild beasts of rapacity come into his consciousness and pass into the annals of this world. On his own plane of being muster the hosts of heaven

and the hosts of hell, and hence the Christian course is not "progress" and "development," but conflict and victory; and the Christian change is not superficial, but radical, a new birth and a new creation out of chaos. Hence, too, a style of manhood and womanhood a great deal better than that of Adam and Eve, not instinctive and natural, but moral and spiritual; men and women who have met temptation and resisted it, who have been immured in sin and risen out of it with triumphal songs of redeeming love; not babies nursed in the sun, like flowers that vegetate in the tropic air, but men and women who have known evil and overcome it, who have met Satan in full armor and conquered him. Not to those who merely receive, but to those who OVERCOME, is promised the fruit of the tree of life.

Unquestionably the Scriptures describe the descent out of Paradise as "the fall of man." But they do not describe it as something which took God by surprise, or which foiled him in his plan and put back his work. It was a fall in order to a greater rise. It was a descent in order to find an ultimate and solid base for springing upward. It was a descent out of mere childhood, in order to find the true manhood of earth and the angelhood of the skies. In short, REDEMPTION was the prospective complement of creation, was involved in it, and completes it as its crowning glory.

It does not agree with our observation of childhood to designate it pre-eminently as the period of selfishness. It is the period of the sweetest and most unalloyed affection, with scarcely the dawn of evil propensity and passion, for the simple reason that the infantile consciousness is flooded with natural goodness. Hereditary evil lies in the deeps lower down, and is not suffered to be evolved and come to the surface till the period of moral choosing, when we are fit to assume the prerogatives of spiritual manhood. But the evil is there, biding its time, — the long and grisly train which so afflicted Gray in the prospect as he saw the children sporting upon the green. But it is held in abeyance during the first years when "heaven lies about us," or rather shines through us as the sun through crystals. It is not the heaven achieved, but imaged within us, and afterward lying behind us

in sunbright memories like fragrant fields on the hillside, which are receded from, but never out of sight even when we travel onward where evil springs up into consciousness, and we tread among the briers and thorns. The sorest temptations to selfishness come later, when the solemn alternatives of God or Mammon, Christ or the prince of this world, are urged upon us, and demand an eternal yea or nay. Hence ever and everywhere the Christian life has been a struggle and a conflict, not with unpropitious environment or something which lies outside of us and tasks our wisdom and patience, but with the hosts of darkness insurgent from the spiritual deeps of our own being, which prompt us to cast ourselves upon an Almighty Deliverer and Cleanser. The Christian experience, from Paul to Bunyan, whether Catholic or Protestant, out of which God has raised up the long train of witnesses who have signalized most the transforming power of the Gospel, is factitious and delusive, unless it be something more than education and development, — even a conflict with innate evil, a triumph over it, and a new creation out of ancient ruins. The party of Augustine did not prevail over the party of Pelagius because the former happened to outvote the latter, but because human nature, searched under the blaze of Gospel light, becomes conscious of troubles and wants which Pelagianism cannot reach with its shallow soundings.

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## Art. V. — FROTHINGHAM'S KEY TO THE PHILOSOPHIES.

*Philosophy as Absolute Science, founded on the Universal Laws of Being, and including Ontology, Theology, and Psychology, made one as Spirit, Soul, and Body.* By Ephraim L. Frothingham. Vol. I. Boston: Walker, Wise, & Co. 8vo. pp. 453.

This is a work of the old ambitious style; a new "Intellectual System of the Universe"; a comprehensive work, touching no solitary themes in science, exhausting no single department of thought, solving no detached problems, but embracing a complete philosophy of the universe, a full survey of the

entire domain of intellectual, moral, theological, and spiritual truth: not an exhaustive, analytical survey, of course, — that is for encyclopædias, — but an outline sketch of the territory occupied by all the knowledges.

The book would be an audacity too enormous to be tolerated, if the essence of it were not contained in a simple formula entirely easy of comprehension, and perfectly manageable; the faithful and sagacious application of which, in the three great departments of the universe, — the World, God, Man, — leads to the fully developed system. The author presumes not to take a place among the great creative thinkers of the world: he merely claims to have picked up the master key which opens the different chambers of Truth; a key which lay in everybody's way, which had been passed by, trodden on, taken up and flung down again as useless, by many a searcher on the highways of knowledge; a key which had been often described in well-known books, especially in the Bible, but which had been unaccountably neglected till now; a magical key, in some sort, which was destined not to be recognized before its charmed hour. He does not pretend to have examined all the chambers whose doors it opens, to have explored their secrets or catalogued their contents. No one man can do that. He avers that he has put the key into all the locks, and has found that it fits the wards and opens the doors. He has tried it so many times that he is confident now of being able to unlock every closet and secret archive; and on this ground he calls attention to it. The key that will do this must, of course, be *the* key. For himself he makes no pretension to knowledge. He does not profess to be a metaphysician, a theologian, or a seer. He has a very modest opinion of his own abilities and accomplishments. One thing only he is sure of, — that he has found the magical key, by which the metaphysician, the theologian, the seer, can enter the mysteries in their departments and get unquestionable truth.

He found this key by accident, as we say. Reading in one of Emerson's Essays, — we have forgotten the passage, — he came across a statement about marriage which kindled up his whole mind. The import of Mr. Emerson's saying was, that marriage consisted in the union of opposites by means of the

reconciling principle of love. Here was food for thought. Here, in fact, seemed to be a clew to many a labyrinth of thought. The male and the female, then, were opposites. This had been suspected and asserted before; the constitution of society, as interpreted by history, somehow assumed it. But how were they opposites? in what respects, and to what extent? Here the elaboration of Mr. Frothingham's system began, in an analysis of the male and female elements. Reflection gradually established these distinctions: — The male is active; the female is passive. The male is intellectual; the female is affectional. The male is conscious; the female is unconscious. The male is internal; the female is external. The male attribute is justice; the female attribute is pity. The male admires truth; the female admires goodness. The male is universal; the female is personal. The male is perceptive; the female is receptive. The male lives in principles; the female lives in details. The male organizes; the female disorganizes. The male is universal and vital; the female is partial and destructive. The male is orderly and regular; the female is fickle and diverse. The female has in every age and under every form of society been subjected to the male. It would seem to follow that the female qualities throughout must be subject to the male qualities for the purposes of production.

These male and female elements, then, — for this is the assumption, — are exactly and vehemently opposed to each other. The active and the passive, the intellectual and the affectional, the conscious and the unconscious, the rational and the impulsive, the internal and the external, the just and the tender, the truthful and the amiable, the orderly and the disorderly, are naturally at war; but the opposition is accompanied by an attraction that is equally strong: in fact, the greatest opposition is generally accompanied by the greatest attraction; and the closest and happiest marriages frequently are formed between individuals who, internally considered, have no points of sympathy. The self-sufficient man weds a dependent woman; the intellectual man chooses, or rather has appointed for him, a sensitive and sentimental woman for his mate; the prophet finds himself allied to a housewife; the

reformer is united for life to a shrinking conservative; the devotee of science is at one with a sentimental enthusiast. The union of opposites through an instinctive attraction for providential ends of production, and the sacrifice of the lower to the higher, of the impulsive to the rational, the passive to the active, the sentimental to the intellectual, the natural to the supernatural, the animal to the spiritual, for the same ends, — this is the law of marriage, nicely analyzed; a law which the institution of marriage enforces and illustrates in the most emphatic and obvious way.

But is this law confined to man and woman in this one estate of matrimony? Is it not a universal law? Does not the distinction of male and female hold everywhere? Are not the male and female elements everywhere set over against each other by radical repugnance, and everywhere attracted towards each other by a mysterious sympathy? Is not the principle of marriage a world-wide principle? This is now to be tested. We have always heard of male and female elements of mind; manly and womanly, masculine and feminine ideas. But on application of this formula it presently appears that these laws of opposition, attraction, union, — the marriage of male and female, — are represented in the whole organization of the mind. There are the religious sentiments set over against the moral; understanding is contrasted with instinct; perception with reception; intuition with reflection; imagination with fancy. The human mind has a spiritual or male department, comprising the reason; a material or female department, comprising the understanding and the instinct; and a mediatorial department, comprising the religious and moral sentiments.

Each of these departments again exhibits its oppositions and its attractions. Thus the reason presents to us as opposite poles truth and good, — harmonized in beauty. The understanding presents to us its demonstrative and philosophic region; its region of sensation; and its poetic region, mediating between the other two. A close examination discloses fresh subdivisions in each of these regions, illustrating still further the male and female qualities united by marriage. Thus, among the religious sentiments, spiritualism and nat-

uralism stand at opposite poles; intuition and veneration are in antagonism; while revelation mediates. Among the moral sentiments justice faces sympathy; satisfaction with one's self confronts approbation from others, and the idea of obligation reconciles the two. Once more, the social instincts are at variance with the individual instincts, and only through the domestic instincts is the bond of harmony found: the social instincts being masculine and vital; the individual instincts feminine and destructive; the domestic instincts mediatorial, constructive. Each of these regions of the instinctive nature, again, may be made to fall into similar contrasts.

From the individual turn to society, and you meet the same order of facts, — elements of positive, radical opposition, elements of harmony effecting reconciliation between them. There we find, universally, the governing and the governed; socialism and individualism; despotism and democracy. Incessant and omnipresent is the action of vital and destructive powers: conservatism and radicalism are ever at war. No society ever has existed, no society can be supposed to exist, without the antagonism of these forces, which represent respectively law and license, order and disorder, unity and diversity, construction and destruction, integration and disintegration; the tendency to equality and fraternity, the tendency to inequality, individualism, aristocracy, caste; the first internal, the second external, — the first masculine, the second feminine. Neither has any society been known to exist without the two opposing mental forces, — without a form of philosophy and a form of religion; the one representing thought, the other representing feeling; the one being intellectual, the other being sentimental; the one conscious, the other unconscious; the one internal, the other external; the two always in conflict, and by their conflict producing discussion and the movement of thought. Philosophy and democracy are in accord; aristocracy and the Church agree in spirit. Men are democrats and philosophers; women are devotees and aristocrats. Thought assails, undermines, decomposes, the creeds and sacraments of the Church. The Church lays thought under a ban. Faith is the reconciling principle which mediates between them, enabling man through the unconscious

action of the religious sentiments to grow from below upwards, and under the action of philosophy to develop from within outwards. In philosophy, besides, the transcendental or internal school shares dominion with the sensational or external school. Aristotle and Plato divide the world of speculation, and make that world resound with the tumult of the battle, until eclecticism steps in with its attempts at reconciliation, or scepticism effects a demolition of them both.

These indications lie open to the most casual vision on the very surface of society and of the mind. Indeed, you cannot mention anything, any idea, feeling, principle, that its opposite does not start instantly into the mind. A dualism bisects nature, and man, and existence.

All this points to a law governing the very constitution of the universe; a law of opposition, a law of attraction, a law of union; a duality, a trinity, a unity; two principles, reconciliation of the two principles by a third; a resulting union having collected these random hints one by one, by a somewhat loose and indiscriminate kind of induction. The next step, as we surmise, was to take the generalization arrived at, to assume the principle as universal, essential, absolute, and to follow it down towards a more complete and exhaustive interpretation of the details of the phenomenal world.

We have then two absolute principles: — I. An infinite principle, law, cause, life, one, universal, harmonious, absolute wisdom, love, and power, — the spirit of Deity, the Holy Ghost, threefold in manifestation as in being, declaring itself as truth, good, and beauty, in three absolute and infinite spheres. II. A finite principle, law, cause; characterized by diversity, partiality, separation; absolute guile, hatred, and destruction; threefold in manifestation likewise, as fraud, evil, and deformity; a law of darkness and death, a principle of death itself, its intellective, affective, and active elements combining to bring about chaos. These are simply the male and the female principles raised to the absolute power. As no life in mineral, plant, or animal can be produced without the conjunction of the male and the female, so the definite existence of the universe, including as it does divisibility, diversity, and multiplicity, — facts of imperfection and evil, — is

inconceivable except on the supposition of a universal sphere in every way opposed to the infinite, but susceptible of receiving its life and becoming productive from it. The infinite principle alone could not give birth to the creation, for on that supposition the infinite must project from itself its own opposite, which would be impossible. Man without woman begets no living creature. The finite constitutes the opposite sphere to the infinite, and supplies the necessary condition of existence, a law of attraction drawing them towards each other for fruitful conjunction. To the end that there may be a universe, the mysterious ineffable conjunction takes place. The finite principle becomes pregnant by the infinite principle, and the conscious Deity begotten by absolute life, and born out of absolute death, is produced; not at first spiritual wholly, and perfect, but imperfect and natural, with a divided consciousness, distinctly at one neither with the infinite nor the finite, — a dual being, exhibiting absolute existence in a natural state, the finite and the infinite laws being combined and represented in him, not integrated by the sacrifice of the lower to the higher.

The next step in this eternal process of spiritual birth is therefore the choice between the finite principle, which is partiality, diversity, and death, and the infinite principle, which is unity, universality, and life, — the consequent repudiation of the former and its subjection to the latter. Through this choice of the infinite law, the finite law was crucified, and a union of these opposites was effected; there was realized a divine sphere of life, a divine personality, which we may call the soul of Deity, the second person in the Godhead, the Father.

We have not yet, however, arrived at the conception of the individual deity, — the deity who creates a visible world, — the external deity, — the body, as it were, of God. The eternal process demands that the inward should have outward manifestation; should, so to speak, project itself in a palpable form. This projection — or "procession," to use the theological term — is the Son. He too is compounded of the two opposite principles; he too makes the choice between them; he compels the lower to be subject to the higher, by sacrificing

the natural, false, evil element; and the active, living, creating God stands in the plenitude of his divine energy over against this dark, dumb, natural, finite evil sphere of universal and indefinite death, which forever remains the fixed condition of God's definite consciousness, the source of finite material for the creation, and the ground of all the phenomena of existence that are antagonistic to the infinite God. Of course, it is understood that we speak here "after the fashion of men," describing in the foolish way of our understanding things that are ineffable mysteries to angels and archangels.

It is claimed now that a trinity is established as the fixed condition of all existence, the ground of a material universe. But where and whence shall we obtain the material for such a universe? The existence of it is involved in the very laws of thought. Each of the indefinite, absolute causes must have its indefinite, phenomenal substances, to give it outward expression; otherwise it would have no definite incarnation, and no capacity for being represented or manifested in the diversified manner required. These substances are not to be conceived as dead, inert masses of matter, but as external media rather, self-subsisting, susceptible of endless natural combinations under the agency of the creative powers. In each inheres its own life; each is improved by its own principle; and on their being combined in definite forms by an absolute power, their manifested phenomena spontaneously appear.

At the head of this material universe is placed man, a phenomenal being, made in the image of God, combining the two ethereal substances, and incarnating the two opposite principles in an external way, — made to be a medium through which God can most completely manifest himself; — a being capable of illustrating either law of life or death; capable of yielding to the finite principle, and losing himself in nature; capable also of yielding to the infinite principle of recognizing and uniting with spiritual and divine forms, of partaking the divine life, of expressing the celestial wisdom, and of becoming the outward image of the Divine perfection; — a threefold being, therefore, consisting of the opposing and the

combining elements, spirit, soul, body, — natural, supernatural, spiritual; the regions of his mind conformed to the laws of his being, fitting him to receive influxes from above and below, — each department of his mind, in fact, offering a field for the active play of the infinite and finite laws, in their repulsions and attractions; — a being fashioned to exist successively in three spheres of consciousness, in three atmospheres of influence, and in three forms of material expression; or, as Mr. Frothingham says, in three bodies. One of these spheres is a vital and combining, the other is a destructive and separating force, rendering necessary a continuous creating process by means of the supernatural medium of the soul through which the divine power acts in the construction, combination, and manifestation of the several forms of life.

This is but a meagre account of the author's conception of the laws of absolute and of phenomenal being; but it not only is as much as our space permits, it is as much as we care to present, — for to attempt more would lead us into a complexity of detail which might confuse a very simple idea, and make understanding impossible.

We are prepared now to appreciate the peculiarity of Mr. Frothingham's philosophical method as prescribed by these primary positions, existence being conditioned on the action of these antagonistic principles of life and death, and phenomenal substance serving as a ground for the demonstration of absolute, divine causes. The phenomenal sphere constituting a medium through which the absolute causes may be represented in a natural, and manifested in a spiritual manner, — the laws of matter being susceptible of realizing, as it were, an objective experience in the Divine consciousness, — it is perfectly plain, it is indeed self-evident, that the only key to the truth of things, the only clew to knowledge, is the science of Correspondences; the only available method is the method of Analogy; the only sufficient faculty is the Imagination.

The ordinary inductive and deductive processes are at fault altogether, for they always move in straight lines, either from particulars to universals, or from universals to particulars. Logical processes are at fault altogether, for they act only on a straight line, feeling along a single principle, by way of

premise and conclusion. The method ordinarily styled scientific can accomplish nothing, for it recognizes nothing but the natural and external. The method ordinarily styled metaphysical can accomplish nothing, because it assumes the facts of consciousness as fixed, simple, and ultimate. The man of science ends in materialism; the man of intuition ends in pantheism. A method is called for which can interpret the relations that are established between the two opposite principles, and can trace the laws which regulate and determine the bearing of one on the other. Says the author: —

"The failure to obtain a conception of the laws of correspondence as the foundation for analogy, — which represents the relationships between internal and external, and between spiritual and natural things, — and the consequent neglect of analogy as a philosophical method or form, has prevented any advance in the philosophy either of the human mind or of the universe, and has confined it almost entirely to the sphere of psychology, which is a region of empiricism; a region of empiricism, because no conception of the opposite spiritual causes which all things are created to represent, or of the natural laws which constitute the life of human nature, can here be obtained; it is a region in which nothing but discordant and deceptive appearances can be known, in reasoning from which nothing but confusion and contradiction can result."

The absolute science is therefore the science of correspondences. Mr. Frothingham's study is bestowed on the subject of correspondences; his claim to originality is based on his discovery of the laws of correspondence. Let none anticipate that at this point he will fall into the powerful wake of Swedenborg. The Swedish seer had much to say about correspondences, and claimed to have disclosed the science of correspondences; but in fact his doctrine of correspondences is no doctrine of correspondences at all, for in his view no two things exist in relationships to each other which allow of such a thing as correspondence. There is no antagonism, no opposition, no contrast. One thing is not set off against another, in his theory of the universe and of man. Swedenborg with main force asserted the existence of a single principle immanent and permanent in all things. This principle is let down by "discreet degrees" from the highest spheres to

lower, from lower to lowest; the spheres are distinguished and divided; they are not contrasted or opposed. The order of existence is a straight line up and down; a line endless in length, but all along made of the same stuff. There is darkness as well as light, but the darkness and the light are both alike to his Deity. There is death as well as life, but death is the negation of life, not its enemy. From such a view of the universe, one may get resemblances, — similitudes, reflections, coincidences; but he can get no correspondences. Internals may be mirrored in externals, but it would be a mistake to call such a shadowy repetition a correspondence. Spiritual things may be repeated under natural shapes by material things; but it would be a misuse of terms to call that correspondence. Things earthly may suggest things heavenly; things human may contrive in a palpable symbolical form the significance of things divine; but that does not fill out our idea of an analogy. Mr. Frothingham allows that Swedenborg possessed a singular insight into the actual facts of correspondence in their more external forms, but he denies to him an appreciation of the scientific laws of correspondence.

Those laws are not so simple, nor so easily apprehended, as some imagine. It is true that the world of phenomena images and represents externally the world of absolute principles; that the spiritual reflects itself in the natural, the internal in the external; that "the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and godhead, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made"; that physical representation is in fact the ground of all consciousness, and of all expression of consciousness; that language itself does but represent this relation between internal or mental, and external or physical things. But as internal and external things are in the most violent contrast to each other; as the spiritual and the natural phenomena have their ground in opposite principles; as the physical creation stands over against God; as the finite at every point contradicts the infinite, — it follows that these relations cannot be simple and direct, but must be complex and inverted. The universe shows God, as a face is shown in a mirror, reversed. We must read his name backwards in order to read it aright. Since natural phenomena are the

very opposite of what they appear to be, to take them at their own showing, and accept their obvious as being their real sense, would lead to immediate and utter falsehood. We must bear in mind the radical oppugnancy between natural and spiritual things, the illusive character of all natural phenomena, and the necessarily inverted order of all development, if we would apprehend the truth in this science of sciences. Especially must we bear in mind the inverted order of all mental development. There is a double and contrary action of the forces that govern human development. Under the operation of one law the individual grows from the lowest organic plane upward towards the fulness and perfection of his form. Under the operation of another law, his interior nature, his mind, unfolds itself from within outwards. The changes of Substance are governed by the first law; the changes of Form are governed by the second. The highest principles, consequently, are associated with the lowest forms, and the lowest principles with the highest forms. The destructive personal laws are exhibited in combination with forms corresponding with vital laws of the mind, which represent spiritual life; and the vital personal laws are exhibited in combination with the destructive laws of the mind, which represent spiritual death. Thus, in the state, the vital democratic principle is associated with the destructive aristocratic form, and the destructive spirit of individualism tends to the vital form of democracy. In the Church the loftiest communications of supernatural truth coexist with symbols the least expressive, and with formularies the least intelligible. The Church presented the most perfect representation of the spiritual life when its subjects were so undeveloped in intelligence and sentiment that they understood nothing, and were obliged to be content with dumb show and "dead languages." As they became rational, and discarded the dumb show, and insisted on living tongues, the glory of the revelations departed.

This law of contrariety makes the study of correspondences exceedingly difficult; and as that study is pushed into the more hidden recesses of the human mind, and into the more occult regions of society, — as it is carried into history, philos-

ophy, government, art, literature, it introduces the student into labyrinths that seem at first sight to be without a clew. Besides this, there are three spheres of correspondence analogous to the three spheres of the human mind. There are the correspondences of the Fancy, which presents the most partial, external, and superficial resemblances between outward appearances and the contents of the mind; resemblances that are fantastical, grotesque, deceptive, and transient. Then there are the correspondences of the Imagination, which are internal, intellectual, and real; the imagination recognizing the true symbolism between natural and spiritual things. Finally, the Reason gives intuitions of the universal laws of being, discloses the ground on which the laws of correspondence are ordained to exist, and thus *explains* the relations existing between natural and spiritual things; relations which fancy had *distorted*, and which imagination had been able to *represent* merely in a symbolical form.

We must not be expected to follow Mr. Frothingham through or into the wide fields of illustration where he exhibits the laws of correspondence, — in the material and ethereal spheres of the universe, — in the general forms of the human race, — in the structure of the human constitution, — in the structure of society, — in the laws of succession or of natural growth and development, in church, state, and philosophy, — in the history of art, — and in the rationale of transcendentalism. These chapters must be carefully studied in order to be understood. No synopsis would convey any notion of their contents. Necessary as they are to give a full comprehension of his idea of correspondence and its laws, we must let them pass, and must leave our readers to derive the general character of their speculation from the hints thrown out above. A bright and thoughtful mind — remembering the first principles laid down as the basis of the philosophy, the existence, namely, of two absolute and hostile principles, — holding clearly the laws by which these principles are controlled in their mutual action, the laws of opposition, attraction, and marriage, — and allowing for the rule of contrariety, which regulates the correspondences between natural and spiritual things — will perhaps be able to work out for itself some of

the most important classifications and conclusions as well as the author himself has done it, for he commenced on the same task precisely without the advantage which he affords his readers. The prescription is simple. Find in any department the two contrasted spheres; fix the two opposite poles that represent the infinite and the finite principles; apply the laws of inverted growth and development, the law of growth from below upwards, the law of development from within outwards; and the sum, through patient figuring, will prove. Discover the male and female, — the old traditions of mankind, the ancient symbolisms, cabbalas, philosophemes, theosophies, of the race, will help you greatly in the discovery of them; marry the male and female together, by marriage rendering the female subject to the male, and your work is done. Discover the male and female: the male and female *elements*, — air, water, light, heat; the male and female *forces*, — repulsion, expansion, attraction, contraction; the male and female *orbs*, — the sun, according to primeval lore, standing as the former, the moon, by the same time-honored consent, standing for the latter, the stars mediating between them as fountains of spiritual influence; the male and female *races*, — Malay, Mongolian, Indian, Ethiopian, — Malay and Indian being male, Mongolian and Ethiopian female, the Caucasian as relatively spirit constituting the universal and supernatural sphere; the male and female *faculties* in the mind, — reason and understanding, — with the religious and moral sentiments between, as communicators of the divine influence; the male and female elements which constitute *society*, — the element of democracy, and the element of aristocracy; the male and female elements in the *church*, and in the *state;* the male and female elements in *art;* — and the position is gained from which knowledge in each department is commanded.

For instance, the author applies his formula to the history of philosophy, and concludes that there must necessarily have been three grand spheres or epochs in the philosophical development of the human mind: an ontological sphere, representing the spiritual principle; a psychological sphere, representing the natural principle; and an eclectical sphere, representing the principle of union. Each of these spheres, again, he finds,

must illustrate the threefold movement of the opposing and reconciling principles. A statement must be made from the spiritual side; another statement must be made from the natural side; a third statement must be made from the side of reconciliation. In each sphere male and female must be married. The task is therefore an easy one. It is to arrange the several systems in accordance with this formula. There must be a material ontology or an ontological statement from the finite position. There must be a spiritual ontology, or an ontological statement from the position of the infinite; and there must be an eclectical ontology, or an ontological statement from the position of reconciliation. So with psychology, — so with eclecticism. Read the best histories of philosophy, — Brucker, Ritter, Hegel, Chalybæus, — and you find that the systems correspond with the classifications. The schools appear promptly as to time and place, — the internal and the external, the physiological and the dynamical, the sensational and the transcendental. The opposite statements are made fully and exhaustively; the reconciling view infallibly comes in at the end of the term. The framework for the history may be constructed antecedently to any study of the separate systems, and all the different phases of movement in the development of philosophical speculation may be predicted before the name of a single writer is known. Reading gives nothing more than the titles of the books in which the passages of thought are recorded, and the names of the men who were instrumental in conducting the providential march of speculation. What was said or written — what was necessarily said or written — was known beforehand. Such and such must have been the course pursued by the human mind under the laws of opposition, attraction, and marriage.

Mr. Frothingham's volume opens with a sketch of the history of philosophy, — very remarkable for its correctness and compactness, — which the author avers was constructed and written while he was utterly unacquainted, not merely with the works of the great masters in philosophy, but with the reporters of their ideas. On submitting it to them later for verification, his judgment was confirmed by the foremost writers in that department of literature, whose corroborating

testimony he freely quotes. Egypt, Persia, and Judæa fill their allotted places. Thales, Anaximander, and Anaxagoras duly appear, confronting Anaximenes, Diogenes, and Heraclitus. The Italic and Eleatic schools range themselves face to face. The Sophists are punctually on the ground. Socrates is not behindhand when expected. Plato and Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus, come to time. A place was provided for the reconciling idea at the close of the Greek period; the Gnostics and Alexandrines step in to fill it. Europe is ready for the inauguration of a new philosophical epoch, the last one prior to the era of Absolute Science; the nominalists and the realists, the scholastics and the mystics, announce themselves as masters of ceremonies. Something like Bacon is looked for; Lord Verulam does not meanly disappoint the hope, but ushers in the modern psychological method as the hand of the dial touches the appointed hour. Hobbes and Gassendi step into the arena of ethics, and do battle in behalf of the finite and infinite principles. Locke and Descartes are the champions for the same principles in the intellectual lists. Spinoza and Malebranche do good service under the direction of the master formula. Once more the sceptics bring in their iconoclastic hammers. Once more the eclectics introduce their paint and glue. Leibnitz tries his skill at splicing systems. Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin, clear the ground for Comte and the "positivists," and the end arrives, according to programme. The adepts in philosophy, the cunning disciples and dexterous knights of special systems, may take exception to some of Mr. Frothingham's classifications and criticisms; but so far as a general knowledge of them justifies an opinion, his arrangement of them seems to be just, and his judgment of them discriminating.

We think now that we have presented an intelligible idea of the main characteristics of Mr. Frothingham's philosophical system. But there is one point which we must try in a few words to make more clear. That is, the nature of the mediating principle, — the principle of marriage. The male and female principles pretty clearly define themselves. The power that unites them is not so manifest to our readers, as yet. Eclecticism, or the spirit of compromise, has been mentioned

as representing it. But it only *represents* it, in the natural sphere. It is not it.

The power that unites the finite to the infinite — that marries the male and the female — is no other than the spiritual power, — the power of God acting through the soul of things, to animate, quicken, and regenerate. "Marriage in all cases is realized through the act of God"; and to the end of its realization, "the human constitution contains in every one of its departments a supernatural principle, constituting a medium through which the Divine activity can operate in the combination of the infinite and finite laws in definite forms." All the natural forms of truth, of good, and of use are produced necessarily, therefore, by the Divine providence, whose care is incessantly exerted in directing and counteracting the destructive tendency of the finite force, whose influence extends throughout the entire domain of the constitution of man. Marriage could not be effected by the mind, because all its conclusions are a compromise between opposite and irreconcilable views of truth and of good. Marriage could not be effected by the will, because the development of the will is partial and one-sided, — its ideal and actual states can never be made to agree, and its determinations are always out of accord with its actions. Hence the necessity that every department of the mind should have an active and constructive principle through which the Divine activity may operate; hence the necessity that media for this activity should be providentially instituted in society, by connection with which the creating, preserving, educating, and regenerating grace may be imparted to individual souls. These providential institutions are specified as the family, the state, the church, — the origin of which Mr. Frothingham refers to supernatural inspiration, and subjection to which he supposes is accomplished through the productive powers of the mind and of the will. The Divine inspiration working effectively through these powers imparts to the mind in a spontaneous and unconscious manner vital and productive truths which it could not otherwise comprehend, secures an obedient recognition of these truths, and gets allegiance to the institutions which embody them. The result is a comparatively harmonious condition, in which

the external and affectional — in other words, the female powers — are subjected to the internal and intellectual, or the male powers; good is subordinated to truth, and the act of sacrifice, so essential to natural progress as well as to spiritual life, is accomplished.

It seems needless to say anything more in explanation of the leading ideas in the volume before us, though a great deal more might be said, and still leave many important features undescribed. A brief characterization of the volume, tending to a judgment of its tendencies, must needs, however, be made.

The weight of the system rests entirely on this single point, — the absolute and essential antagonism between good and evil, truth and falsehood, life and death. Is there, or is there not, such an antagonism? Is what we call evil, under any aspect, a principle, a law, a positive force, a thing? Has it being in the universe? Has it existence independent of our relative consciousness? They who answer these questions in the affirmative virtually admit Mr. Frothingham's first grand assumption, of two absolutes, and, admitting that, can hardly fail to follow them into and through the consequences that flow from it; for no one has ever before developed those consequences so fully and logically as he; no one else has elaborated from it a consistent scheme of thought. Is evil, falsity, diversity, death, anything more than a human experience in this sphere? Is it a power, a principle, an entity? If it is, it has an absolute character and is an absolute law, and may as well be posited fairly over against good, truth, unity, life, as an opposing force, having its seat among the primeval elements of the universe, — a throne facing the throne of God. Evil is either an absolute principle, or it is nothing, — in other words, nothing but a transient phase of feeling, nothing but an idea, nothing but a notion, nothing but a name we give to a certain class of phenomena in our moral development, nothing but a definition of some peculiar sensations in our sentimental structure, nothing but a word used to describe certain painful or afflicting emotions in our body, our mind, our soul, or our spirit.

There is, we apprehend, no middle ground to be taken here. Among the believers in a single supreme principle, will, law,

or power, there is and there has always been a disposition to reduce evil to its smallest dimensions, to qualify its malignant character, to remand it to a place among the negative quantities, and, as far as possible, to resolve it into some form of good; in a word, to get rid of it as a substantial fact in the constitution of the world. The materialists, of every school, regard evil as a form of crudity or defect; it is the mass of elements yet unorganized; in society, it is an unadjusted relation; in the mind, it is an unbalanced state of thought, feeling, or will; wherever it is, it is a condition to be outgrown in time, as the plastic forces developed by the organic movements of the world get control over the rude chaos of material, and bring from it the cosmos. The followers of natural science speak of evil as an "evanescent phenomenon," passing away, as ignorance passes away before knowledge, as weakness passes away before vigor, as disease passes away before the appliances of scientific medicine. The spiritualists of every school, — using the term *spiritualist* loosely, to describe those who start from the assumption of a single transcendent will or spiritual force, and regard creation as an efflux from it, — the mystics, the idealists, the intellectual pantheists, the pure theists likewise, who believe in the existence of one infinite God, — are disposed by their theories to eliminate evil from the universe of matter and of mind. Some speak of it as the shadow of good, — the dark side of the world which is turned away from the sun, the reverse aspect of things, the dumb, gloomy, impenetrable abyss of vacancy and night, that portion of creation wherein God is not. Others treat it as good in disguise, — good not yet recognized in its true character by short-sighted, pleasure-loving mortals; perhaps the highest good that is bestowed by the Giver of all good, — rejected, slandered, vilified, because it is the highest, as benefactors and saviours always are. This seems to be Mr. Emerson's idea when he says, "The lesson of history is the good of evil. Good is a good doctor, but bad is a better." Others again contemplate evil as a phase in man's conscious experience, — a passage which he must struggle through on his way to the divine life, — a fact of terrible import to him individually, but no fact in the sight of God. For the sake of his discipline, as

the means to his development, with a view to his moral perfection, he is constituted to feel and act *as if* such a thing as evil existed, when in fact no such thing as evil does exist or can exist. Evil is self-consciousness, the claim to individual worth as a creature, — a claim which must be made before one can feel his own value, but which must be repudiated before one can become a spiritual person. Something like this we understand to be the view of Swedenborg, whose theory of the Divine life is inconsistent with the admission of an element of pure malignity in the administration of the universe.

Thinkers of the Unitarian school, who, if we understand them aright, simply appeal to the "moral sense" as attesting the absolute fact of evil, claiming at the same time that our moral sentiments reflect truly the moral sentiments of the Deity, who must accordingly set his seal on the judgments of the human conscience, virtually come to the same conclusion respecting the non-existence of evil; for the moral sense is so far from uniform in its verdicts, the facts of the moral consciousness are so various and discordant, the standards of good and evil are so partial and conflicting, that, in the absence of any *philosophy* of evil, the appeal to the moral sense cannot be taken as conclusive as to the fact of its absolute existence. That some notion of evil belongs to the universal conscience of mankind, is no proof that there is such an entity, such a thing, such a law, or principle, or force, as evil. It may be a notion of the universal conscience, and nothing more.

The issue then fairly appears to lie between those who hold the absolute existence of evil, and those who do not; that is, between those who regard evil as a thing, and those who regard it as no thing, but as an accident of things, an incident to things, or a relation of things. All the former accept some form of dualism. Whoever believes in intrinsic evil, — in any single intrinsic evil, — whoever believes that any one institution, system, arrangement, ordinance, deed, is evil *per se*, evil under all circumstances, and in all places, and in all eyes, — belongs to this class of thinkers, and may as well adopt their entire scheme from the first. A drop of pure

malignity involves an infernal law as much as an ocean of it does. A single imp of darkness implies a realm of darkness as much as a legion does. Now to those who hold dualism we can commend this system of Mr. Frothingham as quite worthy of their acceptance. The doctrine was never stated so clearly before; it was never so fairly and comprehensively presented; it was never so thoroughly carried out in its applications. In fact, it never was till now elaborated at all; it never was conceived at all as a theory. The introduction of the third mediating principle relieves it of all its harshness; and the perpetual action of this principle through the supernatural regions of the mind disarms its apparent contradiction. The system as thus presented is in the highest degree honorable to human nature, to the constitution of the universe, and to the character of God. It is throughout consistent with itself. Its multitudinous parts cohere. There is a place for everything, and everything is in its place; there is a reason for everything, an explanation of everything, and for everything an interpretation. It is noble, generous, hopeful, and strengthening. It blinks nothing, it forces nothing, and it exaggerates nothing. If we could accept its leading postulate, — the absolute and essential nature of evil, the finite law, — we should find no difficulty in accepting any of the subordinate features of the philosophy.

Other advantages the system affords in the solution of philosophical problems, apart from the logical ground it furnishes to the believers in absolute evil. It meets fairly and boldly the question of natural existence, of a finite phenomenal world, of creation. It accounts for the distinction between the one and the many. It furnishes a basis for personality separate from God's, which no philosophical theory has hitherto succeeded in doing, which Mr. Henry James, in his remarkable book, "Substance and Shadow," has so earnestly and powerfully — but as we think so ineffectually — tried to do. It gives an account of man, and of his place in the universe as a conscious being. It supplies a systematic classification of his powers and faculties. It renders justice also, in a singular way, to the adverse sides of philosophic thought. It legitimates fate and freedom, stability and progress, law and

spontaneity, conservatism and change. The intuitions of the mind have their due; the blunt understanding is appreciated. No class of thinkers have cause to complain of slighted merits; and yet no effort is made to conciliate any class. There is dogmatism, necessarily; but there is no dogmatism of clique, circle, or sect. There is no petty animosity, no mean personal disparagement, no misrepresentation in place of argument, no partisan endeavor to decry one system for the benefit of another. Each school finds itself dispassionately classified, not as if by an individual, but as if by a law. So remarkably true is this that it is hard to quarrel with the author on purely speculative grounds. He seems to allow everything, and to concede a dignified place to everything; and none but bigoted exclusives can take exception to his notice of their pet doctrine. If we may say so, although the system is founded on radical contradiction, it leaves room for no contradiction, but makes foemen friends without changing face.

We do not by any means insinuate that this new philosophy disarms all opposition. Quite the contrary; it will provoke the most violent opposition from all sides. The chief assaults on it will, however, be made, not from the speculative, but from the practical direction, and especially from the quarter of social ethics. For here the system stands in most undisguised hostility to accepted views. Mr. Frothingham is compelled by the very axioms of his philosophy to be conservative of that which the spirit of the age is trying earnestly to put away, and reactionary against the movements which the spirit of the age is pressing with all the might of its will. In the triumphs of modern progress he sees the triumph of the natural principle, which is the law of evil. Our doctrine of liberty is to him a doctrine of the Devil; and the domes and minarets that gleam before us, and are mistaken for the heavenly Jerusalem, are in his view the towers of the city of death. The finite law is now running the full length of its tether; and man, dragged along in its leash, is dashing into every species of ruin and self-destruction. The end of the age is approaching fast, preparatory to the dawning of the new spiritual age, which does not grow out of this by any means, but simply

succeeds it by the supremacy of the opposite law. Mr. Frothingham's assumption of the finite law pledges him to enmity against every modern reform and innovation in society, character, art, literature, morals. He even forgets for a moment the calmness which his system should breathe into its disciple, so far as to pronounce wicked the most earnest movements of our "humanity." He repels with horror the modern theories in regard to the nature and function of woman, and is persuaded that our championship of woman's rights is war upon the very constitution of society. Woman represents the finite, natural principle, — the principle which is ordained to be in subjection; and to raise her to an equal position with man, to claim for her similar functions, to concede to her equal rights in any region, is plainly to repudiate the fundamental laws of the universe. Her sphere is the sphere of the affections. With the sphere of truth and justice she has nothing in common, and her presence there can serve only to introduce disorder. The condition of the negro, for the like reason, is providentially a condition of servitude. Slavery is his ordained lot as belonging to the female race, the race which represents the finite principle. The doctrine of his equality with the Caucasian on any ground, personal, social, civil, moral, religious, is of the essence of unreason; and the attempt to put the doctrine in practice by the antislavery men of this country is a daring assault on the framework of society.

The system, in a word, involves "conservatism" in every direction. It is conservative in church and state, in science, literature, and art. Mr. Frothingham believes in monarchical forms of government, as being best suited for the maintenance of the democratic principle; characterizes as fortunate the restoration of the empire in France by Napoleon III.; is confident that individualism in America, with democratic institutions, is bringing the people to anarchy and ruin. The present age he regards consistently as an age of decadence; art is degraded, architecture has fallen, music has lost its inspirations and accepts the office of ballad-singer in churches and strolling minstrel to the fancy. Naturalism is rapidly coming into supremacy in thought and sentiment and life; and natu-

ralism is death. To the large class of conservatives we cordially commend this volume as a noble text-book, — a grand summary of arguments in favor of their positions, a scientific defence of their ground. They need such an advocate at present. For conservatism lately has been getting shabby. It has no philosophy of its own, — it has no faith; the argument is on the other side; so is the aspiration and the hope. It has no strength save in custom; no prestige save in prejudice; no trust save in tradition. It falls back stubbornly on routine, and fiercely asseverates antiquated truisms without a shadow of demonstration or a rag of reasoning. Its state is truly pitiable. Mr. Frothingham has rendered it a great service, for which he should receive its hearty gratitude; for he has done more than reinstate it in its old place of honor: he has robed it with a new dignity; he has traced its lineage back to the origin of created things.

Of the theological bearing of the volume we have been reviewing, it is not timely now to speak; another volume soon to be published will present fully the theological side of the system. It is clearly enough foreshadowed in the pages before us, and no great sagacity is required to forecast it in its main features. This, however, we shall not attempt to do, lest we should be guilty of some misrepresentation. We have only to add, therefore, an expression of our cordial thanks to Mr. Frothingham for his thoughtful, earnest, and profound book, and our unfeigned hope that it will find many appreciative readers. We welcome it as a valuable contribution to the literature of philosophy. We welcome it as an original and remarkable scheme of thought.

But more heartily still we welcome it as a touchstone of opinions in our time. It brings popular theories to the confessional; sets them front to front with each other and with themselves, and makes them frankly own what they mean. It draws the lines firmly between existing systems, fairly separating the sheep from the goats. It teaches us where we stand, and whither we are tending. The chapters on Church and State, on Aristocracy and Democracy, are searching and exceedingly bold. The closing chapter on Transcendentalism will be instructive to the great body of professed Transcenden-

talists, and suggestive to all. We sincerely hope that the extreme antagonism of its opinions on some points of peculiar interest at this moment, will not cause the book to be flouted, or flung down in disgust, or coldly passed by. The book deserves to be read and pondered by the leading minds in our community. They may not be convinced by it. They may discover its weak points, and, pulling out a single loose stone, may bring the entire fabric to the ground. Whether they be convinced or not, they will be able at the end of their criticism to give better reasons for the faith they rest in.

Nor will they find the task of reading a formidable one. The work, it is true, is not the work of a scholar: the literary execution is not faultless; the style is often cumbrous and hard; the diction is monotonous; the mind is frequently fatigued with repetitions and unnecessary abstractions; the pages are seldom illuminated by flashes of fancy, and never glow with impassioned eloquence. But the steadfastness of the writer's purpose, the firmness and clearness of his thought, the reach of his insight, the inflexibility of his logic, seize and bear on the attention, while the great variety of ideas that pass under review, and the vital character of the topics treated, make the chapters absolutely in parts entertaining. The eye always lingers with pleasure on such noble octavo pages, fair in paper and beautiful in type. Very often the mind lingers as well, to collect the full significance of some bold statement, or to fix the outline of some broad generalization. The volume is full of incidental thoughts of great value even to those who are not philosophers. And we must award to it the praise implied in the acknowledgment that, whether the philosophy as a system be pronounced sound or unsound, no person can carefully peruse the book without obtaining a larger view of the universe, a profounder faith in Providence, and a more spiritual conception of God.

## Art. VI. — THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.

1. *The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man, with Remarks on Theories of the Origin of Species by Variation.* By Sir Charles Lyell, F. R. S. Philadelphia. 1863.
2. *Annual of Scientific Discovery for* 1864. Art. *Geology.*
3. *Evidences as to Man's Place in Nature.* A Course of Lectures by Prof. Huxley.

We intend in this article to give a summary of the facts which have lately been brought to light, bearing on the question of the past duration of the human race, and incidentally on the question of the development of man from the lower animals. Our motive is not to establish or to controvert the evidence which geologists have accumulated, but, assuming its substantial truth, to see how it bears on our previously formed ideas. We do not propose to examine the question of its effect on the credibility of the Bible history and chronology. There is another doubt which it is adapted to create, more deep-reaching than one concerning the book of Genesis; a doubt, that is, whether the deductions from the long and splendid labors of scientific men, as embodied in the prevalent ideas of man's position relative to the whole series of animated existences on the earth, are not overturned, suggesting at least a painful scepticism as to the possibility of firmly fixing any scientific conclusions.

The nature of the views that may be supposed to spring from a hasty and partial knowledge of these facts, is well shown in the following words from the Monthly Journal of the American Unitarian Association, for 1863: —

> "Science has gone behind the Garden of Eden, and shown us man far away in the geologic ages, but little removed from the brute, and climbing by slow millenniums through weary stone periods into that advanced stage of intellectual and moral life which tradition ascribes to the Paradise watered by the Tigris and Euphrates." — p. 319.

Here are four propositions, of which the first may be dismissed as undisputed. The other three, (designed doubtless as a strong rhetorical statement of what is true,) taken in their most natural sense, are not justified by any facts that have

come to our knowledge. We will take them in the order in which they stand.

I. "Science shows us man far away in the geologic ages." The old geological divisions, Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary rocks, have been divided and subdivided by the progress of science into more than thirty consecutive formations. Over these, and of course later, is the great mass of loose material forming a large part of the surface of the earth. It is only in this surface formation, in none of the thirty-four rock formations, that human remains have been found. A more particular statement will make more striking this recentness of human relics.

The latest grand division of the rocks is divided by Lyell into three periods, named from the different proportions in which their fossil remains coincide specifically with existing races. In the lowest, the fauna, as compared with the previous strata, — that is, the latest of the secondary series, — has a striking resemblance to the present; but only a few, and some doubt if any, *species* are identical. In the second division, a considerable number of species are identical with those now living. In the third, the proportion rises in some instances as high as ninety per cent. That is, the animals existing in the latest rock formations were largely identical in species with those now living on the earth. But there are no human remains here.

After this rock formation, differing from it by an almost complete change of structure, — namely, from rocks to loose, and of course easily shifted materials, — comes the period the whole of which has been geologically termed the Present; because the general conformation of the earth's surface has been throughout what it is now, and the animal and vegetable world filled with essentially the same genera and species that now exist. It is in this formation alone that the human remains spoken of have been found.

But this period has been divided into two portions, the chief difference being that in the first part some animals were in existence that have since become extinct. But no animal or plant, not existing in the first, is known to have existed since, unless man is the exception. No animal or plant now known

to exist is supposed to have originated since man was first an inhabitant of the globe. We are not aware that any kind of plant has become extinct since man existed. Some kinds of animals have become extinct. It is well known that one remarkable species of bird, the Dodo, of the Mauritius, has become extinct within a very recent historic period. It is then the slightest possible change in the organic world which marks the earliest supposed date of man's existence as different from the present; namely, the extinction of a few species of the larger terrestrial animals, such as men would be sure to hunt and destroy.

There is obvious propriety in applying the term Present to the whole period in which the vegetable world has remained identically what it is now. Lyell gives a diagram which illustrates at once this uniformity of vegetable species from the beginning of the present era, and the process by which we are able to divide this same era into several consecutive portions. Near Cromer, in England, are found the remains of an ancient forest, in a bed resting immediately on the chalk. One familiar with our common forest and aqueous vegetation would have found himself entirely at home in that ancient forest, the roots of which still cling, as they grew, in the soil. He could have picked cones of two kinds of fir-trees now common, branches of the yew, berries of the sloe, blossoms of the Menyanthus or buck-bean, and of the white and yellow pond-lilies, berries of the alder, and acorns. But no trace of man is found here. Over this forest have accumulated great deposits of vegetable remains, lignite; over these the drift of the boulder period, the remains of the wonderful era of glaciers; and after this, those deposits in which human remains have been found. That is, these traces of human beings are found only in the later section of the present era, dividing it by that which is its most remarkable feature, the glacial period.*

So much for the first proposition. Instead of being shown "far away in the geologic ages," man now stands where he

* Some geologists regard the glacial drift as the beginning of the present era. It is a question of terms rather than facts. It affects none of the reasoning of this article.

was always supposed to stand, at the very end, — no plant or animal known or believed to have been introduced on the earth later than he. The earliest traces of him yet found only show him in connection with the last appearance of a few species of wild animals; but these clearly belonging, by formation, habits, and generic relations, to the existing fauna. If a great convulsion should overwhelm the existing continents, and embalm the relics of what now is in a sediment hardening afterwards into rock, some far-off explorer in these relics of a remote age would set down as contemporary, geologically, the remains of the present day and all that has been since the tertiary period; these ancient men that we are speculating about, and the extinct animals that were their companions, and perhaps Sir Charles Lyell's book in some crushed library, all going together, as remains of one era. This is what Geology means by contemporary. And this whole period might be denominated the human period, as characterized by the appearance of the human race in its later portion, and at the last forming its chief terrestrial, mammalian feature. No naturalist of that time would hesitate to point to man as the concluding fact in the organic history of this age.

II. In order to make a clear statement of the facts relating to the second proposition, that which asserts the nearly brutish condition of the original man, it will be necessary to recount somewhat in detail the discoveries that have been made. They may be grouped under four heads. First, discoveries in peat-bogs. In certain remarkable peat-bogs in Denmark, there are found in the lowest part the remains of forests of pine, such as are not now, nor within historic periods have been, known to grow there. The next higher stage of the peat is filled with the remains of an oak growth, equally with the pine unknown as an existing growth there within historic times. Still higher are remains of beech forests, such as are now and have been for about two thousand years growing on the surface. Some tools of stone have been found in the lowest stage, that of the pines. Tools of bronze are found in the peat of the oak period. In the same region, in what are called kitchen-refuse heaps, which are piles of clam and oyster shells

and other similar relics, are also found stone implements, similar to those of the lower peat. The character of the shells indicates that these heaps were formed when the Baltic was less closed from the open sea than now. No remains of mammalia have been found, except of species now existing. The few human bones found indicate a race similar to the Lapps now inhabiting the northern part of Europe.

Next are discoveries among the remains of Lake dwellings. The remains of villages are found in the shallow water near the shores of several Swiss lakes. They are supposed to have been built on piles; the motive of selecting such a situation being a matter of conjecture. Traces of a similar practice are found in ancient history, and it is said the Papuans build in this way now. Lyell also says there are signs of a similar custom in Switzerland in recent times. Abundant relics of the manufactures of the people who lived in those villages are found at the bottom of the lakes. They seem to have belonged to successive ages, for in some places the tools are of stone or bone, in others of bronze. Associated with the remains of the earliest, or stone period, are found traces of wheat and barley and of bread made of them, of a kind of plaited cloth, and of the domestic animals that are now common. Among the remains of the period of bronze are also found some iron implements, and coins of gold and silver, strongly suggestive of quite recent times. Few human remains have been found here. One skull, referred to the stone period, agrees very closely with the characteristics of the people now living there. Some calculations based on the rate of accumulation of gravel at the mouth of a river give six or seven thousand years as the probable interval since the first deposits of tools or weapons were made.

Under the head of tools found in ancient gravel-beds, a great number of facts might be mentioned; but these discoveries are of less interest than those made in certain caves, and do not prove anything respecting the antiquity of man that is not better proved otherwise. We pass then to the discoveries in the so-called bone-caves of Europe. The list is long, and it would be impossible in our limits to give a detailed account of all, even if it were not needless for our purpose. In brief,

then, it may be said that numerous caves have been explored in Europe, in which bones and other remains of human beings have been found, mixed with bones of a great variety of animals, including a number of species supposed to have been extinct for a long time preceding the commonly assumed historic age of the human race.

For various reasons many of these instances are of uncertain validity as proof of the actual co-existence of the living beings whose remains have finally found a resting-place together. One of the latest found, in England, was full to the top of organic remains, *débris*, etc., enclosing a great variety of bones, tools of flint and other kinds of stone, ashes, &c., indicating the presence of man using fire and weapons. Among the immense variety of organic remains were those of many extinct animals, all but one accounted post-glacial, but this one supposed to be pre-glacial. There is evidently great uncertainty about the method in which such an accumulation came about. The bones are broken, rubbed, rounded, and often much worn, as if long exposed to the action of running water. Skeletons of the mastodon have been occasionally found in our country, imbedded in the soft mud of swamps. If we suppose a man, wandering in such a place, to become entangled and to perish, and his body to sink beneath the surface, in a few hundred years the two skeletons might be found together, and presenting similar appearances of antiquity, and it might be plausibly argued that the man and the brute lived and died together. Collocation does not prove contemporaneous existence, in these cases. In the bone-caves, some of which at least are supposed to have received their contents when submerged, the remains of extinct animals may have lain for ages before those of men and later animals were deposited near them, to be afterwards mixed indiscriminately in the movement of the waters.

The chief interest in this class of discoveries has been awakened by the finding of a few skulls sufficiently preserved to allow of a comparison with existing forms of human crania. In one instance only has a skull been found differing much from those of existing races. This one, the Neanderthal skull, so called from the place of its discovery, is very brutish in its

shape, and the bones of the skeleton, which was entire when first discovered, are of heavier formation than ordinary human bones, and said to resemble those of the gorilla in the size of the protuberances to which the muscles were attached, a peculiarity also observed in the bones of the Patagonian savages, though in less degree. But there was nothing in the position or state of this skeleton to indicate a very remote antiquity. It was found in an open cave, buried only under a soft mud, and, for anything that appears, might have belonged to some wild man of recent times, some uncouth, coarsely organized, perhaps demented estray from human society. At any rate, it stands by itself. Each of the other specimens, few indeed, are conformed to existing forms of humanity.

By far the most interesting and conclusive discovery of this kind is that made in 1852, in Aurignac, a small town in Southern France. A peasant pursuing a hare discovered a small cave in the sloping side of a hill, covered by the material which had fallen from the higher part of the hill. On digging away the loose material, he found a slab of stone, set upright, and closing the mouth of the cave. Inside the cave were many human bones. The matter being reported, the mayor of the village caused the bones to be removed and buried in the parish church-yard. Being a physician, he took sufficient notice of the remains to ascertain that they belonged to at least seventeen individuals of different ages. Several years passed before the incident was sufficiently reported to attract the attention of scientific men. When at length the place was visited, the sexton had forgotten the spot where the skeletons had been buried, and the rich opportunity to examine so curious a relic of ancient times was lost.

What was left at the cave was carefully scrutinized, and the following facts ascertained. The space in front of the cave had been used as a place of banqueting, ashes and coals forming a considerable deposit; pieces of calcined stone, bones of a great variety of animals, including half a dozen extinct species, burnt, scraped, and split for the purpose of extracting the marrow, stone implements of various kinds, and some rude ornaments, being found intermixed with the ashes. Inside the

cave there was a considerable body of earth, evidently of organic origin, and a few human bones; also bones, and in one instance an entire skeleton, of animals, in such a condition as to show that they were covered with flesh when placed there. There was also found teeth, tusks, ornaments of various kinds, and a new or unused flint knife. From all the facts, it is inferred, and on good grounds, that this was a burial-place, that those who came to place the dead here feasted before the cave, and deposited tools, ornaments, and portions of food with the dead, as if to supply them in their journey to the land of spirits. The point to be particularly noted is this. We have here unquestionable evidence that men co-existed with several species of extinct animals, for they used them as food. These men were as ancient as any of which we have clear traces. Their weapons and implements were of stone, of the rudest type. Yet the proof of their entire *humanness*, of their equality in art and in thought with the ruder tribes now existing, is by far the clearest and most complete afforded by any of these revelations of the primitive human being.

This cave at Aurignac affords the very earliest peep into human life; and so far from being below, it is rather in advance of what now exists among some savage races. In all these discoveries there is not one thing that indicates a grade of human life lower than what has long been familiarly known as now existing, except the isolated fact of the Neanderthal skull, which, with the present light, cannot be held to prove anything beyond itself. These discoveries do not show us man but little above the brutes. They have done nothing to help the theory that man came by gradual elevation from some of the apes. On the contrary, if they do show us man as he was a great many thousand years before Eden, and yet unmistakably man, in his bones and his skull, his art and his sepulture, they afford a strong presumption against the transmutation theory.

We cannot fully sympathize with the excitement produced in many minds by every attempt to show a closer physical connection between man and the lower animals. Physically man is a vertebrate, of the class Mammalia and the order Bimana. Hitherto he has been held to constitute the whole of

his order, as well as of his genus and species. Now, Mr. Huxley thinks it proved that what have been called Quadrumana should be called Bimana, and so man is brought into coordinate relations with apes and gorillas. Why be distressed at this? It seems as if a race that includes in its unquestioned limits those hateful beings known now so familiarly to us as *guerillas*, need not be sensitive at having a relationship proved between them and the less abominable animal of Africa whose name is so similar in sound. By virtue of the method of nurturing the young, we are mammalia, and related to cows and sheep. By the division of the body into two cavities, we are vertebrates, and so related to the fishes and reptiles, batrachians and marsupials. Mr. Huxley attempts to settle what, if settled, is not of any practical importance; to wit, whether the differences between man and all other animals are such that *Homo* shall be accounted an order, or a genus, or only a species. It is no more humiliating to be related to monkeys as of the same order, than to dogs as of the same class, or to toads and snakes as of the same type. All are God's work, and very admirable work too. Why not be willing to be classed with them all physically? Man is man still; and till some of the apes ape Mr. Huxley by writing and printing books to prove their kindred to us, let us rest contented to know that we are men, and not gorillas improved; and when they do that, there will no longer be any objection to the relationship.

III. The third proposition brings before us virtually the question whether these discoveries modify our view of the history of man, as a civilized being; that is, whether they enable us to trace the progress of man from the point where he knows only how to make stone hatchets up to his condition in a Christian civilization. In general terms, the prevalent conception of human history may be said to be that all lines of historic civilizations converge as they run back towards a beginning, sometimes visible, but oftener hidden in uncertain traditions or even entire absence of records, but with no intimations of an antiquity very far exceeding the limits of the Mosaic chronology, say from six to seven thousand years. Possibly in the case of Hindostan some would claim a period longer by one or two thousand years, as the time during which a civilized

community, with laws, architecture, and religious institutions, has existed. We see nothing in these new discoveries to change this view, no remains of elaborate buildings, of stone work, of cities, of walls, no tools indicating a high stage of the mechanic arts, none suggesting the knowledge of the fine arts. Had men lived in civilized communities, as in the whole of the historic period, there is no reason why remains of such things should not be found. Herculaneum and Pompeii, if left undisturbed, would have preserved for indefinite ages, and then to future investigators told the story of Roman civilization, as far in the future as we are from the men who chipped out stone hatchets in ancient France. With the exception, perhaps, of Hindostan, Egypt had the earliest historic civilization. But all the edifices of her civilization stood on the surface of the deposits of the Nile. These deposits have been examined to a depth of fifty or sixty feet, and human remains found throughout, but nothing showing the beginnings or ruder stages of the civilization which has existed above.

And so everywhere. The traces of human civilization are on the surface. They are of the immediate present. Nothing is found to bridge the gulf between these earlier men and the races that in later times have formed civilized and progressive societies; nothing to prove that the elevated intellectual, moral, and religious condition which tradition connects with the garden of Eden, or which arose, whence and how we know not, in Hindostan and Egypt, was evolved by steps, slow or otherwise, from the merely human life of the age of stone hatchets. Considering that all traces of human life found in these ancient localities are precisely like those of recent times among savage tribes, while of the higher forms of civilized human art no traces remain, there is created a presumption in favor of the theory which attributes to an independent origin all the races, or the stock of all the races, which have developed a tendency towards science, art, and religion, towards systematic laws and institutions. Among the lower orders, we distinguish genera and species by purely physical differences. There is no proof that, among men, they may not consist in differences not physical, but intellectual or moral. The great problem of the origin of civilization is wholly unaffected by these discoveries.

Their bearing on our religious convictions is hardly a different topic from the last, since religion, as the object of science, is history. It may be said, in brief, that none of these discoveries show man in any religious act, unless such is implied in the burial rites referred to. There is nothing to modify our common conception of the religious history of mankind; that all which is above the rude conceptions and rites of savages originated in the East, from events of which only traditions remain, — traditions, as most Christians believe, essentially historical, and coming down through Hebrew channels, — by others ascribed to a Hindoo origin, but beyond question arriving at the most positive, simple, rational, and enduring form in Judaism, and blossoming and setting with the slow ripening fruits of a harvest yet to come in Christianity. There is nothing in these discoveries to disprove the essential truth of the story of Adam and Eve; that is, the independent origin in Asia of the race out of which all that is truly progressive in humanity has come, — how created, how far distinct, and by what means, from the rest of the human order or family, it is neither possible nor important to tell. Our religion, our destiny, our present and future welfare, do not depend on the theory we hold respecting our origin, nor on the actual fact; but on ourselves, on our powers, on the trust we now have, on our conduct, hopes, and aims. Our fate is in the future, not in the past.

These discoveries, then, remain simply a matter of interesting knowledge and a field of further investigation. They have not overturned anything essential to our former scientific convictions, but rather confirm the grand deductions of Geology as to the plan of the organic creation. They give us larger views of the wonderful duration of the past ages of the earth, in which the idea of the Creator, prophetically manifested in the four types of animal life as they existed in the inconceivably remote era of the lower Silurian rocks, has been carried on to its consummation in a race of intelligent, religious, progressive, and immortal beings. Least of all is there anything to suggest the notion that man is an erratic from the ape tribe; to impair the depth or vigor of our belief in an in-

telligent, living Creator, or our Christian faith either as to the historical form or the spiritual substance.

We have thus briefly summed up the state of the case as to the three points specially considered. Questions of great interest more or less directly connected with the main topic have presented themselves, and only by a rigorous self-control have we abstained from expressing our views on some, — such, for example, as the now fashionable theory of the transmutation of species as applied to the whole organic world. Upon the question of the actual length of time during which men may be said to have existed on the earth, much has been written, many ingenious calculations and estimates made, and the most diverse conclusions reached. The indications of a very great duration are many and striking. Egypt has been known as a civilized nation from a time four or five thousand years past. Egypt was built on the mud of the Nile. This mud has been examined to the depth of sixty feet, and through the whole depth human remains are found, and remains of animals now existing, but none of those extinct animals which in other places are found associated with man.

We recur to the forest before mentioned, which once stood where its remains now stand, near the surface of the chalk-beds in England. Over this, the deep bed of the lignite represents the accumulations of long ages of vegetation. Over this, the boulder deposits record a lengthened period of polar cold and glacial action. Over this are two successive deposits of drift, each requiring a long period for its accumulation, and then we come to the surface, on which now men plough, sow, and reap, and build houses. But over this surface an ancient river has cut its channel down through the double drift, through the boulders, through the lignite, to the bed of the old forest. This river ran till it ran out. Then in the pools that remained peat began to grow. The deep beds of peat, a work of long years, were then covered with several successive strata of sand and gravel, till the bed of the river finally became dry land, and is now traced only by these intersecting formations, so that we have a wonderful series of changes all subsequent to the formation of the very surface on which men live and labor. Niagara appears to have eaten

out its channel from Lake Ontario to the spot where it now pours down its flood of waters, the admiration of mankind. Seemingly it must have taken an immense time for the accomplishment of this. Yet this began, geologists say, after the surface, even to its deposits of loam, was as now, and the grass has grown green, and tender annuals have bloomed spring after spring, as they are now doing, ever since a time long before Niagara began its wonderful retreat. The mind is simply overwhelmed among such signs of vast duration. We learn that, in the economy of God, time is the element of least importance; that it is not a rhetorical exaggeration, but a simple truth, that with Him a thousand years are as a day. In the light of such facts, we can believe that man is yet a child, and the redeeming work of religion and civilization only begun.

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## Art. VII. — THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

1. *The Two Platforms (Baltimore and Chicago), printed Side by Side.* New York: Tribune Office.
2. *Publications of the Central Executive Campaign Committee.* [Chicago Platform.]
3. *Publications of the Loyal Publication Society.* New York.
4. *Campaign Documents.* New York: Tribune Office.
5. *A Vigorous Prosecution of the War the only Guaranty for an Honorable Peace.* (Campaign Document.) Boston: T. O. H. P. Burnham.

We certainly have no expectation of changing many undecided votes in the right direction, in speaking, very briefly, at this late moment, of the issues involved in the election of the 8th of November. The Examiner will fall into the hands of few voters who have not already determined to support the government of this country by the re-election of the President. We might safely say, perhaps, that these lines will be read by no voter who has not so determined. As matter of record for the future, however, we choose to speak of the central principles involved in the canvass, and with the same object we would refer

the curious to the numerous ephemeral "documents" which illustrate the manner in which it has been maintained.

We should be glad to copy the titles of some of these documents, to illustrate both the spirit and the humors of the campaign. But space forbids. The central committees of the Union party have taken a wider range than those who would displace President Lincoln. In the long series of the publications of the Loyal Publication Society will be found various pamphlets discussing profoundly the fundamental questions at the foundation of government. The committees of the Chicago Platform, or the McClellan party, have kept themselves on more narrow ground. They have attacked the policy of the administration, and have arraigned its feebleness in carrying out that policy; and they have appealed, with unflinching pertinacity, to that recognized prejudice against the negro which they suppose to exist, especially among Irish voters. They discuss "Amalgamation," — what they call "Miscegenation," or the mixture of the races, — and hold out the danger to the laboring classes of "abolitionizing" the country and introducing black laborers in competition with white.

But, as always happens, it is not along the strongest line of defences that the hottest conflict rages. The hopes with which special subjects are chosen for such discussions in a canvass hardly indicate the deep and permanent impressions which control the great proportion of the voters. These discussions are conducted with a view to affect the votes of that little margin of men who may yet be so undecided that a vigorous appeal to prejudice may move them in one direction or another. Between these movements on the flanks, there are strongly intrenched positions, too strong to be assaulted; whose very strength keeps the noise of conflict away from them, while yet they are the essential positions whose strength determines the issue of the conflict.

Two of these positions we shall briefly consider.

In the first place, the determination of the people to reelect Mr. Lincoln has its foundation in the necessity of maintaining free suffrage as the method of appointing our rulers. Very little is said of this feeling in the canvass, but from this feeling in the outset the national movement of three years

and a half ago was born. This feeling has a controlling and central power in determining the particular issue of this hour. It is therefore worth while, perhaps, to restate it simply.

At the election of November, 1860, the people of the United States determined, by a regular vote, taken with all the constitutional forms and guaranties, that Abraham Lincoln should be the President of the United States. It is on all sides admitted that this election was fairly conducted, and the determination fairly made. But the result of the election, when the term of Mr. Buchanan at last expired, proved to be that Mr. Lincoln was not really the President of the *United* States. He was the ruler of the greater part of the country. He was the head of the organized government of the country. He was the commander of its army and its navy; he appointed and removed its civil officers. But none the less was it true, that, beginning with South Carolina, several States had withdrawn their delegates from the Congress of the United States, had driven its officers from their soil, had stopped the collection of its revenue in their ports, had seized its munitions of war, its mints, its forts, and its other property within their borders. President Lincoln therefore found himself "President of the United States," with the important qualification that the local authorities in several States did not and would not take the oaths of allegiance to the government of the country, and even broke, without apology, the oaths which they had already taken to support it. The oath, "I, Jefferson Davis, do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States," had been forgotten as so much Buncombe; and so had the kindred oaths taken by thousands of officials working out the plans of Jefferson Davis. Mr. Lincoln was "President of the United States," with the important reservation that, in large parts of his domain, if he had attempted a "Presidential tour," he would have been arrested as a prisoner of war. He was the "President of the United States," while sundry of the States so united were represented by persons affecting to be their magistrates, who were attempting to negotiate foreign alliances and proclaiming those States wholly independent.

It is clear enough that it is not simply those who voted in

1860 for Mr. Lincoln that are defied by such perjury and rebellion. Every person who voted in that election, for whatever candidate, and every person who relied on the suffrage as the method of appointing rulers, is equally defied. Unless it is determined, by whatever severity of arms, or in a trial of whatever length, that the person elected by the legal suffrage shall hold the office to which he is elected, the election and the appeal to it become thenceforward poor formalities. The Constitution which prescribes such an election becomes thenceforward a mere convenient code of by-laws. It is so completely set aside, that it ceases to be the foundation of the government the moment its central direction is thus violated. "The President *shall* be elected" thus and so, it says. Mr. Lincoln has been elected so. "The President of the United States," thus elected, "shall be commander-in-chief of the militia of the several States," it says. Mr. Lincoln has not been such commander. The determination of the people of this country, announced in 1860, that he should be, has been so far set aside by the determination of a minority that he should not be.

The issue presented when that determination is thus set aside is not an issue between North and South, white and black, federal government and State rights; it is the question whether suffrage shall be considered as determining the questions submitted to it. Does an election mean what it pretends to mean? This issue in the systems of governments established in America is absolutely central. If the people of the United States cannot make Abraham Lincoln President of the United States by choosing him President, the people of a town cannot make a town-treasurer by choosing him; the directors of a railroad cannot make a superintendent by choosing him; the majority of a parish cannot appoint their minister by choosing him. If the people of the United States cannot choose Abraham Lincoln President of the United States and make him so, the iteration of the word "shall" all through Constitution and laws is an absurdity. The separate, independent volition of assent or dissent of the citizen, will then run all through. "Shall do" then means "may invite the citizen." "The Congress shall have power to lay taxes" means, in that case, "may invite the citizen to contribute." The United

States Marshal, in that case, bids us sit on a jury, and we tell him that we are attracted to go a fishing instead. The postmaster asks us for the postage on our newspapers, and we tell him that we prefer to spend the money for Foreign Missions. Now it happens that, after at least seven thousand years of experiment in government, we thought we had hit on an expedient for securing rulers and laws, so indorsed by the strength of the nation that all men must submit. Whether we have done so is the question presented when men ask, "Shall Abraham Lincoln be President of the United States?"

It is the determination that this particular Abraham Lincoln shall have the power which four years ago the country tried to intrust to him, which now gives a stern unity to the canvass as conducted by the friends of the Union and the government. It is very true that the President has shown himself wiser than most of his counsellors. It is very true, as the "New Gospel of Peace" puts it, that he has taken counsel of the two familiar spirits "Human Nature and Common Sense," — having also made league with the mighty spirit "Back-bone." It is very true that he has shown himself a man of the people, — that his education, his experience, and even his public life, have been such as make him a democrat of the democrats, in complete sympathy with the true democratic idea. It is very true, therefore, that he has addressed to the people and to the world epigrams, narratives, and arguments, which have been more alive with the spirit of the crisis than any other words in which the crisis has spoken, — so that he is our only public man for a generation who could write a letter without injuring himself by doing so. All this is true. All this makes valuable material of argument for those who consider that their duty is to present the peculiar fitness of the President for his office. But all this does not make the special reason why the American people propose to re-elect him. That reason is in their simple determination to maintain the supremacy of the suffrage. They said he should be President of the United States, and he shall be President of the United States. He shall be through-and-through President. He shall be President with no divided title. For if his administration closes before he has received all its honors, the supremacy of con-

stitutional suffrage as the means of appointing officers is at an end. If before four more years are over he shall be President of all the States united, then there will be time to talk of a successor to him. But till he is, be it four years or forty years, this country cannot afford to choose another President while he lives. It must pay so much respect to the principle of election by which he was first girded with his authority.

Careless critics of passing history are apt to talk of the "Right of Revolution" as illustrated in the movement of Secession. The truth is, that the American constitutions which refer everything to the arbitration of universal suffrage attempt to organize the "Right of Revolution." They do not claim Divine right for any human organization. But they do attempt to give a peaceful method of overthrowing any organization when it no longer commands the strength of a majority, and no longer answers the purposes of a majority. Such a revolution was that which, in 1860, changed the policy which had so long governed this nation for the opposite policy. It was as complete as if it had been brought out by barricades or by gunpowder plots, — while it had been brought out by the pacific method of solution provided near a hundred years before for such an exigency. To resist that revolution in the hope of reinstating the policy which had been condemned, is to revolt against the essential principle of all our institutions, — the little and the great together. The nation feels this instinctively. It armed itself instinctively to sustain the principle. And instinctively the friends of union feel that to substitute any other candidate for the "Abraham Lincoln" chosen in that great revolution, while he still lives, would be to abate something from the dignity of this principle. To maintain this principle the American people votes and fights till it sees him in fact — what the suffrage of 1860 declared him — "President of the United States."

This stubborn central determination does not, from the nature of the case, express itself much in the canvass. It gives a degree of strength, however, to Mr. Lincoln as a candidate, which no other man could command. Those who canvass for him can fall back on this determination to crown the work of the ballot in 1860, as a rock of strength which they could not

rest upon had the nomination fallen on any other man of the party which chose him, or on any loyal leader of the parties which opposed him. Mr. Chase or General Fremont, Mr. Everett, General Dix or General Butler, however distinguished their popularity, would not have commanded this element of power. Though the nation could have chosen an angel of light to be President, it would have turned away sadly to do so from its previous determination to sanctify the suffrage by making that man President in fact whom the election of 1860 declared President in right and in name.

But this stubborn central determination has been reinforced by considerations which would have applied as well had the friends of the Union made any other nomination. The country has been at war for three years, most unwillingly. The war was forced upon it. "*My* preparations being complete," says General Beauregard in the first despatch of the war, "*I* opened fire." In these words is the history of the origin of the war. Having been at war for three years, the country asks whether the war has had any compensations. Certainly it has. All inevitable duties have inevitable rewards. One compensation is the emancipation in fact of two million slaves, whom Jefferson Davis admits to be emancipated now, and the destruction of the mutual guaranties which bound the nation to insure the slavery of two millions more. This is a very great compensation. When the country is asked to choose candidates in favor of peace at any price, it asks at once what is to become of this compensation. If the answer is, that the peace is to be upon the basis of "things as they were," the country shudders at the waste of blood and treasure which nine or ten leaders of rebellion have brought upon it. It claims at the least the *uti possidetis*. It insists on holding what has been gained, the emancipation in fact of two millions, and the emancipation of two millions more as a condition and security for tranquillity. Men who asked for the arbitrament of the sword must take it, even if the decision be not what they expected.

Nor is this decision the hardship which it is declared to be in the election documents of those who have never held slaves, but have always befriended slavery. The Southern master has always known that he held his slaves by force. Slavery began

in captivity, and as captivity it is continued. Whether this sentiment stated itself with oaths so brutal in language so coarse that we cannot repeat it, or whether it were more blandly and polysyllabically expressed by the Southern grandee who took you to ride in his chariot, and explained to you that "it is an advantage to the inferior race to be in tutelage under the superior," the real statement was the same. It was "woe to the conquered." That the institution rested on force, everybody knew. That it must end with defeat, everybody acknowledged. When Beauregard had made his preparations and fired his first gun, he knew that the "right," so called, of slaveholding was one of the stakes dependent on victory. Failing in victory, it is not the Southern master who will expect the prize of victory.

The acknowledged fact that the master held the slave because he was the stronger, was really the ground of the dumb acquiescence of the somewhat dull Anglo-Saxon conscience in the system. If the negro were so stupid and so weak as to let the white man enslave him, let him take the consequences, said John and Richard and Harry, and the other lineal descendants of Hengist and Horsa, — firm in the homage which their race has been too apt to pay to success. It was only when brute force tried to subsidize allies, — when the white man holding the black man asked distant white men to help him, — that the Saxon notion of what is "fair" protested. It could see a white man bind a black man, but "two against one was not fair." If a slave ran away from his master, he showed in that case that he was the better man. What craft or diplomacy, then, should make John, Richard, or Harry, having no slaves of their own, nor wanting any, — considering themselves better men than slave or master, — undertake the task of restoring the slave to the master who had failed to keep him? "Keep him if you can!" This was the unarticulated grumble of the unseared conscience of the self-called conservative party. Tender consciences considered it a very brutal utterance. So it was, perhaps. But it was definite. And it is still the answer of the same unseared and unquickened conscience this day. "Keep him if you can, but ask no help of me," expresses, as we believe, the real sentiment of the slaveholder

himself. "He was well, — he would be better, — and here he is." He knows who dug the grave of his beloved institution, — and he has no expectation of its resurrection.

Without sincere hope that the love of slavery would be strong enough in the North to defeat President Lincoln, the party of dissatisfaction — always a large party in a republic, and always growing in the midst of the sacrifices of war — sought and gained great additional strength in their candidate. A year ago the outcry against the administration took the form of demanding "a more effective prosecution of the war." Those who made that demand pointed to General McClellan, and described the injustice which he had received, as they said, from the President and Cabinet. There had thus grown up a large and highly influential body of critics of the war, — who could truly point to the enthusiasm with which General McClellan inspired the army after General Pope's failures, — and who claimed that he was the leader who could give us victory, and who had a right to be tried again. This body supposed that they had the support in the army of a large body of soldiers enthusiastic for their disgraced General.

It was certainly a bold move by which the party of "peace at any price" selected the hero of the "effective prosecution of the war" men, as their candidate for the Presidency. But, in all such contingencies, the opposition must select some one. That is the fortune of an election, if but one magistrate is to be chosen. The consent of such varying opinion upon one person is not without frequent precedent. It may be subject of amusement, and still may be justified as a matter of partisan policy. The Convention which met at Chicago represented the dissatisfied party. It cannot be said to represent the Democratic party, while it did not represent such men as Andrew Johnson, Judge Holt, General Butler, and General Dix. It cannot be said to represent the Bell and Everett party, when it could not claim the help of Mr. Everett, and had no one prominent enough to take its honors in the States which gave their votes to Mr. Bell. It was, like all oppositions, the party of the dissatisfied. As such, it had to reconcile its own extremes, to oust the administration, if it could, — and then trust to the future to read the problem of the

future: With very great sagacity, it adopted for its candidate General McClellan.

But with less sagacity it enunciated its "Platform," — the last "platform," as we are disposed to think, which an opposition will ever build up for its candidates to stand upon. So repulsive was this to its candidate's friends, that they doubted whether he could be brought to accept the nomination. So repulsive was it to the nation, that there are keen observers who say that, if he had repudiated it, — and his friends had instantly brought him forward on his own personal claims, — he would have been the next President of the United States. But whatever are General McClellan's excellences as a soldier, boldness and promptness are not prominent among them. That chance he rejected, — and in a wonderfully ingenious letter he accepted the nomination of Chicago, sneering at the "Platform" without disowning it.

We desire to dismiss for the present all discussion of those personal claims. General McClellan has accepted the nomination as a party nomination; and along with it, will he, nill he, the country must regard him as accepting with it the party platform. Nay, with ever so strong a protest, with ever so keen a revolt of personal honor, against the declarations of that platform, the President elected by that party must be utterly, helplessly bound by its dictation. Is General McClellan a stronger, a firmer, a shrewder, a more practised man in political affairs, than the men who have put him where he is, and who have drafted the political code he is understood to adopt? If he were, would the officer who commanded the arrest of the Maryland Legislature be the accepted chief of the party of "State rights"? would the adviser of military emancipation be the man to represent the deadly enemies of that policy? The grand issue at stake is degraded, when we turn from deliberate announcements of principle to men's personal claims or personal wrongs or personal antecedents. The country no doubt understands that, when it is urged to make General McClellan President, it is invited to accept along with him a given announced scheme of public policy. And that policy, disguise or evade or explain away its terms how we will, to the plain common-sense of men means simply, to get

out of the contest at the cheapest immediate terms we can, whatever becomes of the issues so long and obstinately fought for. It means, that, when the government armed in its own defence, it committed a mistake and a crime. It means that the war, whose magnificent results are written all over the heroic history of these years, is a failure. It means that war is a more dreadful thing than the loss of national integrity and honor. It means that peace at any price is so great a boon, that we must catch at any show of it, and accept whatever conditions of it we can get.

This, disguise it as we will, is the strong point of the Chicago Platform. It appeals to that latent weakness supposed to be in the people, — that weakness which we have probably all felt more or less, — which makes us long to turn away from this dreadful fact of war, with its weariness and its horror and its fear, and vainly wish for peace. Now this is but the vain wishing for health in a fever, or in the pain of a broken limb. It is no time to be blaming one another for what is past, or to be vainly crying out for what cannot be yet. Let us look at the plain, simple fact. This war was brought upon us, deliberately and intentionally, by men who had been arming and scheming and nerving themselves for it for at least twenty-five or thirty years. They meant to destroy the nation of the United States of America, so that it should no more have any existence as a nation. They hoped to do it. They still intend to do it if they can, and many of them still expect to do it. Besides, they have sympathizers and advisers in the North, who also intend, if they can, to destroy the Union of the States, and set up some new power, with some strange name and flag, which they hope will serve some purpose of their own ambition. Now this thing cannot be done without a struggle, — a struggle on our own soil, in our own villages and streets, — a struggle far more awful and bloody than the strictly localized and far-away war of the last three years. There is only one thing, so far as we can see, that stands between us and a fate like that which has already ruined and desolated the fairest portions of the South, — only one thing that saves us from it, — that is, the victory and triumph of the government and armies of the nation.

This state of things did not come about by any wish or choice of ours. And it will not go away by any wish or choice of ours. It is simply the condition of things with which we have this hour to deal. Not the first authentic hint has ever come of the willingness of the Rebel leaders to agree on any terms of peace which could possibly be accepted. Mr. Stephens's Macon letter means simply that we should abandon the entire contest, by conceding all the South has ever fought for, and entering into fresh stipulations with them, as "sovereign States."

People say that slavery is all that stands in the way. Slavery is not all that stands in the way. Slavery was scrupulously respected by our government, in all its legal rights, for more than two years after Secession was declared. The leaders of the South chose to have a nation of their own, — a power which they never meant or expected to keep peace with the North for a day, till it should be the supreme acknowledged power on this continent. Independence — that sort of independence — is all they talk of, the only terms of peace they ever speak of now. Does any one suppose they would accept it, if it were offered them to-day, on condition of holding the territory they actually possess? Would they, *could* they, accept a peace which stripped them of more than half the territory they claimed and held in the beginning? — a peace which takes from them all of Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and half of Louisiana and Virginia? — a peace which puts the Mississippi in the hands of a conquering hostile power, and cuts them off utterly from all the vast territories of the West? — a peace which deprives them of both the great naval stations of the South, Norfolk and Pensacola, — which puts the grasp of a foreign hand on the mouth of the Chesapeake and the courses of the James, — which establishes a great station of armed ships and forts at Port Royal, and holds hopelessly from their reach the precious plantations of the Sea Islands, and all the fortified ports but two along the whole Southern coast? — a peace which hems and threatens them on every side with a power they have challenged and provoked, — a power that recruits its armies and mans its forts with a hundred and fifty thousand emancipated slaves, freed by the chances and armed with the rifle

and artillery of war? Does any one seriously suppose that these men *could* accept a peace with independence hedged and limited by such terms as these?

Or does any one on the other side propose — has any one even dared to hint — a peace which means the offer on our part to abandon all that we have gained in these three years of fighting, in which steadily and month by month we have pushed back the boundaries of the rebellion? Shall any one dare to hint the dishonor of forsaking the loyalists of Tennessee, — of abandoning the conquered free navigation of the Mississippi, — of hauling down the dishonored flag from the forts and cities now held in the Southern territory? — the infamy of betraying the million and more of freedmen who have accepted our summons and trusted themselves to our care? — the cowardly and base retreat, hundreds of miles, over territory wrested from rebellion by our victorious brothers in the field, to be surrendered to the insolent and brutal force that has already rent and blasted it with the ravages of war? Has *that* ever been hinted, as the way in which peace could probably be had? Even if the pride of our people should stoop to it, what would be our people's *security* in it, — once accepting the humiliation and shame of it, once owning itself baffled, humbled, and beat?

No; it is important for us definitely to understand that the talk of peace — *as things now are* — is only a treacherous and deceptive way of taking the heart and nerve out of a contest which we cannot give up if we would, any more than a man in a wild beast's den can have any peace except he throttle the beast or the beast him. We have definitely to understand, clearly to see, frankly to acknowledge, that the only terms of peace which can be discussed at present are those which shall be settled by our two armies, at Petersburg and Atlanta. So far as our human eye can see, there is but a single alternative. If our armies are victorious there, — if the great Southwestern arm of the rebellion shall prove to have been broken by the fall of Atlanta and Mobile, and its heart shall be pierced by the fall of Richmond, — or if either one of these enables us to concentrate our strength, and so make the other doubly sure, — peace is sure to follow by the triumph and on the terms of our

own government. If our two great armies are baffled, beaten, crushed back, — or if the defeat of either enables the Rebels to hurl all their force upon the other, and so annihilate it by dint of a double blow, — then it may well be feared that our people's patience and courage may at length give way under so frightful costs and sacrifices, — and that they will refuse longer struggle in the field, but sullenly accept such form and measure of dishonor as they must, or such mitigation of it as they can.

In the mean time, whatever the state of the public mind at home, we have never heard yet, out of all the testimony that has come to us, that there was any waning or failure in the courage, the faith, the heroism of the magnificent armies, officers, and men, who are our accredited envoys to negotiate the terms of peace on the only field where they can at present be discussed. Suppose the rebellion beaten there, what terms should we consent to grant ? The answer will be, simple, unqualified submission to the authority, the government, the laws, the judicial tribunals of the nation : that is all ; it includes all we can or shall be likely to demand, it is the least we can or ought to accept. Those terms of peace are very simple, — will be very efficacious and sure. But the way to them is still through storm and battle and blood. Half a million of our men — a magnificent force, though broken, bleeding, and crippled from the assaults of a long campaign — are before us in the field. The one duty of the day is — though sadly, yet with no wavering of heart or will — to hold them steady there, give them the support they crave, and fill the breaches in their ranks. A sad, a solemn, an awful duty ! yet none the less the duty of the hour. Hard may be the task to give or choose others to fill their places as they fall, — hard, no doubt, is the service we look for to those whom we send to fill their places. Yet we do not hesitate to say, as we feel, that for any one of us it were a better fate to go there, through march and battle and wounds and death to fulfil to the uttermost our task, to die in victory and honor, to die at least in hope, than to suffer what may be the likely consequence of defeat in that awful field ; — better than that the seat of war should be brought home to our villages and hills ; better than that the States hitherto

exempted should be lacerated and mangled by civil war transferred to our fields; better than that our wives and children should be the victims of that from which we would fain protect the wives and children of those who hate us.

This powerful, intense conviction it is, that creates the sentiment and defines the duty of the hour. The existing administration appeals to the nation to sustain it in this final crisis of the campaign. In its errors, its failures, its obstinate hope and slow-won triumphs, it has so far fairly represented the people, that its success in the present canvass seems to carry with it the nation's verdict on all the issues involved in the war, — nay, a decision on the final question, Shall we continue to exist as a nation at all, or shall we sullenly abandon the resolve that has nerved us thus far to the encounter? This, as we believe, — *a verdict on the justice of the war itself, and of the cause in which the war is fought*, — is the shape which the issue of the canvass takes, to those qualified to judge most dispassionately the symptoms of the hour.

Under such conditions are the elections to be held. The personal considerations of most importance are, — for President Lincoln, that he has been chosen President of the *United* States, and that to see any other man President before they have been reunited is to degrade the dignity of election; for General McClellan, that he has won the admiration of his army, the respect of his enemies in the field, and the reputation of being unfairly used. These personal considerations are connected on the one side with the determination to secure a united country, to yield no point which has been gained in the great question of slavery, and to secure complete guaranties for the new civilization in the future. They are connected on the other side with the hope of peace, with a feeling that Union also is possible if the questions of slavery and freedom can be waived, and with steady dissatisfaction with the Administration, against which every charge of imbecility, corruption, and insincerity is brought forward.

On such an issue the American people will decide. We have ourselves no question but it will sustain the principles of the supremacy of elections, the liberty of the enslaved, and the national unity of the land.

## Art. VIII. — REVIEW OF CURRENT LITERATURE.

### THEOLOGY.

The chief value of the work * whose title we give below is in the indication it gives of a remarkable modification of anthropological views in the ecclesiastical body of which its author is a member. Dr. Hibbard is a prominent minister in the Methodist denomination. He is not a radical or extreme man in any sense; but a cautious writer, and one who would be reckoned "safe" almost anywhere. In endeavoring to show that his views are only a legitimate development of the doctrines of the denominational fathers, he renders his statements somewhat obscure, and his notions are less definite than if he had set forth his theory independently. Still this is no uncommon fault with a denominational writer, and Dr. Hibbard has furnished an elaborate, careful, and, so far as the restraints imposed by himself admit, a clear and comprehensive presentation of the views of a large and advanced section of his own Church on the subject discussed.

Two doctrines largely prevailing in the Church have had much to do in shaping its notion of the moral condition of infants. These are the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration and that of Total Depravity. Both were held by the Catholic Church up to the time of the Reformation, and both were incorporated in the articles of the Church of England, — the former explicitly, the latter unmistakably, yet with some little ambiguity of statement.

Wesley, who had no intention of departing from the theology of the Church of England, held the dogma of baptismal regeneration, though involved by it in certain inconsistencies which he vainly endeavored to reconcile. So with the Augustinian doctrine of human depravity; he agreed with the Calvinistic view, though breaking with its adherents in other important particulars. It appears to have been his notion that the child comes into the world a sinner, inheriting from Adam guilt as well as moral disorder; and that baptism washes away this hereditary guilt, leaving the child in the condition of a regenerate adult. He differed, however, from the High-Churchmen and the Calvinists, in positively and strenuously asserting that, whatever might be the condition of infants at the commencement of their career, none of them, either by reason of that moral condition or from lack of baptism, could be lost, — that somehow the Atonement covered and saved them, — his instinct here, as in some other instances, proving too much for his logic.

These general views have prevailed in the religious body of which Wesley was the founder, with the exception that the dogma of baptismal regeneration seems to have been held in abeyance almost from the first, and never to have been in any sense an article of faith. Yet the

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* The Religion of Childhood; or Children in their Relation to Native Depravity, to the Atonement, to the Family, and to the Church. By Rev. F. G. Hibbard, D.D. Cincinnati: Poe and Hitchcock. 1864. 12mo. pp. 411.

language of the Methodist rituals, being borrowed principally from those of the English Church, rather fully implies the doctrine.

So far as we can ascertain, the standards of the denomination substantially coincide with the Calvinistic theory of depravity; that in some sense we all sinned in Adam, and are all guilty of his sin, and all deserve death on account of this hereditary guilt; that there is nothing good in the child even previous to voluntary transgression; that he naturally hates holiness and loves sin; and that, if he dies in infancy, he must be eternally lost unless the Spirit of God regenerates him (as the Methodist writers assert that he does) previous to, or in the article of, death. To find any authority for this last opinion, to reconcile it with other opinions firmly held, have always been points of embarrassment.

Under the influence of the Arminian theology, avowedly adopted by the Methodists, and unavowedly adopted in its principal features by many professed Calvinists, there have been evolved the more humane sentiments with which we now have to do. The advocates of these new views do not propose to abandon the doctrine of total depravity. In the work before us the author puts the doctrine very strongly, — going further, doubtless, than many of those whom he substantially agrees with would accompany him. By nature, — that is, by natural birth, — he regards every infant as inheriting the effect of Adam's sin, — a moral derangement so thorough, that, if left to itself, it will manifest an invincible repugnance to holiness and a thorough aversion to God. The child thus left to itself would necessarily grow up sinful, exclusively selfish, and bad. Yet, bad as this state is, — and here begins the divergence from the old doctrine, — it implies no personal guilt or ill-desert of any kind. It is simply an unfortunate disease, for which the subject is no more culpable than for the scrofula. The idea of any such connection with Adam that his sin is *imputed* to the child, Dr. Hibbard repudiates. The human race sinned in Adam, and by the fact of that sin merited destruction; but it was *the race as it then was*, consisting of the sinning pair, and not *as it now is*, consisting of many hundred millions of persons who then had no existence. They would have received their merited doom, and humanity would have had no further existence, but for the intervention of the remedial scheme. By virtue of the promised atonement, the race was permitted to proceed, Adam begetting children in his own moral likeness, with all the *natural* disorders that come from sin, but there was to be furnished to each certain *supernatural* influences restoring the equilibrium. Dr. Hibbard does not state, as some who adopt these views do, that the child inherits a double nature, — that he is in a certain sense an offspring of Christ as well as of Adam; but that he receives an evil moral nature from Adam, and grace from the beginning of his being from Jesus Christ.

These views, though technical in their form, and conveyed in phrases familiar only to students of the older theology, are yet interesting as symptoms of transition and growth in a community deserving the very highest respect for the share it has had in developing the religious life

of our people. They indicate emancipation from some of the most strange and abhorrent beliefs of the past, and will prepare the way for still greater freedom of religious thought from ancient error.

The general purpose of Henri Lutteroth's exegetical essay * is to demonstrate the motive of Matthew in preparing his version of the Gospel from the extant oral traditions. This motive is the wish to show that the Messianic kingdom of Jesus was not that which the Jews expected, but that which the prophets really predicted, — to show that Jesus understood the prophets better than the scribes and Pharisees understood them. The present instalment of the commentary includes the account of the preaching of John the Baptist, of the temptation of Jesus, of the calling of the first disciples, and the whole of the Sermon on the Mount. Lutteroth's spirit is at once reverent and free. Some of his criticisms are in the direction of rationalism, but the general tone is not destructive. *Repentance*, as John preaches it, is, in Lutteroth's view, not a change of personal character, a change of heart, but a change of opinion concerning the kingdom of Messiah, — a change of hope. Men had expected help from the earth, but they must look for it from heaven. John proposed to found in the very midst of a degenerate people, who boasted that they were the people of God, a real people of God, understanding his plan and way. The *dove* and the *voice* at the baptism of Jesus were a "*vision*," perceptible only to John and Jesus. Visions, both in the Old and New Testament, as Lutteroth remarks, commence often with the "opening of the heaven."

So, too, the temptation is a vision of Jesus. Lutteroth finds no reason for believing that there was any real wandering in the wilderness for forty days, any actual climbing to the pinnacle of the temple or ascent of an exceeding high mountain. No mountain in Palestine answers to the description which the Evangelist gives. All the temptations were in the soul of Jesus, and passed in his thought, — were the pictures only of his mental conflict. The spiritual purpose here strives with the temporal purpose, and Jesus refuses to be an earthly Messiah. This narrative is only an illustration of Matthew's design, and need not be an historical fact.

Lutteroth's view of the "miracles" and their significance is expressed in the following paragraph: —

"The proof of the miracles of Jesus, for those who were their objects or witnesses, showed them a special power around them. But, at our distance of time, they cannot influence us in the same way, or be necessarily to us an evidence of the same kind that they were to contemporaries. They have not come down to us as sufficient in themselves to compel our acceptance of the words of Jesus, but only that, in seeing him as well by his works as by his word, we may be able to form a picture of his ministry as a whole. This is the sum of their present worth. They are not for us, as they were for the generation in which Jesus lived, an external cause to hold attention and in-

* Essai d'Interprétation de Quelques Parties de l'Évangile selon Saint Matthieu. Par Henri Lutteroth. Deuxième Partie. Chapitres III. – VII. Paris: Meyrueis. 1864. 8vo. pp. 154.

troduce the word to be preached. The equivalent of the miracles in that particular now is the equally marvellous fact, when we consider how much conspired to make it impossible, of the establishment of Christianity in the world." — p. 61.

Lutteroth does not, however, believe that Jesus wrought any miracles for the purpose of confirming belief, but mainly for the purpose of healing and blessing in the acts themselves.

His critical survey of the Sermon on the Mount is, on the whole, wise and satisfactory. He does not regard this as a single discourse on any particular mountain, but as a collection of sayings made at divers times, while Jesus and his disciples were sojourning in the hill country of Galilee, — of the sayings directly bearing upon the question of the new kingdom. The "poor in spirit" are those who feel themselves to be poor, whatever their earthly fortune, as they know how excellent and superior are the gifts of the new kingdom. The real poor are the "mourners," who are happy even in the loss of earthly goods because they have the glorious promise. Some of the remarks about the Beatitudes seem to us to be strained, and the theory is occasionally hard pressed to suit the facts. In speaking of the Lord's Prayer, Lutteroth remarks that, while the word Father was not entirely wanting in the Jewish invocations, the Law and the Prophets, with a single exception (Psalm lxxxix. 27), do not use this name when they speak of the relation of the Deity with single persons, but only when they tell of the relation between God and his people.

## PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE.

One of the most perplexing things in the study of mental science is the accumulated, direct, and imposing array of testimony as to the facts classed under the names of "Mesmerism," "Spiritualism," and the like, compared with the absolute nullity of the impression it seems to have had on the current opinion, or on the views of scientific men. To present this testimony, complete, in all its wild wonder and mystery, to connect it with a clear physiological theory, to fortify it by a great amount of detailed personal evidence, and to make it the ground for revision of our moral convictions and religious beliefs, is the purpose of the large, full, and handsome volume of Mr. Brittan.* It carries the weight of much curious and intimate physiological knowledge (which it couples with electrical and other dynamic theories), and of personal authority. Much the most strange and incredible narrations are those giving detailed statements of his own experience. And the book is extremely interesting, as a revelation of that side-stream of obscure fact and speculation which runs parallel to the main course of human knowledge, yet scarcely mingling so much as to tinge its waters.

Whether the two currents will ever be completely mingled — the marvel of the one tempering and tempered by the clear gravity of the other — one may be well justified in doubting. Whoever has dipped,

* Man and his Relations, illustrating the Influence of the Mind on the Body, etc. By S. B. Brittan. New York: W. A. Townsend. 8vo.

for his own curiosity, into that world of unrecognized experiments and outlawed observations, is apt to recall his experience in it as a dream, to allow it a quasi-reality in what Thackeray calls "fable-land," to hold in reserve a half-faith in it as a region of its own, but never to associate it, either for belief or disbelief, with the real things of the work-day world. It is a region which seems to belong to singular temperaments and abnormal constitutions: intensely real to them, it seems like opium or hashish dream-land to ordinary people. To deny the testimony demands a vast and unreasonable amount of scepticism. To admit it, seems to revolutionize, in a startling manner, our entire world of knowledge and experience, so as to leave us hardly any standing-ground among things sane and plain. So that, until it comes a little nearer to our average and ordinary spheres of experience, we shall be likely to reckon it as part of the obscurer pathology of mind, and as only a gathering of remoter facts for some revision of our philosophy yet to come.

Dr. Brittan's book, in short, seems to us a philosophy, drawn up with much ability, earnestness, and plausibility, resting on facts too obscure, exceptional, and abnormal to make firm standing-ground as yet. It is very bold in the nature of the facts it adduces, very explicit and clear in the recitation of its testimony. As is inevitable from the nature of it, the book is in very large part made up of mere narration. Its theory and its essential facts — all that makes it a contribution to the sum of our thought on these matters — could have been put in far narrower bulk than this handsome octavo, and, for its best scientific value, should have been given in a far conciser and simpler style. It is too much a book appealing to the mere sense of mystery and marvel. Its testimony requires the severe cross-questioning which every assertion on points of fact must pass ; and it has the air, in its style and getting-up, of an appeal from scientific thinkers to the untrained popular mind.

While it is hard, for this reason, to assign the volume its right place and value as a contribution to science, it would be unjust not to recognize the writer's earnest endeavor to connect his facts and theory with a higher tone of practical ethics than he finds prevailing in the world, and with an enlightened religious faith; and for a repository of evidence as to that twilight-region of human experience which we know as "fascination," "spectral illusion," "ghostly apparition," "premonition," "clairvoyance," and the like, its value is unrivalled and peculiar.

The beautiful edition of Mr. Mill's Essays just published * will win new gratitude and admiration for that wise, comprehensive, and accomplished intellect, so long ranked among the foremost guides and instructors of our generation. Two features in this collection affect us with particular pleasure; — first, to meet in it, from time to time, papers which, when first published anonymously in reviews, had done us timely and great service, as interpreting some phase of thought or history

* Dissertations and Discussions, Political, Philosophical, and Historical. By John Stuart Mill. Boston: William V. Spencer. 12mo. 3 vols.

then prominent, — for example, the papers on Michelet's France, the Revolution of 1848, and the Enfranchisement of Woman; and, secondly, the evidence it gives of a wealth of general and literary culture, of poetic and artistic sensibilities, — we may now add, of strong and tender personal affections, — which it is good to associate with the masculine strength and breadth we recognize in Mr. Mill's larger works. The value, indeed, of his Logic and Political Economy, was fairly divided between the argumentative exposition and the ample knowledge and culture brought to bear in illustration. Perhaps no writer of equal eminence on topics of pure intellect, unless it be Lord Bacon, has so made his argument the expression of a ripe and rich intellect, trained to the grasp of thought in its widest relations and in its finest historical or literary expressions. An authority on logic, who is as much at home with Plato as with Aristotle, — a political economist, whose familiar knowledge of the ancient world is from a first-hand acquaintance with its finest literature, — a writer so clear and strong in his own range of argument, who at the same time indicates his intelligent judgment in very various fields of modern literature, art, history, and politics, — a radical and earnest thinker, in the front rank in the debate on all topics of social and political reform, who combines the grave courtesy of the scholar with the refinement of taste and temper supposed to mark the fastidious conservative, — such a thinker and writer is one of the benefactors of his time. And we gratefully welcome this rich addition to our accessible sources of the noblest thought.

In point of positive value as contributions to the thought of our time, perhaps the admirable essay on Civilization in the first volume, and that on Utilitarianism in the third, will take the highest rank among these papers. As touching questions of immediate moment and interest, those on Democracy in America, on the Enfranchisement of Woman, and on the questions that have arisen during our present war, are of chief value. As a specimen of fine, clear thought, carried through a very fertile and wide field of illustration, the reader will find particular pleasure in the essay on Poetry and its Varieties. Examples of the breadth of literary culture and abundant technical scholarship, so necessary in giving proportion and fulness to our estimate of Mr. Mill's intellect, are found in the several interesting papers on topics of Grecian history; while those who seek in the writings personal hints and expositions of the writer himself will be attracted by such sketches as those of Armand Carrel, Bentham, Coleridge, and Guizot. The same clear, critical judgment, generous sympathy, elevated plane of moral thought, and manly, vigorous, and lucid style, are equally shown in all.

We have already had occasion to pass in more detailed review* Mr. Mill's characteristics as a writer and thinker, especially on ethical and political subjects; and to refer to those characteristics of his intellect which seem to rank him rather in the second than in the first class of the leading thinkers of the time,† reserving the first rank for the crea-

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* See Christian Examiner for January, 1863.

† Ibid., May, 1863, Art. IV.

tive imagination and the "prophetic" order of mind. We have, therefore, no general judgment to pass upon these writings now; only to make a single remark as to the paper on Utilitarianism. While he adopts this theory as his philosophy of moral distinctions, and maintains that conscience is not an original and innate, but a secondary and acquired faculty, it is important to a fair judgment to bear in mind that the argument does not imply any lack of reality in moral distinctions, or of authority to conscience. The *facts* of the moral life are seen with singular clearness, and presented with great weight and force. In particular, the vindication of the real authority of the highest law over the personal conduct is given in a way to satisfy even those advocates of "intuitive morals" who would protest most strongly against its theoretical foundation. As a *polemic* argument on the same topic, the reply to Professor Sedgwick's Discourse, in the first volume, is keen even to brilliancy, while quietly but mercilessly severe.

In Mr. Dwight's "Modern Philology,"* we have a learned and valuable contribution, by an American scholar, to the studies which are destined most to exercise the scholarship of the succeeding generation. These two noble octavos are made up, in part, of papers previously published in the Bibliotheca Sacra and the New-Englander, but carefully revised, enlarged, and supplemented by tables of much labor and value. The first volume contains a sketch of the Indo-European languages, exhibiting, as clearly as may be in so limited space, their true connection as established by modern learning; then a brief history of modern philology, interesting and curious, but rather overcrowded with unsuggestive names; and, finally, an outline of the science of Etymology, which, to most readers, will be the most valuable portion of the book. These are followed, in the second volume, by 263 pages on Comparative Phonology, mostly very hard, technical, and dry; an Essay on Comparative English Etymology, in its classical features, very interesting to the critical student; and, lastly, a synopsis of illustrative examples, containing 481 groups of words connected with Greek, Latin, and German roots, and embodying perhaps the most painstaking and suggestive studies of all.

It is impossible in our present limits to present even a fair sketch, much less a critical view, of a work of so undoubted merit, and of so high pretensions. It is by far the most significant illustration that has yet been given of the turning of American mind and scholarship in this direction. We cannot doubt that it will both mark an epoch, and have a powerful effect to turn fresh minds toward the same class of studies.

We have but a single remark to make on its style, and on its subject. In style we are surprised to find it marred by a vague and pompous rhetoric, — an attempt, we suppose, to relieve the dryness of the subject-matter, — which incessantly seeks to magnify or illustrate some special view, at the expense of clearness and good taste. No recent

* Modern Philology; its Discoveries, History, and Influence. With Maps, Tabular Views, and an Index. By Benjamin W. Dwight. First and Second Series. New York: Charles Scribner. 8vo. pp. 360, 552.

work of creditable scholarship, that we know, so sins in this particular. It is the less pardonable after the example Mr. Marsh has given, in similar studies, of simple manliness of style, along with the most copious and suggestive illustration. And it appears to particular disadvantage in the criticism of such works as Max Müller, whose statement of his views is every way superior; and especially when coupled with arguments so weak as those from the literal story of Eden, Babel, and the Flood. Meanwhile, the method and the point of view are far inferior to those of Renan, who is not once referred to in these volumes.

As to the subject, we find a great deal of enthusiastic assertion as to the attractions, the majesty, and the delight as well as fruitfulness of the new science of philology, all which we receive with respectful incredulity. We believe a taste for the intricacies of this science is as much an exclusive and artificial taste as that for Differential Calculus, and about as rare. In assuming the severe method of a science, philology separates itself from the charms of literature as such, which have made our delight hitherto in Homer, Æschylus, and Plato. Philology may be dealing with the same materials, but it cannot promise the same pleasure to the same class of minds, any more than an artist may be supposed to be peculiarly fascinated by the chemistry of his pigments. And we think it neither likely nor desirable that philology should usurp the place and the interest now held in our classical studies by the simple literary motive, or which Mr. Mill would have us find in the philosophic and historical motive. It is not a question we feel called to argue here; and we only refer to it because Mr. Dwight seems to have been misled by the theory that, because his studies deal with the same material, they are therefore a superior method of obtaining the same or a better result. And this error has led him in these volumes, first, to promise, in exaggerated terms, a pleasure in philological pursuits which most students are not at all likely to find in them; and, secondly, to mar the severe simplicity of statement, which is most winning in a purely scientific treatise, by an incongruous and ambitious rhetoric. The error does not impair the value of his labors to the serious student, who will be misled by no false expectations of a literary charm in these studies, and who will understand that only by years of dry and repulsive toil can he win his way to the *adytum*, where he may share the philologist's technical and professional delight.

## GEOGRAPHY AND TRAVELS.

Another name is to be added to the martyrs of science, another really valuable record of discovery has been given to the English world, another scene of vast ruins is suddenly laid before us, in the Asiatic travels of Alexandre H. Mouhot.*

Aided by the Geographical and Zoölogical Societies of London, after extensive travel in Europe, this young French naturalist gave four years of his life to Siam and its vicinity, made vast collections of shells,

* Travels in Siam, Cambodia, and Laos, by the late M. Henri Mouhot. With Illustrations. London: Murray. 1864. 2 vols.

insects, &c., drew exceedingly graphic sketches, which make his volumes instructive even without any narrative, and suddenly fell a victim to the climate before his journey was finished, November, 1861. He had been warned of the peril; he knew that no party returned without paying some penalty in death as well as disease; but he trusted that his entire temperance, aided by his excellent constitution, would carry him through the fearful exposure in pathless forests, vast morasses, and fever-smitten jungles. He carried a brave heart as well as a devout spirit, and everywhere made friends and found helpers; at every point has interesting matter to communicate, for which the world cannot but be grateful.

Though a Protestant, he finds friends and admirers in the Roman Catholic missionaries, — whose self-sacrifice he extols, whose poverty he pities, with whose loneliness he sympathizes. Fever, isolation, and lack of converts seemed to embitter their voluntary exile. In Cochin China it is even death to shelter a French missionary; and yet they are never betrayed.

M. Mouhot's principal discovery is the great Ongcor Temple, whose erection by some extinct race he fixes at the time of the dispersion of the Indian Buddhists, or some two thousand years ago. It is of vast extent, exceeding beauty, and substantial workmanship, — a single building containing 1532 columns of stone, roof rising above roof to a vast height, and the whole decorated in the richest style of Asiatic art, as the abundant engravings he has furnished sufficiently prove. Besides this immense deserted temple, surrounded like those of Central America by unbroken solitude, he discovered an exquisite grotto, to which the semi-barbarians have had the taste to add stairways of stone, without injuring a single stalactite, and to consecrate the fairy spot to worship with images of their gods, yet without defacing the basalt walls.

Although the imperfect state in which he left these pencilled sketches deprives us of many reflections upon the country and its future, there is no doubt but that Siam is destined to rapid development through the protection of some European power.

The exodus of a whole nation, voluntary and instant, from the land it has fought for, but failed to defend, is a spectacle as sublime as it is sad. Whatever may be its religion, or however inferior its civilization, no lover of freedom can refuse to the nation that exhibits a heroism so steady and so exalted the tribute at once of his sympathy and his respect.

For more than eighty years Russia has been at war with the Circassians. Slowly, but surely, once and again driven back by the desperate fury of their adversary, but again steadily advancing with the fatal obstinacy of the Slave, the Russian armies have year after year been pushing this unfortunate people up the valleys to the water-shed and down the valleys again which slope toward the Black Sea, till at last, — surrounded, every point of resistance seized and occupied, their numbers diminished by famine and by feuds, — the Circassians have had the choice given them by the Czar of colonization in other parts of his

dominions or of expatriation. They have chosen the latter. And in large numbers they have been now for several months crossing the stormy wastes of the Black Sea, to find a refuge and a home in the fertile lands of Asia Minor or among the friendly mountains of Armenia.

They are a healthy and a hardy people. Their sons will fill the armies and their daughters adorn the harems of the Turks. Vast spaces of deserted arable ground will invite them to industry and peace. To the effete society of Turkey they will impart new blood and new strength. In a material point of view they are more likely to gain than to lose by the sacrifice, so intrepid and so grand, of the country which, in their own touching language, "has been their home since the creation of the world."

As a merely political event affecting present relations, the depopulation of a country so barbarous and so distant has little significance for Europe, and no interest whatever to America. But, as throwing further light upon the character and aims of Russian policy, it deserves to be studied and to be remembered.

With other nations, ancient as well as modern, the development has been natural; with Russia, it is artificial. With other nations, it has been accidental, as it were, and unconscious; with Russia, it is conscious and by system. After a thousand years of ignorance and of apathy, the Slavic tribes find themselves the subjects of a great empire, face to face with the enlightenment as well as with the tumult of Europe. The people are barbarous, and therefore they respect force. They are bigoted, and therefore they worship the ruler who embodies also their religion. In the hands of able statesmen, by the help of institutions skilfully adapted to their condition, this vast mass, as discordant as it is rude, is slowly taking the form of a centralized and aggressive state.

But in order, while it develops its own resources, to introduce the civilization of Europe, Russia must have a path of its own to the south. It is this imperious necessity, guiding the ambition it stimulates, which for more than a century has dictated alike its treaties and its wars. It is in this necessity that the explanation is to be found both of the depopulation of Poland and the exodus of the Circassians. Slowly, if it cannot be quickly, by force, if it cannot be by persuasion, but by all means and at any cost of treasure or of blood, — by ceaseless oppression and by remorseless cruelties, — the lands and the races which stand between Russia and its gigantic schemes are to be Russianized or wasted.

Surely there is something awful in the contemplation of such a policy. For the moment the future of Europe falls into the hands of Russia, there is an end of its progress, — its career is over. But, apart from any considerations of humanity or of right, it may be questioned whether the process by which Russia is endeavoring to work out the problem of its greatness is not as false in reality as it is delusive in appearance, leading in the end to the overthrow of the very plans it contemplates. In spite of all that has been written of their corruption and their cruelty, the Roman Emperors never violated those principles

of autonomy and of tolerance by which alone subject states can be honorably reconciled and permanently retained. Unlike that of the Czar, the empire of Rome never attempted to reduce the world it aspired to embrace to one monotonous uniformity enforced and maintained by the sword. Rome was wiser than Russia, yet Rome passed away.

But whether upon states as upon men there comes at last a retribution for wrong, it is needless to discuss. Contemplating her course not as moralists merely, but in the light of that large philosophy which draws from all the sources of human experience the rules for the government of men, we cannot but see that Russia is making a mistake, which will sooner or later show itself in dangerous, if not fatal, consequences.

If Mr. Lowell's new book* were the work of a young man, and with his foot on the first round of the tedious ladder of literary renown, we should call it promising, and expect better things from the maturity of its author. Graceful it is certainly, and something more; it shows tender feeling and delicate humor, a quiet perception and hearty enjoyment of out-of-the-way people and of the peculiar traits of every-day people, to an extent which few books of travel can equal. Its sentiment is healthy, its retrospection cheerful, its memory discriminating. Still it is like the book of a young man. The paper on "Cambridge Thirty Years Ago" is the only portion of it which would indicate to any reader unacquainted with the author's name that he might possibly have passed middle age; and even here there is this peculiarity, that the style seems at wide variance with the subject. The style is brisk, not flowing; with the flash of wit oftener than the glow of humor, and the wit itself seeming not always to kindle without some poking. There are, however, some charming pictures in this little essay, — pictures, for instance, of Mr. Allston, Dr. Kirkland, and others less easily recognized though not less carefully drawn.

With the exception of this paper, the book is made up of reminiscences of travel, partly on the waters and shores of Moosehead Lake, but for the most part of Italian travel. And here let us qualify what we said of the apparent youthfulness of this book, so far as to admit that it needed both the skill of a veteran *littérateur* and the boldness of a famous one to print a piece of European journal, after the flood of books which have described with infinite variety of minuteness the doings of six months, three months, thirty days, and we know not how much less, of this fascinating toil. 'T is like printing another Life of Napoleon. But Mr. Lowell's is a model diary, and as we jog contentedly along with him in the company of his not very mysterious friend Storg, and their guide Leopoldo, over the mountains and through the ravines about Tivoli and Subiaco, the whole freshness and flavor of that delightful travel come back to us, and we lose all taste for criticism amid the crowding memories of the days when we too trod those moun-

* Fireside Travels. By James Russell Lowell. Boston. 1864.

tain roads, and heard the nightingale at sunset among the ruins of Tusculum and Falerii, or, in one glorious and crowded day, climbed the steep ridge of the promontory which divides the Gulf of Salerno from the Bay of Naples, and looked backward upon Amalfi and forward over Sorrento and the white circlet of cities which binds the flashing waters of the loveliest bay in the world. In such temper we drop our pen and exclaim, Stupid indeed must he be who cannot be entertaining when he writes of Italy! Mr. Lowell is certainly not stupid, and is pretty sure to be entertaining, whatever he writes. But he would be quite as much so with less effort at smartness. Why, for instance, should he make his friend Story, — to whom with a taste as true as his friendship he dedicates the volume, — why should he make his friend ridiculous by parading him before the eyes of an admiring public as "the Edelmann Storg"? The frequent repetition of the name forbids us to consider it, what at first sight it would seem to be, an absurd misprint; and as a disguise it is about as efficient as the boyish device of spelling backward.

Mr. Lowell seems likely to end where most writers begin. At one-and-twenty, his literary promise was brighter than that of any rival, and was not merely the promise of a brilliant and cultivated intellect, but also and equally of a vigorous and earnest reformer, with the heartiest contempt for Mrs. Grundy, and a perfect willingness to sacrifice ease to the love of truth and of truth-speaking. At forty-five, his literary efforts are confined to an occasional magazine or review article, or to the reprinting of fugitive papers like those of this little volume of travels. The principles which he advocated with such warmth of enthusiasm at the beginning of his career he still advocates, but the enthusiasm has disappeared, and the generous and hot indignation is sometimes replaced by a sarcastic bitterness, which, even when attacking the old enemies, leaves room for an occasional sneer at the old friends. So true it is, as Bacon says, that "the counsels of youth stream more divinely."

Mr. Lowell writes no more poetry. That bright and sparkling fountain is dry. Of this we must not complain, but we may at least, regretting what seems to us a complete abdication of his old position as one of the earliest and ablest of the leaders of the literary class in America, pray him to lose no time in resuming the place which would be so gladly accorded him by a people whose hearts were touched and elevated by his words almost a generation ago.

## POETRY AND FICTION.

How marked are the differences between the new volume of the Laureate and the "Dramatis Personæ" of Mr. Browning! * They show why the former draws his pipe of wine, or the commutation thereof, from the British Treasury; while the other still supplies him-

* Enoch Arden, &c. By Alfred Tennyson, D. C. L., Poet Laureate. Dramatis Personæ. By Robert Browning. Boston: Ticknor and Fields.

self at the vintner's. Simplicity and level sentiment, a fine and noble vein, characterize the Laureate. Mr. Browning is not less fine and noble, but he has a subtilty which loves to set forth exceptional moods and characters. He does truly set them forth, notwithstanding that his style is so chary of words, his sentences so clipped of expletives and the ordinary conjunctive helps to the reader. Tennyson gives you his plain roast and boiled. A baron of beef always heads his board. Browning puts up his pemmican, and you sometimes find it troublesome to force the can. But an ounce of it nourishes the brain all day. You can travel on it like Peruvian Indians on their coca. He does not involve or swathe his thought, so that, after undoing furlongs of wrappers, you find a mummy, very well kept and entirely superfluous. But he dreads lest his thought should be concealed in a dilution of words, so that the reader would have to swim to take it in, with mouth wide open, as a whale swims a league to get his lunch of squids. Neither does Mr. Tennyson dilute his rare and gentle feeling, but it is detached from him in equable pulsations, and does not leap in concentrated sparks. Mr. Browning's emotion accumulates till the act of expression is like the return of electric fluid to an equilibrium. Similes of half a page, closely packed, flash to their period. Nervous lines are the boiling down of an ordinary paragraph. And when this subtile action does not move, as it often disdains to do, upon the ordinary meridians of the earth's surface, but follows aerial currents, both panting time and readers toil after him in vain. Is it that there is too little time, or not enough of the reader? The insinuation is excusable, since Mr. Browning has written things that are cherished by a great and ever increasing audience that loves manliness, sincerity, and power.

In reading Mr. Browning one often misses a precious thought, or a very delicate and subtile fancy, because the attention flags from its last effort. In climbing the steep face of a cliff, one does not notice the first time all the flowers. In reading Mr. Tennyson, rare places are slipped over by accident, their style is so smooth and so unobtrusive. A waft of something sweet and healthy just makes you turn back, and the violet couches in the grass, not hid nor unwilling to be gathered. "Enoch Arden" and "Aylmer's Field" are full of these meadow glories. They have so little trouble and make so little parade in growing, that the reader does not always think to stoop. If he goes striding on, as the fashion is in modern books, he misses star-shaped and lightly tinted petals that nod on slender stems.

Yet what a powerful and manly pen he can hold, to depict the injury which the proud do to the lowly, to set forth his indignation at the brutality of class feeling and the heartlessness of an old society. Read the sermon in "Aylmer's Field." It has the sombre glow and movement of a chapter of Isaiah. You are obliged at length to sympathize with the guilty couple at whom it is levelled, as they cower in their pew and seem to be seeking shelter.

"Enoch Arden" is most gracefully and tenderly written. It embodies a story of real life, which was told to Mr. Tennyson by one of his friends. Philip Ray, the miller's son, and Enoch Arden, a sailor's or-

phan lad, as they grow up with a playmate, Annie Lee, learn to love her. Enoch proffers his suit at last, but Philip keeps his love concealed. Enoch must needs go to sea after his marriage. Ten years pass without his return, and Annie believes at length that he is lost. Then Philip gently offers love and protection, is at last accepted, and they are living tranquilly together when Enoch returns, overlooks their joy, but soon dies forbearing to disturb it. The story has the delicate and noble traits which Tennyson loves.

Of the smaller poems, the best appear to us to be "The Grand-mother," "The Voyage," and "The Sailor Boy." The feeling is true and simple, and the words are so choicely mated with it, that they pleasantly surprise and satisfy. His words and phrases are inevitable; a change in them could not be contrived that would not damage the meaning they convey.

"AZARIAN"* is the story of a brilliant, facile, and heartless young man, who has inspired a profound affection in a girl, and keeps her, with a little pitiful love and a great deal of pride, dangling after him, till she learns, by accident, that he has no real need of her. She escapes from the thraldom, is befriended by a magnanimous actress whom she had cast off to please his caprice, goes to Europe, returns, and is seen by him through a window, when her tranquil countenance punishes his pride. It ought not to be called an Episode, for the events neither demand nor suggest continuance. It is a sketch, but not worked out with free and delicate touches. Half as many words would have told the whole. Words less flamboyant would have served the modest purpose better. The writer has wasted a whole palette of colors on her little adventure. It is, both in crudeness and prodigality, as if she had prepared to paint scenes by the acre, but was pressed for time, and crowded all her colors, to save them, into a panel.

There is a fatal luxury of words for tinting, staining, embossing, begemming; in effect there is a good deal of besmearing. Such fancy, such an eye for shades, hues, tones, moods, and lights, and such facility of expression, needs a great deal of training, severe renunciation, a long period of studious silence, before the undoubted genius of this writer will gain chaste and noble outlines. She has many gifts; they are scarce among writers, and deserve to be reverently trained.

"EMILY CHESTER"† is more than an ordinary novel. Its excellences and faults are peculiar, and show the writer to be a person of unquestionable genius and insight. The interest of the story grows out of the singular psychological relations of the principal characters. There is no relief of by-play; no lesser personages move across the stage and interrupt the painful progress of the drama; no gay flash of wit, no repartee, lights up the sombre picture; there is not even the form of a

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* Azarian: an Episode. By HARRIET E. PRESCOTT. Boston: Ticknor and Fields.

† Emily Chester. A Novel. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1864. 12mo.

plot; nothing happens unexpectedly, in fact nothing happens at all, yet the story is one of absorbing interest, and, whatever faults it has, dulness is certainly not one of them. The only important event is the marriage of the heroine; and the desolation and despair which follow are inevitable, — inevitable, because they do not result from outward circumstances, but from the conflict of natures inherently inharmonious.

Emily Chester is a girl of vigorous intellect, great clearness of perception, and delicate but healthy nervous organization. Like all heroines, she is beautiful, — of a grand and lofty beauty, according with her character. It is her misfortune to become, in early life, an object of passionate devotion to a man with whom she has great intellectual sympathy, but from whom she experiences an absolute physical repulsion. At a time of great weakness and prostration she marries him, but with renewed physical strength this feeling of repulsion returns with added force, and continues until her death. Frederick Hastings, the only other character of importance, is a friend of Emily's early and happy years, and an entire contrast to her husband. Graceful, accomplished, and amiable, a perfect gentleman in spirit and life, he is entirely agreeable to her, and her nature gladdens in his presence like a flower in the sunshine. Max Crampton, the husband, meets her intellectual needs; Frederick Hastings fulfils the cravings of her heart; but she loves neither, refusing the latter from a consciousness that he could not satisfy her mental wants.

And here we take issue with our author. A novel must be true to life and nature; and the deeper it goes to the heart of the common experience, the more absolute are our demands upon its truthfulness. That our heroine should entertain for this person the sentiments which are described, should unfold into new grace and gladness in his presence, and not be tempted to the weakness of falling in love, taxes the likelihood of fiction. A girl of warm, rich nature, like Emily Chester, in the flush of youth, will hardly leave to her intellect so large a share in these decisions, or coolly reserve her love for an ideal person, who shall be mentally and morally the exact complement of herself. Life goes on, we are glad to believe, after a more spontaneous fashion than this. A thoroughly devout and religious tone pervades this book; indeed the three principal characters are so ruled by lofty principle, that they tread the dizzy edge of temptation more safely than is altogether natural. Emily's aversion to her husband never becomes hatred, and never prevents a grateful, admiring regard for him. Max Crampton's stormy passions and iron will never tempt him to take revenge for his bitter disappointment in any unworthy act. His love and tenderness for his wife strengthen and brighten to the end. And Frederick Hastings, whose affection for Emily exceeds in devotion and warmth what most men call love, is, after her marriage, always the friend, never the lover. The subject, with all its difficulties, has been managed with wonderful skill, and if this is, as has been represented, the first book of an unpractised writer, it abounds in brilliant and remarkable promise. It opens in a terse and vigorous style, and the strong, even flow of the narrative gives an impression of great power.

MISCELLANEOUS.

We have, in the pleasant and handsome volume reprinted from perhaps the ablest of the London weeklies,* almost every quality we have a right to look for in such a series, except the final and essential one. We have quiet good temper, some little humor, fair knowledge of the world, agreeable illustration of its dozen or two points of the minor morals of society, occasionally something really suggestive and fresh, as in the Essay on "Hugger-Mugger"; but we have them all without that skill and felicity of workmanship which alone would seem to justify their separate publication. As papers written with current pen, ready each against the inevitable hour, and to be paid for, like so much merchandise, by the bulk, they are certainly of unusual merit. But we claim that, in a volume of "Essays," the public has a right to expect something different and something more, — point and concentration at least, if not brilliancy and wit. In practice, we have found the reading of these papers improved by omitting, on the average, two pages at the beginning, and skipping two sentences out of three of the remainder. But this is not a grateful process; and we wish that author or editor could have done it for us. In an age running so much to looseness and haste of literary composition, we insist that an author in this kind cannot be held to too severe and exact a standard.

Mr. Taylor's book on Thackeray† is the result, in about equal proportions, of a desire to hoist a sail in a breeze of popular interest, and to record personal feelings and recollections. There is consequently too much of the book-making and too little of the memorizing. Not enough material was at hand in time to make a selling book. But what material there is would serve a good purpose in the hands of a man who meant deliberately to present the character of Mr. Thackeray. It is very loosely put together, like a parcel of notices collected from newspapers, and is defaced with a frontispiece representing a British father making a maudlin speech at a hymeneal breakfast, which does not materially illustrate the subject of the book. It is well enough to have the engraving of Mr. Thackeray's house and a fac-simile of his handwriting. But by this time the book has sold and is almost forgotten.

The name of Isaac Disraeli still holds a respectable rank in English literature. Two or three of his works may be found in every well selected library, and are regarded with equal favor by persons of the most various literary tastes. Yet it is long since we have had an American edition of his writings; and Mr. Veazie has rendered an acceptable service by commencing a republication of them in a convenient and beautiful form. To his elegant edition of the "Curiosities of Literature,"

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* Essays on Social Subjects. Reprinted from the [London] Saturday Review. Boston: Ticknor and Fields.

† Thackeray, the Humourist and the Man of Letters. By Theodore Taylor, Esq. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864.

which appeared four or five years ago, he has now added one not less beautiful of the "Amenities of Literature," * — to be followed, we hope, by a reprint of Disraeli's other principal productions. The "Amenities" was the last of its author's works, and in its original design it was intended to furnish a comprehensive survey of the history of English literature. But when its composition was begun, Disraeli was well advanced in life, and his failing eyesight soon compelled him to relinquish his first plan, and to publish only some disconnected observations on the principal writers and some of the principal periods embraced in it. Accordingly, the book has the same fragmentary character which belongs to nearly everything that he did. This, however, can scarcely be regretted; for Disraeli possessed neither the exhaustive knowledge of his subject, the analytical skill, nor the judicial habits of mind, needful for the proper performance of the task which he proposed to himself. As a History of English Literature, his book would not have been such a work on the subject as we have the right to demand from any one who undertakes to write upon it, and his volumes would probably have fallen at once into the same abyss which has swallowed up his ponderous "Commentaries on the Life and Reign of Charles I."; but in the form in which we now have the fruits of his labors, there is much of the charm that every one finds in the "Curiosities." In a word, the book, though fragmentary, is a rich magazine of curious and recondite facts and genial criticism, with many passages of genuine eloquence, and with none of the marks of decaying strength, either in the style or the thought.

Disraeli is not always a safe guide: mistakes as to facts, and unsound criticisms, are not infrequent, and his reputation has already begun to decline. But no one who wishes to make himself familiar with the course of English literary history can afford to neglect these writings, from a belief that they have been superseded; and, for a leisure hour, or in weariness and ill-health, we know nothing of the kind which affords pleasanter or more instructive reading.

In 1863, Mr. Blanchard Jerrold made a minute and careful inquiry into the condition of the poor of Paris, the result of which he has just given to the world under the affected title of "The Children of Lutetia."† His special object was to ascertain the character and extent of the operations of the *Assistance Publique*, with a view to the introduction into England of such forms of charity as might have been found by experience practical and useful in France. But the various information which he acquired as to the social condition of the artisans and tradesmen of Paris is not less interesting than the details of poverty which

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* Amenities of Literature, consisting of Sketches and Characters of English Literature. By Isaac Disraeli. A new Edition, edited by his Son, the Right Hon. B. Disraeli, Chancellor of her Majesty's Exchequer. Boston: William Veazie. 1864. 2 vols. Small 8vo. pp. 419, 453.

† The Children of Lutetia. By Blanchard Jerrold, Author of "The Life of Douglass Jerrold," "Imperial Paris," "The French under Arms," "The Poor of Paris," "Signals of Distress," etc. In two volumes. London: Sampson Low, Son, and Marston. 1864.

he accumulated, bearing directly as it does, if in a larger way, upon the whole problem and evil of pauperism. For it is always to be borne in mind, that poverty is not less the effect than the cause of evil. If you systematically assist one half of the workingmen of a great capital like Paris, as Mr. Jerrold affirms is done, you fall into the danger of demoralizing its whole poor, as well as of breeding a race of hereditary paupers, which M. Simon asserts to be already the result of the general system of French charity.

There are ten thousand paid officials employed in Paris in the distribution of alms; the Bureau de Bienfaisance deals with ninety thousand persons in a state of positive indigence; yet seventy thousand persons rise in the morning not knowing where they shall rest at night, or get a crust of bread during the day. And it is a striking fact, that the rate of increase of the population has decreased since the beginning of the present century, although, from the greater regard paid to the laws of health, human life appears to be worth ten years more purchase. By a fatal law, which no device of statecraft and no discovery of science has been able as yet to counteract, the more you give, the more need there is of giving. It is not how much, but how little, you need give, that is really the question. In England the state compels those who have money to assist those who have not, and the result is an aggregate of pauperism and misery unknown in any other civilized nation. In France there is no direct tax, we believe, for the support of the poor, but there are vast state endowments and ceaseless private contributions, and the result appears to be that the state adopts the children of those who decline the burden of offspring, and furnishes the parents with soup.

But as against the evils which always spring up in the pathway of charity, it is instructive to observe the civilizing agencies which the administration of it in Paris brings to bear upon the poor. Its first lesson and its last lesson is the value and dignity of human life. It takes gently into its lap the babe flung into the streets, and smooths reverently the pillow of decrepid or friendless age. By an organization as complete in its details as it is delicate in its working, the benevolence of the state is allied with that of individuals, and both are brought to bear, with a courtesy at once beautiful and affecting, upon every form of suffering, and upon many forms of sorrow. For promptness, also, and thoroughness, there is probably no organization for the relief of the poor which can be compared with that of Paris, with which, it may be added, the richer and educated classes, the ladies of the *salons* as well as the idlers of the Boulevards, as Mr. Jerrold was glad to discover and to witness, are ever ready and ever eager to co-operate. It is a frequent complaint, that the age is material in its tendencies; doubtless it is; but one has only to compare the Paris of 1863, as Mr. Jerrold found it, with the Paris of 1789, as any historian will describe it, to perceive that the problem of pauperism is to be solved, not by dogmas which theology frames in one age to be derided in the next, but by food which can be eaten, and by air which can be breathed. The Greek civilization had no word for paupers; the Roman Empire died of pauperism. Christianity put a new face upon the world when it

taught the duty and the holiness of charity. Yet no one can have traced the workings of organized Christian benevolence without a painful conviction of its general insufficiency to remedy the evils with which it grappled. With its early ascetic tendency, it was not to be expected that Christianity should have much regard for the body, if it could save the soul without it. But a profounder appreciation of spiritual truth, keeping pace with the increasing enlightenment of the age, has wrought a change in the popular ideas of matter. The intimate, if mysterious, connection of body and soul, is forcing its way as a fact, if one may say so, in religion.

Catholicism built itself up on ignorance, and Protestantism on knowledge. Yet by one of those apparent contradictions which are ever presenting themselves in human affairs, it is from Catholic France that the world is getting this day its best lessons, not merely in the administration of charity, but in the conception of its character and the adjustment of its relations. The anomaly, however, if such it may be said to be, arises from political causes. Limited in territory, with a compact but not increasing population, France cannot afford to be encumbered with waste material. Unskilled labor is a dead weight. It is only by its industrial and military talent, by its artistic genius, and its scientific training, that it can hold its place as the foremost state in Europe. And the light which Mr. Jerrold has thrown upon the hidden mechanism of French society constitutes in this respect an interesting feature in his valuable work.

"The Maori King" * is the story of the needless and disgraceful war waged lately with such difficulty upon the natives of New Zealand. Some of the English settlers desire the extermination of the Maoris, a brave, generous, improvable race. All these traders and farmers, without exception, rejoice to have the expenditures of a considerable army, improving trade and multiplying profits. A few do not see any other way out of the inextricable confusion caused by frequent change of governors and government policy than the sword. The very initial step of the English government, according to its own Commissioner, Mr. Gorst, was wrong. By the present of a blanket to every man professing to be a chief, it induced the Maoris to surrender the sovereignty over their lands to the Queen of England, with the right to buy land of any person willing to sell. Many chiefs did not sign at all, and many who did sign were not chiefs, as the foundation of all the troubles, and the surety of their continuance, is the general lawlessness which leaves every Maori very much his own master, the originator, judge, and executioner of law. Since that period, 1840, the British government did next to nothing to make its sovereignty felt, next to nothing to civilize those amongst whom English families were coming to reside. Then the natives, alarmed by British encroachments, and provoked at large tracts of territory being sold to the foreigners by those who were not the real owners, set up a sovereign of

* The Maori King. By J. E. Gorst. London: Macmillan & Co. 1864.

their own, prepared to defend him by force of arms, and evinced no little bravery, resolution, and sagacity. The whole difficulty could have been easily settled at the beginning. But the provincial authorities committed the fatal mistake of despising the natives; more than that, they were at conflict among themselves, and the home government was chiefly felt in unsettling questions which had once been settled in New Zealand, displacing officials who had won general confidence, and legislating as if it understood everything where nothing but the residence of years could enable one to judge at all. So that Buckle's theory of the superior race destroying the inferior, when brought freshly in contact with it, seems destined to another, we may hope a last illustration, along the Wakori River.

The same work which Henry Colman did years ago on a grand scale to make Americans familiar with the immense advancement of English agriculture, Elihu Burritt has done in a lively volume of "Notes by the Way," * detailing most interesting and successful experiments of various kinds in making barren land and even mountain streams productive, improving the breeds of animals, and raising the character of the English peasantry. The seven hundred miles from south to north were really done on foot, nothing of interest by the way was neglected, the common people told their own story by the chimney-corner of the village-inn, and a vast amount of interesting matter for all classes is given in the learned blacksmith's spirited way. No man could have done this better than our friend Burritt; whom ten years' philanthropic labors in Great Britain had made universally known, whose hands had been hardened at the same humble toil that he was preparing to report to the world, whose sympathy with struggling industry no one could doubt, whose hope of the better time coming shines brightly through every cloud, even the immense consumption of beer by the besotted farmers of England.

Many of the details given must be new to general readers; — the fish-farming upon the river Tay, for instance, where twenty-five wooden troughs laid so as to be fed from a mill-race hatch salmon enough to make the river produce at least two hundred and forty thousand dollars' worth of fish annually, by a process which seems to be simplicity itself, and which is copied as far away as Australia. Several of these benefactors of the public are new names on this side of the water; — the Quaker Cruickshank, for instance, who early conceived the idea of utilizing the cold and unfertile county of Aberdeen by raising a superior race of short-horn cattle; and who now possesses the finest herd in the world, whose hardy progeny are bought at great prices and carried all over the earth, to the real benefit of mankind and the substantial profit of the raiser. The largest measure of praise in the volume is bestowed upon the late Jonas Webb, who turned the stony, water-soaked acres of Dartmoor into immensely productive

* Walk from London to John O'Groat's. By Elihu Burritt. London: Sampson Low. 1864.

grainfields through the agency of liquid manure; and whose breeds of sheep are now grazing on our own prairies, on the steppes of Russia, the vast plains of Australia, and all over Europe. Nor is the Miller of Houghton forgotten, who devoted the princely income of his mills to making those around him happy by making them good, holding public festivals for children, and generously aiding every religious enterprise.

If material for the life of a saint can anywhere be found in this nineteenth century, it will certainly be in the Journal of Eugénie de Guérin.* No record of Catholic piety and self-sacrifice gives a more exquisite picture of human and divine love blended, than this record of a life spent almost wholly in obscurity and in the narrow round of domestic duties. We know not which most to admire, — the devotion of this sister to her brother, or the devotion of this soul to God. The Journal is a long record of self-communion, intended for no eye but that of the dear brother; yet the love that flows out in it is a gushing love, which no words can measure and no bounds can contain. She loves this brother, as Jesus loved his brethren, "unto the end"; and even beyond the end, for when Maurice is dead she keeps a Journal for him "in heaven," and the affection never wanes or falters. Her *faith* is like that of Saint Catherine or Saint Theresa, as deep, as burning, as blessed, as aspiring, yet there are no vague raptures, no mysticism, no morbid self-reproaches; — she is always happy in her belief and in her prayer. Her fervor of confession never betrays her into fanaticism, and the zeal is not merely tempered by charity, but all infused with this beautiful grace. There is not a harsh word in all the volume, toward man or beast, toward rival or sinner. The meditations on death are cheerful, and their sadness is only an autumn garb of beauty.

It is creditable to the French Academy that a work of this kind, which has neither fine writing, nor profound thought, nor scientific precision, nor pretension of any kind, which only reveals the wealth of a simple, devout, and loving soul, should receive its prize of honor; that these wise men of our age should allow to the almost mediæval faith of a credulous maiden, who found such virtue in masses and confessions, and believed most firmly in healing by miracle, the reverence of their suffrages, because she had loved so much. Such a book as this will go far to convince the sceptical that the "lives of the saints," as they are called, are not wholly mythical, and that there is no exaggeration in the stories of devotees. It will be a better argument for the Catholic Church than the logic of an orderly succession, or the charm of an imposing ritual. In all our reading of memoirs, we have rarely found so fascinating a book.

The Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Congresses are justly charac-

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* Eugénie de Guérin, Journal et Fragments, publiés avec l'Assentiment de sa Famille. Par G. S. Trebutien, Conservateur-adjoint de la Bibliothèque de Caen. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie Française. Neuvième Édition. Paris: Didier et Cie. 1864. 12mo. pp. xii., 449.

terized by Senator Wilson * as witnessing the inauguration of a new era in our national councils, namely, the era of Antislavery Legislation. "For nearly two generations, the slave-holding class, into whose power the government early passed, dictated the policy of the nation." This class, whose aggressive policy had been persistently urged, at last retired from Congress at the signal of the Rebellion, and the half-century of *Slavery* legislation came to an abrupt close. Then the band of devoted men, who had resolutely but almost fruitlessly opposed the encroaching tide of slavery, commenced a series of Antislavery measures, which will render ever memorable the Congresses of 1861 – 65.

In the volume in question, the Senator has done a good work by presenting in chronological order these several measures, showing the form of the original bills, the various amendments, presenting the course of the debate, the several votes upon the bills, and such other detail as serves to give the reader at a glance an intelligent understanding of these remarkable enactments. The principal measures thus considered are, Slaves used for War Purposes made Free; Fugitive Slaves not to be returned by Persons in the Army; The Abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia; President's Proposition to aid States in the Abolition of Slavery; The Prohibition of Slavery in the Territories; Hayti and Liberia; Education of Colored Youth in the District of Columbia; Colored Soldiers; Amendment of the Constitution; Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws; Pay of Colored Soldiers; A Bureau of Freedmen; Reconstruction of Rebel States; The Coastwise Slave-Trade; Confinement of Colored Persons in Washington Jail.

Two things must especially impress the reader of this volume. One is the pertinacity, the venom, and the utter disregard to the logic of events, with which these measures were opposed in every stage of their progress; and the other is the elevated tone generally assumed in their advocacy. It is not alone that the friends of freedom in both houses no longer scrupled to call things by their right names, nor hesitated to arraign the former one-sided legislation of their body as the cause of present disasters, but, abandoning often the customary grounds of expediency and immediate public good, the passage of these bills is urged on grounds of pure justice and abstract right, as something the nation owes, not only to a long-suffering and much-abused race, but to itself and to humanity. The contrast between these lofty sentiments, which acquire an intensity of conviction from the events of the past four years, and the narrow, selfish, and often brutal and indecent character of the opposition, is vastly significant.

The service done by the Senator, in thus placing in juxtaposition the temper and spirit of the two classes, causing them to testify of themselves, is only second in importance to that rendered by giving us in a clear and connected form the *facts* as to the legislation already accomplished, and showing what remains to be done.

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* History of the Antislavery Measures of the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth United States Congresses. By Henry Wilson. Boston: Walker, Wise, & Co. 1864.

We had been in the habit of regarding Mr. Herbert Spencer as fairly enough ranked, in the general apprehension, with Comte and the "Positivist" School, although an independent thinker, differing very widely in details from the comparatively elementary and rude form of the doctrine announced by Comte. This general judgment is not, indeed, contradicted by his recent curious pamphlet; * though we own to a little surprise at the clear, definite, and numerous statements of a difference, which Mr. Spencer considers so radical, as to make his only relation to the French philosopher that of an opponent, differing profoundly on all fundamental doctrines, save those which we inherit in common from the past. We cannot follow him in his enumeration, which is extremely interesting and instructive; but we do him no more than justice in repeating and recognizing his claim to a position wholly independent, if not radically hostile. The essay on the Classification of the Sciences, which makes the body of the pamphlet, deserves careful study, as unquestionably the most complete analysis yet given. As a curiosity of diction, we have observed in this little work a percentage of words of un-English origin as high as thirty-eight. This we consider to be near the extreme limit of pardonable style.

We hope to present in January the result of a careful examination of the new edition of Webster's Dictionary.† At present, we state only a few features of this great and admirable work: 1. The careful revision of the entire work, and especially the etymology, in the light of a recent scholarship; 2. Its typography, (wholly new,) a great improvement on its predecessors, in which the column of leading words is much more readily caught and followed by the eye; and, 3. The great fulness and value of its supplementary tables, including one, extremely curious and interesting, of noted characters, places, etc. in the world's literature of fiction and the drama. The number of pictorial illustrations is increased to something like three thousand. In the inevitable tendency to make a Dictionary into a condensed Encyclopædia, it is difficult to anticipate greater abundance and completeness than we find in this.

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* The Classifiaction of the Sciences; to which are added, Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte. By Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton & Co. pp. 48.

† A Dictionary of the English Language. By Noah Webster, LL.D. Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam. 4to. pp. 1840.

## NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

### HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

Life, Times, and Correspondence of James Manning, and the Early History of Brown University. By Reuben Aldridge Guild. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 8vo. pp. 522.

Life of Jean Paul Friedrich Richter, compiled from various Sources, preceded by his Autobiography. By Eliza Buckminster Lee. Third Edition. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 12mo. pp. 539. (A new edition of this standard and exquisite biography, uniform with the late beautiful issue of Richter's writings.)

Memoir of Mrs. Caroline P. Keith, Missionary of the Protestant Episcopal Church to China. Edited by her Brother, William C. Tenney. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 12mo. pp. 392. (To be noticed.)

The American Conflict; a History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860–64; its Causes, Incidents, and Results; intended to exhibit especially its Moral and Political Phases, with the Drift and Progress of American Opinion respecting Human Slavery from 1776 to the Close of the War for the Union. By Horace Greeley. Vol. I. Hartford: P. D. Case & Co. 8vo. pp. 648.

A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention for proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, held at Washington, D. C., in February, A. D. 1861. By L. E. Chittenden, one of the Delegates. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 8vo. pp. 626.

History of the Peace; being a History of England from 1816 to 1854. With an Introduction, 1800 to 1815. By Harriet Martineau. Vols. I., II. Boston: Walker, Wise, & Co. 12mo. pp. 455, 500. (A careful notice of this important and timely reprint will be given in January.)

### POETRY.

Dramatis Personæ. By Robert Browning. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 12mo. pp. 262.

Poems of the War. By George H. Boker. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 12mo. pp. 202.

Poems by David Gray. With Memoirs of his Life. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 16mo. pp. 239. (To be noticed.)

The Poems, Sacred, Passionate, and Humorous, of Nathaniel Parker Willis. New York: Clark and Maynard. 24mo. pp. 370.

The Poems and Ballads of Schiller. Translated by Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton. New York: Clark and Maynard. 24mo. pp. 407.

Chimasia; a Reply to Longfellow's Theologian; and Other Poems. By Athos. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 12mo. pp. 96.

Poems by Bayard Taylor. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 32mo. pp. 419. (Blue and Gold.)

### JUVENILE.

Walter's Tour in the East. By Daniel C. Eddy. Walter in Damascus. 18mo. pp. 220;

American History. By Jacob Abbott. Vol. VI. Revolt of the Colonies. 18mo. pp. 288;

The Florence Stories. By Jacob Abbott. Florence's Return. 18mo. pp. 252;

The Child's Cotton Plant. (Illustrated.) pp. 16;

Mamma's Talks with Charlie. Reported by Aunt Susan. 16mo. pp. 120. — New York: Sheldon & Co.

The Young Crusoe; or, Adventures of a Shipwrecked Boy. A Story for Boys. By Dr. Hanley. (Illustrated.) Boston: Walker, Wise, & Co. 16mo. pp. 270.

The Ocean Waifs; a Story of Adventure by Land and Sea. By Captain Mayne Reid. With Illustrations. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 16mo. pp. 366.

Seaside and Fireside Fairies. Translated from the German of George Blum and Louis Wahl. By A. L. Wister. Philadelphia: Ashmead and Evans. 18mo. pp. 292. (In beautiful style, illustrated, green and gilt.)

### EDUCATION, ETC.

Our World, or First Lessons in Geography, for Children. By Mary L. Hall. Boston: Crosby and Nichols. 12mo. pp. 177. (An accomplished teacher has, in this volume, done a very needful work. It tells children about the earth just what they ought to know, just what will keep their attention and remain in their memories and kindle their curiosity; and this in a manner which is not puerile, though simple and childlike. Natural wonders and historical associations are made to illustrate all the details of lands and seas; and though there is no direct moral instruction, there is an undertone throughout of charming sentiment. Everything about it is good, — the arrangement and balance of the parts, the style, and the spirit.)

1. Primary Geography. By F. A. Allen;

2. Comprehensive Geography. By B. F. Shaw and F. A. Allen. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

(Arranged with skill, so as to present a great variety and amount of interesting facts; — the "Comprehensive" in particular, including a brief illustrated view of the geological periods, and a rapid but clear outline of general history; and the maps adapted to present the main features only of physical and political geography to the eye, in the clearest manner. A very great improvement on all previous school geographies that we have seen, if only in its careful selection and its omission of the crowd of barren names.)

Willson's Larger Speller, with Synonymes and Definitions. By Marcus Willson. New York: Harper and Brothers. pp. 168.

A Dictionary of the English Language. By Noah Webster, LL. D. Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam. 4to. pp. 1840.

### MISCELLANEOUS.

Do all to the Lord Jesus. A Sermon by Rev. E. B. Pusey, Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Boston: E. P Dutton. (Devout, practical, and excellent. Sold for distribution, at one cent a copy.)

Crusoe's Island; a Ramble in the Footsteps of Alexander Selkirk. With Sketches of Adventure in California and Washoe. By J. Ross Browne. New York: Harper and Brothers. 12mo. pp. 436.

Tit-Bits; or, How to Prepare a nice Dish at a moderate Expense. By Mrs. S. G. Knight. Boston: Crosby and Nichols. 12mo. pp. 124.

Lindisfarn Chase. By T. Adolphus Trollope;

Not Dead Yet. By J. C. Jeafferson. — New York: Harper and Brothers.

# INDEX

TO THE

# CHRISTIAN EXAMINER,

NEW SERIES, VOL. XV.

JULY TO NOVEMBER, 1864.


Abeokuta, Burton, 134.
Adriatic, Eastern Shores of, 260.
Africa (Savage), Reade, 135.
American Art and Artists, 175 - 190 (Jarves's "Art Idea") — The "Confessions," 176 — Architecture in America, 180 — Wm. H. Hunt, 183 — Vedder, 185 — the life of artists, 187.
Antiquity of Man, 339 - 342 — Geological Periods, 340 — earliest traces of man, 344 - 347 — permanence of species, 347.
Antislavery in Congress 1861 - 64 (H. Wilson), 386.
Antisupernaturalism in the Pulpit (F. H. Hedge), 145 - 159 — criticism is legitimate, 148 — Theism is a tradition, 150 — the Bible or Mathematics, 152 — the indemonstrable, 155 — no progress from negation, 157 — love of truth, 158.
Aristotle on Slavery, 196.
Arnold, H. P., European Mosaic, 134.
Azarian, H. E. Prescott, 379.
Beecher, Miss Catherine, her religious writings, 301 - 314 — her creed, 303 — its defects, 305 — defect and falsity of Pelagianism, 307.
Bible and Slavery, 191 - 200 — real condition of Hebrew slaves, 192 — compared with Greek and Roman, 195 — influence of Christianity, 198.
Brittan, S. B., Man and his Relations, 369.
Browning, Robert, Poems, 51 - 64 — Dramatis Personæ, 377.
Burritt, Elihu, Walk from London, &c., 385.
Carlyle, T., past and present, 206 - 231 — his Frederick the Great, 208 — his earlier style, 210 — (Unitarianism in 1830, 212) — his influence, 214 — capacity of reverence, 217 — his present aspect, 218 — transition, 219 — the French Revolution, 219 — Latter-Day Pamphlets, 220 — the Rebellion of 1861, 223 — cause of the change, 225 — truth without love, 227 — false moral judgments, 229.
Children of Lutetia, 382.
Circassians, Exodus of, 374.
Clarke, J. F., Sermons, 254.
Confessions of an Inquirer (J. J. Jarves), 176.
Controversy, Religious Lesson of, 201 - 205.
Coronado, Carolina, 160 - 174.
Dewey, Lowell Lectures, 116.
Disraeli's Amenities of Literature, 381.
Dwight, Modern Philology, 372.
Eastwick, Persia, 135.
Election of 1864, 351 - 365.
Emily Chester, 379.
Essays on Social Subjects, 381.
European Mosaic (Arnold), 134.
Forest, function and value of, 70.
France, Modern, by Kirwan, 132.
Frothingham, E. L., Key to the Philosophies, 314 - 338 — Harmony of Opposites, 316 — Law of Correspondence, 323 — of Contrariety, 325 — Philosophical Systems, 327 — Practical deductions, 336.
Gervinus, Shakespeare Commentaries, 140.
Greece, New King of, 41 - 50.
Greeks, Ancient and Modern (Count Marcellus), 130.
Grimm, Jakob and Wilhelm, 232 - 239.
Guérin, Eugénie de, 386.
Hawaii (Hopkins), 262.
Hedge, F. H. See Antisupernaturalism.
Hibbard, Religion of Childhood, 366.
Hopkins, T. M., Spots on the Sun, 251.
Hospitals, Notes on (Florence Nightingale), 286.
Hunt, W. H., his pictures, 183.
Immen-See, 136.
Inspiration, Doctrine and Theory of, 265 - 285 — Hebrew Scriptures, 267 — the Canon, 268 — Divine origin assumed, 270 — the Christian Canon, 272 — theory of Inspiration, 275 — the Divine in nature and the soul, 276 — its conditions, 280 — the Scriptures, 283.
Jarves, J. J., Art Idea, 139, 175 - 190 — Confessions of an Inquirer, 176.
Jane Cameron, 141.
Kingsley, Charles, Roman and Teuton, 121.
Kirwan, Modern France, 132.

London to John O'Groat's, 385.
Lowell, Robert, Poems, 73 - 83.
Lowell, J. R., Fireside Travels, 376.
Loyalists, American (Sabine), 259.
Lutteroth on Matthew, 368.
Maori King (New Zealand), 384.
Marcellus, Count, Ancient and Modern Greeks, 130.
Marsh, Hon. G. P., Man and Nature, 65 - 73 — desolation of the earth by men, 67 — the woods, 70 — the waters, 71 — forest of the Frische Nehrung, 72.
Merivale, Romans under the Empire, Vols. III., IV., 120.
Mill, J. S., Dissertations and Discussions, 370.
Moran on Money, 125.
Mouhot's Asiatic Travels, 373.
Neutrality, American Expositions of, 239.
New Zealand, British war in, 384.
Parker, Theodore, Character and Historical Position, 1 - 41 — (Weiss's Biography, 2 - 4) — his nature, 4 — quantity, 8 — religion, 9 — affection, 10 — moral vigor, 11 — love of truth, 12 — simplicity, 13 — moral irascibility, 15 — humor, 18 — homeliness, 20 — intellect, 21 — defect as philosopher and critic, 23 — his thought, religious and practical, 25 — wholeness of the Catholic world, 26 — divided character of modern thought, 28 — sacred and profane, 29 — science and revelation, 30 — wholeness of Parker's religious thought, 32 — a pioneer, 35 — battle with slavery, 37 — John Brown, 38 — love and duty, 40.
Pelagianism in Miss Beecher's writings, 302 — its defects, 305.
Persia (Eastwick), 135.
Philology (Dwight), 372.
Poland, Russian (Fortescue), 261.
Praed's Poems, 292 - 300.
Rawlinson's Five Monarchies, 119.
Renan's Critical Essays, 83 - 98 — science and miracle, 85 — religions of antiquity, 87 — Israelites, 89 — Critics of the Gospel history, 91 — Islam, 93 — Future of religion, 95.
Riehl, Culturstudien, 122.
Sabine, American Loyalists, 259.
Sawyer, L. A., Gospel according to Mark, 252.
Shakespeare (Gervinus), 140 — (V. Hugo), 256.
Slavery and the Bible, 191 - 200 — in Congress, 386.
Smith, Goldwin, on Hebrew Slavery, 191.
Spencer, Herbert, on the Classification of the Sciences, 388.
Stumbling-Blocks (Gail Hamilton), 141.
Tennyson, Enoch Arden, &c., 377.
Theism a tradition, 150.
Thackeray, the Humourist, &c., 381.
Thoreau, H. D., Maine Woods, 142.
Trollope, Small House at Allington, 138.
Tuckerman, H. T., America and her Commentators, 127.
Unitarianism in 1830, 212.
War, a Word on the, 109 - 116.
Webster's Dictionary, new edition, 388.
Wilson's Antislavery in Congress, 386.

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# CONTENTS.


| Art. | | Page |
|---|---|---|
| I. | Doctrine and Theory of Inspiration | 265 |
| II. | Notes on Hospitals | 286 |
| III. | Praed's Poems | 292 |
| IV. | Miss Beecher's Pelagianism | 301 |
| V. | Frothingham's Key to the Philosophies | 314 |
| VI. | The Antiquity of Man | 339 |
| VII. | The Presidential Election | 351 |
| VIII. | Review of Current Literature | 366 |

*Theology.* Hibbard's Religion of Childhood, 366. Lutteroth on Matthew, 368. — *Philosophy and Science.* Brittan's Man and his Relations, 369. Mill's Dissertations and Discussions, 370. Dwight's Modern Philology, 372. — *Geography and Travels.* Mouhot's Asiatic Travels, 373. Exodus of the Circassians, 374. Lowell's Fireside Travels, 376. — *Poetry and Fiction.* Tennyson's Enoch Arden, &c., and Browning's Dramatis Personæ, 377. Miss Prescott's Azarian, 379. Emily Chester, 379. — *Miscellaneous.* Essays on Social Subjects, 381. Thackeray, the Humourist, 381. Disraeli's Amenities of Literature, 381. Children of Lutetia, 382. Maori King, 384. London to John O'Groat's, 385. Eugénie de Guérin, 386. Wilson's Antislavery Measures in Congress, 386. Spencer's Classification of the Sciences, 388. Webster's Dictionary, 388.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| New Publications Received | | 389 |
| INDEX | | 391 |



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